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Abstract 
 
How do we explain divergent trajectories of change in wage bargaining 
institutions? The advancement of European economic integration, leading to 
markets liberalisation and increased competition, was expected to bring the 
breakdown of centralised bargaining arrangements. This expectation was even 
stronger given the internationalisation of new management practices, pushing 
European firms to enhance their competitiveness via increasing flexibility. 
Despite strong theoretical expectations towards a generalised breakdown of wage 
bargaining, one finds divergent trajectories of change across European countries 
and sectors. The task of this thesis is to explain the puzzle of varied responses in 
otherwise similar sectors. Banking and telecommunications sectors in Italy and 
Greece display a diversity of paths of institutional change: breakdown of 
bargaining, reform of bargaining, successful centralisation, and failed 
centralisation. 
 
The direction of the paths of institutional change may be explained in large part 
by two factors ignored by earlier literature: ‘employer associability’ and ‘labour-
state coalitions’. On the one hand, it is argued that employers associations which 
possess the legal competence and take into account the collective interests of both 
large and smaller firms, may reform the wage bargaining institution, getting the 
‘best of both worlds’ for their members. Additionally, a ‘labour-state coalition’ 
may moderate the destabilising pressures to wage bargaining, as long as trade 
unions are able to speak with a ‘single voice’. The government will not only be 
motivated by electoral concerns, but also support centralised bargaining to gain 
‘room for manoeuvre’ for tactical policy trade-offs advancing its agenda. Overall, 
the thesis refines earlier propositions, suggesting a more nuanced causal 
mechanism to explain institutional change. The argument speaks to wider debates 
in comparative political economy and comparative employment systems; it 
fleshes out empirically the role of the state in Mediterranean capitalism and 
highlights factors that moderate pressures to convergence to the Liberal Market 
model. 
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PASKE: Pan-Hellenic Militant Trade Union Movement of Employees 
[Πανελλήνια Αγωνιστική Συνδικαλιστική Κίνηση Εργαζοµένων] 
PASOK: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party [Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνηµα] 
  
17 
PCI: Italian Communist Party [Partito Comunista Italiano] 
PRP: Performance Related Pay Systems 
PSI: Italian Socialist Party [Partito Socialista Italiano] 
PSTN: Public Switched Telephone Network 
RSU: Unitary Workplace Representation [Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria] 
 
SATPE: Greek Licensed Telecommunication Providers Association [Σύνδεσµος 
Αδειοδοτηµένων Τηλεπικοινωνιακών Παρόχων Ελλάδος] 
SEPE: Federation of Hellenic Information and Communication Technology 
Enterprises [Σύνδεσµος Επιχειρήσεων Πληροφορικής & Επικοινωνιών 
Ελλάδας] 
SEV: Hellenic Federation of Enterprises [Σύνδεσµος Επιχειρήσεων και 
Βιοµηχανιών] 
SILCEA: Italian Trade Union of Workers in Credit [Sindacato Italiano 
Lavoratori Credito Enti Assimilati] 
SILT-CISL: Italian Trade Union of Workers in State Telephony [Sindacato 
Italiano Lavoratori Telefonici Stato] 
SINFUB: National Federation of Autonomous Trade Unions in Banks, Finance 
and Insurance [Federazione Nazionale Sindacati Autonomi – Personale di 
Credito, Finanza e Assicurazioni] 
SIP: Italian Telephone Company [Società Italiana per l'Esercizio Telefonico, 
originally Società Idroelettrica Piemontese] 
SLC-CGIL: Trade Union of Workers in Communications [Sindacato Lavoratori 
Comunicazione] 
SME: Small Medium-sized Enterprise 
SMT: Trade Union of Waged Engineers [Σύνδεσµος Μισθωτών Τεχνικών] 
SYN: Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology [Συνασπισµός της 
Αριστεράς των Κινηµάτων και της Οικολογίας] 
 
TQM: Total Quality Management 
 
UGL: General Union of Workers [Unione Generale del Lavoro] 
UIL: Italian Union of Workers [Unione Italiana del Lavoro] 
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UILCA-UIL: Italian Union of Workers in Banks and Insurance [Credito Esattorie 
e Assicurazioni] 
UILCOM-UIL: Italian Union of Workers in Communications [Unione Italiana 
Lavoratori Comunicazione] 
UILM-UIL: Italian Union of Workers in Manufacturing [Unione Italiana 
Lavoratori Metalmeccanici] 
UILTE-UIL: Italian Union of Workers in Telephony [Unione Italiana Lavoratori 
Telefonici] 
 
VoC: Varieties of Capitalism 
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Chapter 1 EU Liberalisation, Work Flexibility, and Wage 
Bargaining Institutions: Explaining Divergent Trajectories 
of Change 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The progress of European economic integration and the internationalisation of 
employee management practices were expected to have far-reaching 
consequences on national wage bargaining institutions across advanced capitalist 
countries. Responding to what is commonly perceived as the move from Fordism 
to the post-Fordist era, European firms sought to enhance their competitiveness 
by pushing for more labour flexibility. This ‘search for flexibility’ (Atkinson, 
1984; Boyer, 1988; Deakin and Reed, 2000; Freeman, 2005; Marsden, 1995; 
Streeck, 1987) would involve –among other things– the breakdown of long-
standing wage bargaining institutions along Anglo-Saxon lines. However, the 
direction of change proved to be more nuanced and differentiated than initially 
anticipated. In this thesis I examine the divergent trajectories of change in wage 
bargaining institutions. 
 
The early 1990s marked a crucial turning point for the progress of European 
integration. On the road from the Single European Act of 1986 until the 
completion of the Single Market in 1992 the focus of rules harmonisation within 
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the European Union shifted from traditional industries towards utilities and 
services. The European Commission held that distortions in competition could 
come from sectors providing a backbone to economic activity. Therefore 
‘network sectors’ such as telecommunications, financial services, transportation 
(railways, shipping, airlines), and energy (electricity, gas) became part of the 
agenda of EU liberalisation (Begg and El-Agraa, 2004; Mercado et al., 2000:101; 
Young, 2005:109). Notably, legislation over the single market required the 
liberalisation of state monopolies, but it did not require a change in the ownership 
of state firms (Featherstone, 2005:232). Nevertheless, national governments 
across Europe launched a series of privatisation programmes reducing the extent 
of public ownership in these sectors. 
 
The twin processes of liberalisation and privatisation marked the withdrawal of 
the state from direct regulation and ownership of those sectors. Regulation was 
delegated to independent regulatory authorities, and ownership transferred to 
private actors. These processes were expected to have a ‘domino effect’ on 
national wage bargaining institutions leading to a generalised decentralisation of 
bargaining (Crouch, 2000a; Dolvik, 2004; Wallerstein, 1998). Although the 
‘convergence’ of wage bargaining arrangements was not a preoccupation of the 
EU-level negotiations for the Economic and Monetary Union (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999:785), the expectation was based on several grounds. The 
opening up of these markets to competition was thought that it weakened the 
incentive for cost-standardisation from the part of the firms. The process of 
privatisation was expected to modernise the internal work organisation of the 
firms, introducing new and more flexible management practices, thus 
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transforming bureaucratic organisations into competitive firms. Overall, the 
pressures from EU liberalisation and international diffusion of work flexibility 
were the implicit forces putting pressure for institutional convergence to the 
Liberal market model of decentralised industrial relations. 
 
Despite the above strong pressures, a uniform trend towards decentralised pay 
setting is not observed in Europe (Wallerstein et al., 1997). Indeed, there is a 
drive towards breakdown of wage bargaining in some sectors, but this is mostly 
observed within Anglo-Saxon countries (Brown and Walsh, 1991; Wallerstein, 
1998). This contrasts sharply with sectors in Continental Europe, which opted for 
a reform of wage bargaining institutions. 
 
How do we explain the different trajectories of change in wage bargaining 
institutions, despite the common pressures from liberalisation and flexibility? 
More specifically, why do we see a breakdown of bargaining arrangements in 
some sectors, whereas in other similar sectors there is a reformation of wage 
bargaining institutions? Even more, how do we explain the successful efforts to 
centralise bargaining in some sectors, while other similar sectors centralisation 
fails and they remain decentralised? The aim of this thesis is to refine earlier 
theoretical conjectures, by explaining the puzzle of divergent trajectories of 
institutional change in wage bargaining. The thesis develops a novel conceptual 
framework based on actors’ coalitions to explain the dynamics of change in wage 
bargaining institutions. More specifically, I focus on the interactions between 
employers associations, trade unions organisations, and governments, and their 
coalitional strategies. The relevance of the argument is suggested by four case 
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studies from liberalised and privatised sectors within the Mediterranean model of 
capitalism (on case selection criteria see Section 1.5). 
 
The focus on Southern Europe is justified on the basis of received wisdom from 
the scholarship on different varieties of capitalism (Albert, 1993; Amable, 2003; 
Berger and Dore, 1996; Crouch, 2005a; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Dore, 2000; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancké et al., 2007; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; 
Kitschelt et al., 1999; Schmidt, 2002; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). This burgeoning 
literature suggested that the institutional configuration of European countries 
differs markedly. Each county approximates a different model of capitalism, 
having distinct modes of coordination and different ‘interlock’ of institutions. 
Most notably the Anglo-Saxon Liberal Market Economies and the Coordinated 
Market Economies in Continental Europe are considered as the more ‘coherent’ 
models of capitalism with institutional complementarities that keep the 
institutional pieces tightly together. In contrast, the Mediterranean model of 
capitalism (also termed as Mixed Market Economies)  (Amable, 2003; Hancké et 
al., 2007; Molina and Rhodes, 2007; Schmidt, 2008) is characterised by 
‘incoherence’ and weak or inexistent institutional complementarities. Thus, the 
pressures from liberalisation, intensification of competition, and increased 
flexibility are expected to alter the institutional arrangements within the 
Mediterranean model countries. They are generally considered as more 
susceptible to institutional change (Hall and Thelen, 2009:26) and more 
vulnerable to convergence to the Liberal Market model (Amable, 2009:20). 
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The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. The next section 
discusses the puzzle of divergent paths in wage bargaining change placing it in 
the wider debate of institutional change across advanced capitalist countries. The 
third section briefly reviews the sources of the pressures for convergence in wage 
bargaining institutions and criticises the blind spots of earlier theoretical 
conjectures. The fourth section previews the conceptual contribution of the thesis, 
outlining a coalitional approach to wage bargaining change. The fifth section 
considers the research design of the thesis and related methodological issues. The 
final section concludes with an overview of thesis’ chapters. 
 
1.2. The Puzzle: Divergent Trajectories of Change in Wage Bargaining 
Institutions across Europe 
 
One of the central research questions in the debate around varieties of capitalism 
has been whether countries are becoming institutionally more similar over time. 
This process of greater institutional similarity has been typically understood as 
convergence to the Liberal Market model of capitalism. Indeed, several scholars 
from different disciplinary fields predicted that convergence to a single model of 
capitalism was inevitable (Albert, 1993; Strange, 1997) and  the prime driver of 
change was the ‘stateless enterprise’ which adopts whatever best practice confers 
comparative advantage in a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1989; Womack and 
Jones, 1994). These convergence theorists were challenged by scholars in the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ strand, who argued that diversity persisted among 
advanced capitalist countries and comparative advantage was embedded on 
institutional distinctiveness (Dore et al., 1999; Soskice, 1999; Streeck, 1996). 
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Indeed, according to Crouch (Crouch, 2005b:439) one of the main 
accomplishments of the varieties of capitalism literature is that it provided an 
‘intellectual counterweight to easy arguments about globalisation’. 
 
In any model of capitalism, the industrial relations sphere occupies a central place 
in the overall institutional configuration. In this sphere, the market pressures push 
for convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model of decentralised bargaining. The 
experience of collapse of centralised wage bargaining institutions in various 
sectors of Liberal Market Economies (LME) during the 1980s was interpreted as 
a glimpse of the future for the rest of the advanced industrialised world (Katz, 
1993). Product market liberalisation was unambiguously followed by wage 
bargaining decentralisation. Even the countries with strong corporatist 
institutions, such as Sweden, did not seem to be able to evade this trend of 
convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model (Pontusson and Swenson, 1996). As a 
result a large body of research in US and UK (Kapstein, 1996; Katz, 1993; 
Mueller and Purcell, 1992; Reder and Ulman, 1993) suggested that a generalised 
pull for convergence towards the Liberal market model would occur in wage 
bargaining institutions of advanced capitalist countries. 
 
Yet, empirical reality defied strong theoretical expectations and centralised wage 
bargaining arrangements proved to be much more resilient than a large body of 
literature assumed. Wallerstein et al. (1997) showed that wage bargaining 
institutions in Northern and Central Europe proved to be resilient at least until the 
late 1990s. Even more, the second chapter of this thesis uses novel empirical data 
to show that the expectation for a generalised decentralisation is barely observed 
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across EU15
1
 up until the late 2000s. Instead, the trajectories of change across EU 
countries are divergent, which presents us with an intriguing empirical puzzle 
with a wider relevance. 
 
The growing body of work around varieties of capitalism offers a few insights to 
partly explain those divergent trajectories of change. Continental European 
countries were considered as part of Coordinated Market Economies; in which 
certain institutions ‘clustered together’ and produced increasing returns derived 
from ‘institutional complementarities’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001:17). As a result 
complete breakdown of wage bargaining was avoided, because decentralisation 
would likely jeopardise the provision of collective goods (such as skill-formation) 
or because new production strategies have increased employers’ dependence on 
social peace (Thelen, 2000; Thelen and Van Wijnbergen, 2003). 
  
Instead of an outright decentralisation of the Anglo-Saxon type, liberalisation of 
industrial relations was resisted and in the greater part of Continental Europe the 
response of unions and employers was an ‘organised’ reform of wage bargaining 
institutions (Crouch, 2000a). In this case the sectoral-level bargaining was 
retained, but firm level bargaining increased in relative importance. The sectoral 
level was kept to set minima in wages and working conditions across a sector, 
while more (and more substantial) issues (e.g. working time) were deferred to the 
firm level, so as to promote flexibility and better suit the needs of individual 
enterprises. This type of change was dubbed as ‘organised decentralisation’ 
                                                 
1
 EU15 refers to the group of ‘old member-states’ before the 2004 enlargement: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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(Crouch, 2000a; Traxler, 1995:7). However, this term was little more than an 
observation and certainly fell short of explaining this counter-trend. As Thelen 
(2010:189-192) notes, these developments still pose a challenge for conventional 
wisdom in the literature. 
 
While the VoC insights on institutional complementarities offer a start for an 
explanation for the resilience of wage bargaining institutions in Continental 
Europe, they leave wanting an explanation for the survival of wage bargaining 
arrangements in Mediterranean capitalism. In the latter ‘complementarities’ of the 
CME type are weak or absent, organised interests are not ‘encompassing’ enough 
to ensure provision of collective goods (Molina and Rhodes, 2007), and industrial 
conflict is endemic (Visser, 2002).  
 
Thus, one would expect that when Mediterranean model countries experience the 
process of liberalisation in a given product market, wage bargaining will face 
severe destabilising pressures, following a path of institutional convergence 
towards the Liberal Market model. The lack of complementarities will not hold 
the institutional arrangements intact. Nevertheless, this development is not 
uniformly observed, and this still poses a challenge for earlier conjectures. Before 
advancing a novel conceptual framework to explain the dynamics of change in 
wage bargaining, I will first turn to the received wisdom in the literature outlining 
the pressures associated with a breakdown of wage bargaining institutions. 
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1.3. The Conceptual Frame: Pressures to Wage Bargaining Institutions 
from Liberalisation and Flexibility 
 
The received wisdom on wage bargaining change can perhaps be grouped in two 
hypotheses, which highlight the changed business preferences vis-à-vis wage 
bargaining institutions. The first hypothesis could be termed ‘the liberalisation 
hypothesis’. The emphasis here is on the external and increasingly competitive 
business environment that firms face, and how this alters their preferences. In 
relatively closed and protected product markets, oligopolistic firms preferred to 
‘take the wages out of competition’ (Marginson et al., 2003; Swenson, 1989) 
through sectoral wage bargaining. But the increased integration of product 
markets ‘weakens this logic’ (Marginson et al., 2003:165) and firms’ incentives 
to bargain with trade unions are reduced, thus favouring abandonment of sectoral 
bargaining (Reder and Ulman, 1993; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). 
 
The second hypothesis entails a more diverse list of factors, which could be 
dubbed ‘the flexibility hypothesis’. This includes the adoption of new flexible 
work organisation inside firms in response to technological changes (Katz, 
1993:14-15; Pontusson and Swenson, 1996:235; Wallerstein and Golden, 
1997:700-701) as well as the need to link closely pay with individual 
performance (Brown and Walsh, 1991:51-53; Iversen, 1996:406-407; Pontusson 
and Swenson, 1996:236-237). The more general point is that the model of a firm 
based on Fordist mass production with ‘internal labour markets’ is gradually 
diminishing. Internal labour markets entailed permanent employees with fixed 
and stable wages, who carried out simple tasks and responsibilities in the division 
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of labour, and their management was based on strict hierarchies (Grimshaw et al., 
2001). Instead, the post-Fordist era includes a move to ‘lean and mean’ 
organisation of production, with increased pay flexibility, need for employees 
with polyvalent skills, and a flatter job classification system. The common 
implication from all these changes is that the detailed specification of wage levels 
and working conditions in sectoral wage agreements inhibits ‘flexibility’. 
Therefore, business preferences change towards favouring decentralisation of 
bargaining. 
 
There are good reasons to doubt a priori the plausibility of the above hypotheses, 
not least because they are focused solely on business needs. While they describe 
well the triggers that may change individual firms’ preferences, they do suffer 
from the weaknesses of functionalism. They assume a simplistic causal chain 
between changing needs and changing institutions, and are likely to miss crucial 
mediating factors that may moderate pressures or may transform the nature and 
direction of institutional change. Firms are portrayed as automatically pursuing a 
single-best strategy that serves their interests irrespective of place and context. 
This conception misses the point that firms are creative and adaptive rational 
actors (Streeck, 1997) and their responses are far from mechanical. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical developments proved to be inconsistent with the 
expectations of the above hypotheses. As mentioned above, there is no trend 
towards generalised breakdown of centralised bargaining across EU15, despite 
the apparent pressures from liberalisation and flexibility. Instead the trend across 
Europe is characterised by divergent trajectories of change. In some countries 
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there is indeed decentralisation, in others stability of wage bargaining level, and 
in some others a trend towards centralisation. To put it in other words, while the 
scope conditions of liberalisation and flexibility are present in a wide range 
European capitalist countries, the outcome of breakdown of wage bargaining 
appears only in a handful of Anglo-Saxon cases (cf. Wallerstein, 1998:201). As a 
corollary, there is a lack of a conceptual framework to understand these divergent 
trajectories of change. Therefore, the task of this thesis is to develop an 
alternative approach, which could account for the divergent trajectories of 
institutional change in wage bargaining. The next section previews the argument 
of the thesis. 
 
1.4. Preview of the Argument: A Coalitional Perspective on Change of 
Wage Bargaining Institutions 
 
I argue that the factors pinpointed by earlier hypotheses may constitute triggers of 
preference change for individual firms; however, they alone are not sufficient to 
bring institutional breakdown (i.e. decentralisation of bargaining). In other words, 
these pressures provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for the breakup of 
wage bargaining institutions. Instead, the way that these pressures will play out 
depends on the coalitions that the relevant actors will be able to form. A 
coalitional approach to wage bargaining change suggests that there are two 
crucial mediating conditions –ignored by earlier literature- that may moderate or 
block the pressures towards abandonment of wage bargaining institutions: 
employer associability and labour-state coalitions. 
 
  
30 
1.4.1. Employer Associability: A Coalition of Small and Large Firms 
 
The first factor that was neglected by the earlier literature was the role that 
employers associations may play vis-à-vis wage bargaining change. Drawing on 
the literature on business associations (Doner and Schneider, 2000; Schmitter and 
Streeck, 1999; Traxler, 2001) I argue that employers associability is likely to be a 
mediating factor between individual firms preferences and institutional outcomes. 
Employer associability is a wider concept than just an employer association. It 
not only means that an association possess the legal competence to represent the 
members’ interests in labour relations (as an employer association), but also the 
internal representation process is balanced so that decision making does not result 
in a skewed representation towards one or another group of members. Therefore, 
employer associability is missing in two occasions: (i) when an association does 
not have the legal competence to represent firms on labour relations (i.e. is just a 
trade association representing narrow interests) and (ii) when representation is 
skewed towards one category of firms in the sector (e.g. large firms vs. small 
firms). 
 
Following from the above, the first hypothesis is that if employer associability 
exists, then destabilising pressures in wage bargaining are likely to be moderated. 
Drawing on insights offered by Schmitter and Streeck (1999:13) ‘collective 
interest associations’ are in a better position than individual firms to appreciate 
and protect the long-run interests of their membership, even if this requires to 
enforce their decisions upon reluctant or resisting members. But given the new 
competitive environment, an employer association will also recognise its 
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members’ needs for greater flexibility. Therefore, it is likely to strike a 
compromise getting ‘the best of both worlds’ for its members by reforming the 
wage bargaining institution. The sectoral wage agreement would set a level-
playing field with minimum standards across the sector, lowering drastically 
transaction costs and ripping off the benefits from social peace. At the same time, 
issues regarding more pay and work organisation flexibility can be deferred to the 
firm level. The first research hypothesis follows from the above analysis: 
 
Hypothesis I: Whilst pressures from liberalisation and flexibility may act as 
triggers changing individual firms’ preferences towards abandoning centralised 
bargaining, the presence of ‘employer associability’ will likely moderate 
destabilising pressures and lead to a  reform of  the institution. 
 
1.4.2. Labour-State Coalition: Labour Unity and Government Agenda 
 
In addition to employer associability, there is another mediating factor that has 
been neglected by earlier literature and may temper the pressures towards the 
abandonment of wage bargaining institutions: labour-state coalitions. Admittedly, 
there is a long literature documenting and explaining the decline in trade unions’ 
membership across advanced industrialised countries (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 
1999; Freeman, 1995; Western, 1995). This picture of union power decline 
enhanced the expectation for a generalised breakdown of wage bargaining 
arrangements. However, trade union power should not only be conceptualised in 
terms of membership, but also in unions’ ability to invite the government to 
intervene (Rees, 1989:35). Especially in the Mediterranean model of capitalism, 
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trade unions have developed clientelistic and particularistic relationships with 
political parties, investing in ‘political power’ (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 
2008; Molina and Rhodes, 2007). But more generally, the importance of the role 
of the state in steering social bargaining across Europe was highlighted by a large 
literature on social pacts (Crouch, 2000a; Rhodes, 2001; Schmitter and Grote, 
1997). I borrow from this literature the insight that bargaining is likely to take 
place in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ namely the shadow of the state. Subsequent 
accounts of social pacts and welfare reform fleshed out the causal mechanism that 
links the motivation of state steering social partners’ bargaining, pinpointing the 
role of party politics and electoral pressures (Green-Pedersen, 2003; Hamann and 
Kelly, 2007). The above insights support a priori the plausibility of the 
hypothesis that the institution of wage bargaining may not only rest on a ‘cross-
class’ coalition as  Swenson (1989:34) suggested, but also on a ‘labour-state’ 
coalition. 
 
Indeed, in the context of steep union membership decline, I argue that organised 
labour is unlikely to be able to stem alone the employers’ challenge to centralised 
bargaining. Still, if labour steers the interest of the government, it may hinge on 
its coercive (and persuasive) power and forge a labour-state coalition. Thus, an 
institutional arrangement may be enforced to resisting individual firms. There are, 
however, two important conditions. First, labour should be able to speak with a 
‘single voice’ irrespective of the decline in membership or the organisational 
structure of trade unionism. This denotes the interest representation on the side of 
labour. Second, union members’ vote should be significant for the party in 
government; and retaining wage bargaining institutions should be congruent with 
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tactical policy trade-offs in the rest of the government’s agenda. Therefore, a 
labour-state coalition cannot be forged in two occasions: (i) if labour is divided 
and cannot unite to pursue or defend centralised bargaining or (ii) if electoral 
pressures are weak and priorities in government agenda clash with the support of 
wage bargaining institution. The above analysis results in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis II: Whilst pressures from liberalisation and flexibility may act as 
triggers changing individual firms’ preferences towards abandoning centralised 
bargaining, the presence of a ‘labour-state’ coalition will likely moderate 
destabilising pressures and lead to a survival of  the institution. 
 
In a nutshell, the above hypotheses refine the earlier conjectures by introducing 
two factors (employer associability and labour-state coalitions). Both factors 
allude to the coalitions of domestic actors that may transform the direction of 
institutional change. To use quantitative terminology the hypotheses suggest two 
‘intervening variables’ which mediate the relationship between the ‘dependent 
variable’ (wage bargaining agreements) and the ‘independent’ variables’ 
(liberalisation and flexibility). The next section considers the overall research 
design of the thesis. 
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1.5. Research Design 
1.5.1. Case Selection Criteria 
 
The thesis suggests the plausibility of the hypotheses applying them to explain 
four ‘most likely’ (Eckstein, 1975; George and Bennett, 2005) sectoral case 
studies: Greek banking, Italian banking, Italian telecommunications, and Greek 
telecommunications, which are arranged in matched pairs.  
 
There are several reasons that justify lowering the unit of analysis from national 
level to sub-national level. First, the composite indicators of national wage 
bargaining centralization (used in the second chapter) are not suitable for the 
research question and can only document trends over time. National level 
institutions change very slowly over time, and thus the analysis is better off 
locating those ‘rare events’ of significant and abrupt institutional change. 
Thereby, one can inquire the motives and interactions between actors via in depth 
sectoral case studies. By contrast, the composite indicators would tend to identify 
stability even in cases where the change is subtle, as in the case of reform of 
wage bargaining towards ‘organised decentralisation’. Despite the actual change 
in the relative importance between levels of bargaining, the composite indicators 
would still count the same level of centralisation. 
 
In addition, all four cases exhibit the scope conditions of earlier theories, namely 
they are liberalised sectors in which competition intensified, and the privatisation 
accelerated the diffusion of flexibility in work organisation. Thus, the pressures 
for destabilisation appeared strong and their convergence to decentralised 
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bargaining was ‘most likely’. Although their starting points differ (in banking 
sectors the starting point is sectoral bargaining, whereas in telecoms the starting 
point is firm level bargaining); still, the expectation was that all of them will 
converge to the LME decentralised bargaining structure.  
 
Simultaneously, the wider institutional context of the countries strengthens this 
research expectation. Italy and Greece belong to the Mediterranean model of 
capitalism, which is also ‘most-likely’ for institutional convergence to the Liberal 
Market model. On the one hand, these cases are institutionally incoherent; unlike 
CMEs, wage bargaining is not part of strong institutional complementarities that 
keep the system together. On the other hand, both cases share similar traditions of 
extensive state ownership in the economy and state involvement in the industrial 
relations realm (Baccaro and Pulignano, 2011; Ioannou, 2010). This ‘controls’ for 
substantial differences in national-level institutions. Indeed, as Culpepper (2005a) 
argues, this research strategy may help holding constant a number of pertinent 
explanatory variables, such as differences in national-level institutions and state 
traditions. 
 
In spite of the strong expectation for a common trajectory of change, we observe 
that the paths of institutional change diverge. On the one hand, there is survival 
and reform of sectoral wage bargaining in Italian banking, whereas there is a 
breakdown of sectoral wage bargaining in Greek banking. On the other hand, 
there is a successful centralisation of bargaining in Italian telecoms and there is a 
failure to centralise bargaining in Greek telecoms, which remains decentralised.  
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Hence, the cases are also matched on pairs following the most similar 
systems/different outcomes comparative design (Collier, 1993; Mahoney, 2004; 
Przeworski and Teune, 1970). The dependent variable is binary, i.e. the presence 
(or absence) of a sectoral wage agreement. Extreme selection bias is avoided 
because case selection allows ‘for at least some variation on the dependent 
variable’ (King et al., 1994:129). The different timing of the case studies is 
determined by the difference in the timing of the processes of liberalisation and 
privatisation, and accordingly, the different times that the destabilising pressures 
appeared. In Italian banking and telecoms the pressures appeared around the late 
1990s, whereas in Greek banking and telecoms around the mid 2000s. 
 
More generally, the ‘universe of cases’ (Ragin, 2004) comprises of liberalised 
and privatised sectors in Southern Europe. There is a clear EU regulatory impact 
on these sectors, since they have been liberalised in the 1990s and the state 
withdrew from their regulation. Second, these sectors shared a tradition of state 
ownership, while privatisation signified the withdrawal of the state during the 
1990s. Following from their privatisation, these sectors underwent intensive 
restructuring and work organisation flexibility was introduced. The second half of 
the third chapter examines these systemic pressures in more detail. 
 
1.5.2. Data Collection Method 
 
The data for the case studies were collected via interviews with key informants. 
Elite interviewing was chosen as the most appropriate data collection method to 
answer a research question that seeks to trace the process of change and unveil 
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actors’ motivation (George and Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2006). The key informants 
included representatives from sectoral and national trade union organisations, 
representatives from sectoral business associations, representatives of 
governmental political parties, as well as experts who had deep and intimate 
knowledge of the developments in those sectors. The typical length of interviews 
was about one hour, ranging from a minimum of thirty minutes to a maximum of 
two and a half hours. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded (unless the 
informants preferred not to) with a commitment not to attribute quotes and to 
respect confidentiality. The discussion was based on a semi-structured interview 
protocol with open questions. 
 
Interviewing is a research technique that has clear strengths with respect to 
unearthing original empirical detail, which is usually possessed by few 
informants in key positions. It is especially well suited to garner evidence 
pertaining to actors’ strategies and motivations. Still, interviewing is also a 
technique with weaknesses, which were also considered in the research design 
stage and there was an effort to minimise those weaknesses. Notably, the validity 
and credibility of informants’ insights was cross-checked via triangulation 
(Denscombe, 2007:201) of the information either with other informants and/or 
with other primary and secondary sources. Hence, the case studies also rely on 
several sources including inter alia: press releases and official announcements, 
wage bargaining agreements, newspaper articles, and expert reports on sectoral 
developments. If the informants’ insights were judged to be debatable and were 
not confirmed by other sources, those pieces of evidence were dropped. Finally, 
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the total number of interviews was 28. The final section outlines the structure of 
the thesis’ chapters. 
 
1.6. Outline of the Thesis 
 
The next chapter starts by reviewing the scholarly works dealing with 
institutional change across and within varieties of capitalism, and then examines 
the more specific works on wage bargaining institutions. Those works lie at the 
intersection of comparative political economy and comparative employment 
systems literatures.2 The works on wage bargaining institutions are reviewed with 
two questions in mind: (i) what are the benefits that actors perceived to get from 
sectoral wage bargaining institutions in the Fordist era?; and (ii) how do the post-
industrial pressures towards destabilisation of those institutions manifest 
themselves? Thus, the chapter elaborates on the causal mechanisms behind the 
liberalisation and the flexibility hypotheses. The hypotheses are then criticised on 
theoretical grounds and this outlines the conceptual lacuna that this thesis seeks to 
fill. The rest of the chapter examines empirical data on national level wage 
bargaining trends across Europe since the 1990s. The central finding is that 
despite the liberalisation of markets and introduction of flexibility across EU15, 
wage bargaining centralisation followed divergent trajectories of change. This 
                                                 
2
 On the one hand, comparative political economy is a strand of literature that has its roots on 
comparative politics, for an overview see Gamble (1995:525-527) and Hall (1997). On the other 
hand, comparative employment systems examine both the institutional context of industrial 
relations and human resources practices within firms; for example see Dore (1996) or Katz and 
Darbishire (2000). Although there were earlier attempts to bridge the two fields (e.g. Wever and 
Turner, 1995), the two literatures started talking to each other more intensely after the publication 
of the Hall and Soskice (2001) varieties of capitalism theory. This thesis lies at the intersection of 
those fields. 
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strengthens the empirical puzzle of the thesis and suggests the broader relevance 
of the research question. 
 
The third chapter presents a novel coalitional approach to wage bargaining 
change. Coalitional approaches have already been used in comparative political 
economy to examine institutional change. Notwithstanding, a coalitional 
perspective has not been applied (to the best of my knowledge) to explain the 
dynamics of change in wage bargaining institutions up until now. The core 
insight of the thesis suggests that although structural factors of liberalisation and 
flexibility pull towards a generalised breakdown of centralised bargaining, the 
particular trajectory of change will be determined by the coalitions of collective 
actors. Thereby, employer associability and a ‘labour-state coalition’ are 
presented as crucial mediating factors explaining divergent trajectories of change. 
The logic of the hypotheses is set out via synthesising and cross-borrowing 
insights from related literatures on business associations and state’s role in social 
pacts. This strengthens their ex ante plausibility, before getting to the empirical 
evidence. The second part of the chapter examines the systemic pressures across 
European banking and telecommunications sectors. Both sectors have felt the 
European regulatory impact with an opening up of those markets and 
intensification of competition. At the same time, the international diffusion of 
flexible working practices had an impact on the internal work organisation of 
firms in those sectors. 
 
The fourth chapter starts with an in-depth examination of labour politics in the 
Greek banking sector. It begins with an overview of the Greek industrial relations 
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system since the 1980s, introducing the main actors and setting the institutional 
context at the national level. Then it briefly examines the banking sector under 
state ownership until the late 1980s, before turning to the processes of 
liberalisation and privatisation that mainly took place during the 1990s. It is 
shown that the two processes facilitated the increase in competition within the 
market. The opening up allowed the entrance of foreign banks, accelerated 
mergers and acquisitions, and intensified competitive pressures. In addition, the 
privatisation process accelerated the modernisation of banks with introduction of 
new technologies and new management practices towards working time and pay 
flexibility. The purpose of those sections is to pin down the presence of strong 
destabilising pressures towards abandonment of wage bargaining institutions. 
Then the chapter turns to the wage bargaining rounds in the 2000s paying close 
attention to the interactions between the three major actors and their underlying 
motives. The wage bargaining institution survives until the mid 2000s, but broke 
down in the late 2000s. This ‘within-case variation’ is explained by the the 
presence or absence of a labour-state coalition. 
 
The fifth chapter turns to the Italian banking sector, which provides a sharp 
contrast to the Greek case. In Italian banking sectoral wage bargaining did not 
break down, but was reformed to meet new needs. The chapter begins with an 
overview of the Italian industrial relations system since the 1980s and introduces 
the main actors at the national level. Then it examines the banking sector under 
state ownership, before turning to the processes of liberalisation and privatisation 
of the system during the 1990s. Afterwards, the chapter sketches the pervasisve 
introduction of flexible working practices in banks. The purpose of those sections 
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is to show that the destabilising pressures towards wage bargaining institutions 
were strong. However, this outcome did materialise. The account of wage 
bargaining rounds in the late 1990s shows that the trajectory of reform of the 
wage bargaining system towards ‘organised decentralisation’ was facilitated by 
employer associability and a labour-state coalition.  
 
The sixth chapter shifts the focus to the Italian telecommunications sector, where 
wage bargaining is centralised from firm level to sectoral level. It briefly reviews 
the sector under state ownership until the late 1980s and then turns to the 
liberalisation and privatisation of the system during the 1990s. Afterwards, it 
presents the penetration of flexible working practices during the 1990s in both the 
privatised Telecom Italia and new telecom operators. The purpose of those 
sections is again to pin down the strong expectation towards a decentralised wage 
bargaining structure. The account of wage bargaining rounds in the early 2000s 
pays close attention to the interactions between the three major actors: employers, 
labour and the state. The role of the state in supporting the institution of wage 
bargaining appears more vividly in the mid 2000s when call-centre firms resist 
their inclusion under the remit of the sectoral agreement. Overall, the case study 
shows that the centralisation of wage bargaining solidified due to employer 
associability and a labour-state coalition. 
 
The seventh chapter examines the Greek telecommunications sector, where wage 
bargaining remains decentralised at firm level (inertia) despite the effort to 
centralise it as in the Italian case. It briefly reviews the sector under state 
ownership until the late 1980s and then turns to the liberalisation and privatisation 
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of the system during the 1990s. Afterwards, it presents the penetration of flexible 
working practices during the 1990s and early 2000s.  Those sections pin down the 
strong pressures that militated against a centralised wage bargaining arrangement. 
However, the chapter refines earlier theories showing that the decentralised 
bargaining structure is explained, because the stronger union in the sector was 
simply not interested in such a strategy and was focused on pursuing narrow 
interests. Additionally, firms’ associations were narrow representing only product 
market interests, while labour was organisationally and ideologically divided and 
the conditions to forge a coalition with the state for centralisation of bargaining 
were missing. 
 
The final chapter brings everything together by reviewing the main argument and 
summarising the central empirical findings. Thus, the conceptual and empirical 
contributions of the thesis are clearly set out. The chapter also gauges the wider 
applicability of the argument and outlines how it can be tested to further cases. 
Moreover, the implications of the argument and empirical findings for broader 
academic debates in comparative political economy and comparative employment 
systems is discussed. In comparative political economy, the thesis contributes to 
fleshing out empirically the role of the state in shaping institutional change within 
the Mediterranean model of capitalism. More generally, the cases suggest that 
divergent trajectories of institutional change are possible even within cases 
belonging to the same model of Mediterranean capitalism. Finally, the 
implications for comparative employment systems literature are discussed. The 
findings of the thesis corroborate other works’ findings that despite 
internationalisation of flexible working practices, this does not lead to 
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institutional convergence across countries. Instead, the diffusion and introduction 
of ‘flexible’ practices is mediated by domestic actors and their coalitions. Finally, 
the last section concludes by discussing the prospects for institutionl change in 
the context of the current crisis and the role of wage bargaining institutions in 
those economies. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining: 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Puzzle 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I will review the broader debate of 
institutional change within varieties of capitalism, and then I will turn to the more 
middle-range theoretical conjectures on wage bargaining, which expected the 
generalised breakdown of centralised wage bargaining and its convergence to the 
Liberal Market model. Second, I will examine empirically the destabilising 
pressures across Europe, and then look at national level data on wage bargaining 
centralisation across the EU15. Thus, I will enhance the empirical underpinnings 
of the empirical puzzle: despite liberalisation and flexibility, centralised 
bargaining in Europe took divergent trajectories of change. 
 
The distinction between background theory and focal theory is useful here. 
Following Phillips and Pugh (2005:57-58), backround theory refers to the wider 
field of study in which a thesis is placed, whereas focal theory refers to the 
narrower set of hypotheses, which relate to the precise topic of analysis. Thus, the 
debates on institutional change within varieties of capitalism provide the 
background theory of the thesis, while the middle range propositions on wage 
bargaining provide the focal theory of the thesis. 
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The link between the two is that the industrial relations system is one of the five
3
 
central institutional spheres for varieties of capitalism models (Hall and Soskice, 
2001:22-33). In the stylised picture of Liberal Market Economies, wage 
bargaining is decentralised at the firm level and organised interests behave as 
‘narrow interests’ unable to provide collective goods. In the stylised picture of 
Coordinated Market Economies, wage bargaining is centralised at the sector-level 
and firm level bargaining is a complementary second-level of bargaining, while 
labour and business act as ‘encompassing interests’ providing collective goods. 
Finally, in the Mediterranean model of capitalism (or Mixed Market Economies) 
the institutional arrangement is more of a hybrid: bargaining tends to be 
centralised, however, organised interests are not encompassing enough to ensure 
the provision of collective goods (Almond, 2011; Molina and Rhodes, 2007). As 
a consequence, a move from centralised (sector level) to decentralised (firm level) 
bargaining would be indicative of convergence to Liberal market model of 
decentralised industrial relations (Marginson and Sisson, 2002:671; Pérez, 2000; 
Traxler, 1996:282). However, these stylised pictures exhaust the usefulness of the 
–admittedly– highly abstract capitalist ideal types. 
 
Indeed, scholarship has moved further, examining the dynamics of change in 
specific institutions, rather than merely constructing static typologies of 
capitalism. Although there is a sizeable body of literature on the dynamics of 
change in institutional spheres such as the corporate governance/financial system 
                                                 
3
 The other institutional spheres are: the corporate governance or financial system, the education 
and training system, the internal structure of the firm, and the structure of inter-company relations. 
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(for instance see Cioffi and Höpner, 2006; Culpepper, 2007; Deeg, 2005), our 
understanding of institutional change in wage bargaining has lagged behind. 
Therefore, one of the primary aims of the thesis is to fill this gap, by developing a 
coalitional approach to understand the dynamics of change in wage bargaining 
institutions. Still, if one wants to explain specific changes in this institution, one 
has to lower the level of abstraction and turn to more middle-range theoretical 
propositions on wage bargaining. These insights dwell either on the comparative 
political economy or the comparative employment systems literatures. 
 
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows. The next section starts with a 
brief review of the recent debates around institutional change across varieties of 
capitalism. The third section delves into the wage bargaining literature and 
elaborates on the causal mechanism expecting pressures to wage bargaining 
institutions due to liberalisation and flexibility. The review is guided by two main 
questions: (i) what are the benefits that actors perceived to get from sectoral wage 
bargaining institutions in the Fordist era?; and (ii) how do the post-industrial 
pressures towards destabilisation of those institutions manifest themselves? This 
part concludes with an ex ante critique of earlier theoretical conjectures 
identifying blind spots and outlining the gap to be filled. The second part of the 
chapter seeks to strengthen the empirical underpinnings of the thesis’ puzzle. It 
shows that although liberalisation and flexibility appeared as pressures across 
EU15, yet, wage bargaining centralisation took divergent trajectories of change. 
Thus, it suggests the relevance of the research question for a wider set of 
countries. 
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2.2. Institutional Change Between and Within Advanced Capitalist 
Countries 
2.2.1. Convergence and Divergence across Capitalisms 
 
The debate between theorists expecting a convergence of advanced capitalist 
countries to a single model, and others maintaining that there is persisting 
diversity is not recent. It can be traced back to the works of the ‘Harvard team’ of 
institutional labour economists, who set out to refute the Marxian predictions of 
an inevitable self-destruction of capitalism. After completing a seminal 
comparative study of trade unionism across US and Western Europe, Clark Kerr, 
John Dunlop and their colleagues (1960) claimed that advanced capitalist 
countries are likely to converge to a single model of ‘pluralistic industrialism’; in 
which trade unions’ militancy would be reduced, as the labour movements 
matured and the economy developed shifting from the agrarian sector to 
industrial production. Unlike Marx’s idea that trade unions would become 
‘schools of war’ to overthrow capitalism, Kerr et al. (1960) suggested that trade 
unions would become embedded into the mode of production and transformed 
into forces of stability for the capitalist system. 
 
The argument of convergence towards ‘pluralistic industrialism’ was picked up 
several years later by a team of political economists under the auspices of 
Oxford’s John Goldthorpe. They challenged the Kerr et al. argument of 
convergence to pluralistic industrialism, highlighting the divergent responses of 
the United States and European countries towards the stagflation crisis of the 
1970s  (Goldthorpe, 1984). Notably, they emphasised that trade unions were 
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differently embedded into the capitalist system across countries. Accordingly, the 
responses of different countries to the crisis of the 1970s differed, with Western 
Europe pursuing corporatist incomes policies, whereas Anglo-Saxon countries 
using monetary policy tools. 
 
The convergence argument reappeared in the 1990s under the guise of the wider 
globalisation debate. A series of popular and polemical works led the discussion; 
putting forward the proposition that – in the context of globalisation – different 
models of capitalism would be subject to pressures, which will force countries to 
converge to the Anglo-Saxon model (Albert, 1993). This expectation was shared 
by scholars from different disciplinary fields.  For instance, international political 
economy (IPE) scholars recognised the potential for clash between different 
models of capitalism (Cox, 1994) and argued that global market integration 
pushes countries towards convergence (Strange, 1997).  
 
Global market integration pressures were manifested either top down or bottom 
up. The top down pressures were associated with the increasing liberalisation of 
product markets regulation as a result of dismantling tariffs after GATT/WTO 
agreements, the completion of the single market in Europe, and the ‘changing 
policy paradigms towards liberalisation and privatisation spreading from US and 
Britain’ (Scharpf, 2003:375). On the other hand, the bottom up pressures towards 
convergence were emphasised by scholars studying the behaviour and 
management of firms. They argued that market pressures push firms to adopt 
‘best practice’ models of industrial production (e.g. lean production) and 
therefore divergent forms of business organisation 
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single international model of the ‘lean enterprise’ (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2003; 
Womack and Jones, 1994). Others also argued that multinational firms operate in 
a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1989) and therefore they owe allegiance to no 
national state and locate wherever on the globe market advantage dictates (Rees 
and Edwards, 2011:12). Thus, the ‘best practices’ in production were diffused 
internationally via multinationals, which also put pressure to states to converge in 
institutional arrangements. Thereby, the prospect of convergence to a single 
Liberal Market model of capitalism gained credence in literature. 
 
In response to these arguments, scholars from comparative political economy 
(CPE) substantiated the alternative vision of ‘persisting diversity’. An exploding 
literature touched different institutional realms and showed that there is a 
surprising diversity of institutional arrangements clustering into models of 
capitalism (Berger and Dore, 1996; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Gamble et al., 
2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Kitschelt et al., 1999). One of the main tenets of 
their argument was that similar pressures from globalisation and liberalisation are 
mediated differently across models of capitalism, refuting the neo-liberal 
convergence thesis. Additionally, scholars from comparative employment 
systems literature reached similar conclusions. Despite the prophesied expansion 
of ‘lean production’ one finds a diversity of work organisation systems within 
firms, which are congruent with different national institutional arrangements 
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Marsden, 2004; Turner 
and Auer, 1994). 
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2.2.2. Varieties of Capitalism: From Comparative Statics to the 
Dynamics of Change 
 
In their hallmark contribution to the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, Hall 
and Soskice (2001) argued that there are two main varieties: Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) with examples such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom; and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) such as Germany and 
Sweden. Each model of capitalism is characterised by a particular configuration 
of ‘complementary’ institutions, which jointly contribute to high economic 
performance. The CME ideal-type is based on non-market (strategic) 
coordination among collective actors and thus produces ‘institutional 
complementarities’ between long term employment relationships in labour 
markets, a stakeholder value approach in corporate governance, bank-
based/patient capital funding, training systems that emphasise specific skills, and 
their comparative advantage lies in sectors that require incremental product 
innovation (machine tools, transport vehicles, consumer durables, etc.). On the 
contrary, the LME ideal-type is based on market coordination across spheres of 
the political economy and thus produces ‘institutional complementarities’ 
between flexible labour markets, a short-term/shareholder value approach in 
corporate governance, equity based financial systems, training systems that 
emphasise general skills, and their comparative advantage lies in sectors that 
require radical innovation (e.g. biotechnology, semi-conductors, 
telecommunications, medical engineering). 
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Later contributions elaborated on additional types of capitalism dubbing them as 
Southern European/Mediterranean model of capitalism (Almond, 2011; Amable, 
2003; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008; Hyman, 2004; Karamessini, 2008) 
or as Mixed Market Economies (Hancké et al., 2007; Molina and Rhodes, 2007; 
Schmidt, 2008). This model is conceived as a more statist hybrid between LMEs 
and CMEs, has weak institutional complementarities and is prone to low 
economic performance. Empirical examples included countries such as Italy, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
 
Naturally, the literature was not simply placing countries into boxes. Amongst the 
many contributions of the VoC framework was that it ‘provided an intellectual 
counterweight to easy arguments about globalisation, which predict an inevitable 
trend towards similarity among the world’s economies’ (Crouch, 2005a:439; 
Crouch, 2005b). Instead, the VoC framework stressed that rational actors (firms, 
unions) will resist the trend towards convergence, choosing to adopt practices 
congruent with their institutional environment (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007:83). 
 
In spite of the valuable insights of the VoC framework, the literature also 
attracted considerable criticism. Blyth (2003:222) charged VoC with a 
‘manufacturing bias’; a picture that was based on relationships and institutions in 
the manufacturing sectors, which were not representative of the whole economy. 
Similarly, O’Reilly (2006:735) suggested that the models told a succinct story for 
the 1980s, but already in the 1990s and certainly in the 2000s the paradigm cases 
had changed and deviated a great deal from their respective ideal-types. 
Additionally, scholars began to hesitantly identify signs of convergence across 
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models of capitalism, even if this was ‘convergence at variable paces’ and 
distinguished between policy convergence, institutional convergence and 
outcome convergence (see Hay, 2004).  
 
Another important criticism was that VoC was far too firm-centred. It ignored the 
role that the state may play in altering incentives of actors and steering 
institutional change with government policies (Featherstone, 2008; Schmidt, 
2003; Thatcher, 2007a). Finally, the framework was also criticised for having a 
static view of interlocking institutions (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007:83), with all 
feedback tending to ‘sustain and reproduce the existing system’ (Thelen and Van 
Wijnbergen, 2003:860). Hence, ‘if the only change recognised as fundamental is 
of a sort that is practically impossible, social systems are stable almost by 
definition’ (Yamamura and Streeck (2004) cited in Culpepper, 2005b:174). These 
criticisms encouraged the shift in the debate from comparatively static ideal-types 
to an examination of ‘institutional change’. 
 
Institutional change is certainly an elusive concept. For instance, what one could 
call as an ‘institution’ in everyday parlance may be quite different from what one 
would define as an institution in the context of scholarly work. Following 
Douglas North, ‘institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ 
(North, 1990:3). While still a very broad definition, it helps distinguish, as North 
does, between two basic types of institutions: on the one hand, there are formal 
institutions such as statute law, common law and contracts, and on the other, there 
are informal institutions such as conventions, codes of conduct and norms of 
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behaviour (North, 1990:6). Indeed, this thesis examines an institution that falls in 
the category of formal institutions: wage bargaining contracts.  
 
Turning to the concept of ‘change’ this might be equally a source of confusion, 
and result in diametrically opposed interpretations. As Streeck and Thelen 
(2005:26) argue, this has been especially the case with ‘path dependence’: 
scholars understand it either as very minor and more or less continuous change or 
very major but then abrupt and discontinuous change. As a remedy to this 
weakness, scholarship sought to integrate a dynamic analysis ‘introducing more 
agency’  to track and explain institutional change and unveil ‘how actors can 
circumvent or recast those institutions toward new ends’ (Jackson and Deeg, 
2008:554). Along these lines, Crouch (2005a:25) argued that to study institutional 
change and diversity: 
‘…we need to deconstruct the taken-for-granted wholes of contemporary neo-
institutionalism and discover their constituent elements - elements which are able to 
survive in combinations other than those identified in the taken-for-granted wholes’. 
Similarly, Hall and Thelen (2009) supported a turn to studying institutional 
change in varieties of capitalism. They suggested that ‘we need to disaggregate 
the concept of “liberalisation” and explore each of its dimensions’ and to what 
extent different manifestations of liberalisation tend to occur together (2009:22). 
 
The above remarks summarise neatly the rationale behind this thesis. It does not 
aspire to study institutional change in models of capitalism as wholes. Rather, it 
focuses on the industrial relations realm, exploring to what extent liberalisation in 
product markets tends to occur together with a liberalisation (i.e. breakdown) of 
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wage bargaining arrangements. The next section considers in more detail the 
dynamics of change in wage bargaining. 
 
2.3. The Dynamics of Change in Wage Bargaining Institutions 
2.3.1. Wage Bargaining: an Institution that Rests on a ‘Cross-Class 
Coalition’ 
 
Wage bargaining was according to Sidney and Beatrice Webb one of three types4 
of employment regulation (Clegg, 1976:2). In this type of regulation, rules are 
made by agreement between employers and trade unions and involve setting 
wages and working conditions. As Peter Swenson (1989:34) convincingly argued 
wage bargaining can be construed as an institution rested upon a ‘cross-class 
coalition’ between labour and capital. The explanation of such a coalition is based 
on actors’ motivations and specifically the benefits they perceive to get from the 
institution. The next sub-sections elaborate on the benefits that actors get from 
sectoral bargaining, outlining how centralised wage bargaining became the norm 
across Europe in the Fordist era. 
 
2.3.1.1. Firms’ Benefits from Sectoral Wage Bargaining. 
 
Firms are expected to be favourable to industry-wide bargaining because it 
provides a degree of market control by taking labour costs (wages and working 
                                                 
4
 The other types included statutory regulation (state’s employment law) and unilateral trade union 
regulation (rules set by craft unions, which practi
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conditions) out of competition within the given product market (Marginson et al., 
2003:164). Especially under conditions of labour scarcity (full employment) it 
stabilises the cost of wages from rising too high (in an ‘auction bidding’ style). 
As a corollary, individual firms avoid ‘poaching’ by other firms, which may offer 
a premium on wage or working conditions to attract highly skilled labour 
(Swenson, 1989:29). Moreover, industry-wide bargaining maximises employers’ 
bargaining power in dealing with trade unions and can protect them from 
‘whipsawing’ tactics (Zagelmeyer, 2005:1627). Any action will be orchestrated 
across the sector and therefore the threats of ‘lockout’ and ‘investment strike’ are 
credible and effective. Additionally, sectoral wage bargaining reduces transaction 
costs associated with multiple firms bargaining with firm level trade unions over 
wages and conditions (Marginson et al., 2003). Lastly, the institution promotes 
industrial peace (linked with ‘peace-clauses’) and cooperative relations within 
firms, because the ‘distributive conflict’ is taken out of the workplace (Thelen, 
2000:162).  
 
2.3.1.2. Trade Unions’ Benefits from Sectoral Wage Bargaining 
 
Trade unions are also expected to be favourable to sectoral wage bargaining for a 
number of reasons.  First, it ensures uniform levels of wages and working 
conditions (and uniform increases) for the same job description across the 
industry, covering small firms where unions are not always well-organised 
(Marginson et al., 2003:164). The idea of uniformity (and setting a ‘common 
rule’ or a ‘rate for the job’) complies with unions’ concerns over distributive and 
procedural justice among their members. Since the median wage in a firm or 
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sector is normally less than mean pay, then a median voter model of union 
organisation suggests that over half of union members will favour redistribution 
towards the lower paid, and therefore unions will have a preference for 
standardising wages and reducing wage differentials (Metcalf et al., 2001:63). 
Especially under conditions of high unemployment, this standardisation of wages 
protects them from falling too much, if firms engage into a ‘competitive 
undercutting’. Similarly, regulating working conditions (work organisation, 
working time, health and safety, etc.) provides a ‘level-playing field’ as 
individual firms cannot obtain a cost advantage by deteriorating these conditions. 
Additionally, sectoral wage bargaining maximises trade unions’ bargaining power 
vis-à-vis employers and protects them from employers’ ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics 
(Zagelmeyer, 2005:1631). Industrial action is expected to be orchestrated across 
the sector and therefore the threat of strike is credible and effective. Lastly, trade 
unions benefit from the reduction of transaction costs and industrial peace 
offering a steady flow of income to their members. 
 
2.3.1.3. Governments’ Benefits from Sectoral Wage Bargaining 
 
Finally, governments are expected to support sectoral wage bargaining, because 
the peace clause (which is usually attached to wage agreements) minimises 
industrial conflict and disruption in investment, employment, production and 
consumption. Wage bargaining institutionalises the class-conflict (Marginson et 
al., 2003:164) through established rules of conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
between the two sides of the industry. Last but not least, wage bargaining is an 
invaluable instrument for price stability, since it is a policy complement for 
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monetary policy to stabilise inflationary pressures from wage increases through 
‘wage restraint’. This was exemplified by Germany’s response to the stagflation 
of the 1970s, in which the Bundesbank ‘coordinated with the powerful and 
centralised unions to contain cost-push inflation through effective wage restraint, 
(Scharpf, 2011:6). 
 
2.3.2. Pressures for Change in Wage Bargaining Institutions 
 
The previous section provided a picture of the three main actors’ preferences vis-
à-vis wage bargaining and outlining why centralised wage bargaining became 
institutionalised across Europe in the Fordist era by highlighting the motivations 
behind actors’ preferences and conceptualising the institution as a positive-sum 
game. These motivations notwithstanding, a significant literature in the 1990s 
predicted a breakdown of centralised bargaining arrangements and their 
convergence on more decentralised models of industrial relations (Kapstein, 
1996; Katz, 1993; Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Martin and Ross, 1999; Mueller 
and Purcell, 1992). Employers’ search for flexibility in the post-Fordist era 
pushed for the dissolving of wage bargaining institutions. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the main drivers behind this trend can be 
grouped under two hypotheses: the liberalisation hypothesis and the flexibility 
hypothesis. Both these sweeping forces altered the payoffs/perceived benefits that 
mainly firms derive from the institution of wage bargaining. The common 
implication of these changes was that they rendered bargaining institutions 
increasingly unnecessary. In the rest of this section I shall briefly examine the 
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causal mechanism through which the pressures are linked with an expected 
breakdown of centralised wage bargaining.  
 
2.3.2.1. External Pressures: Markets Liberalisation and Intensification of 
Competition 
 
The first hypothesis expecting a generalised trend towards breakdown of 
centralised bargaining emphasises the external and increasingly more competitive 
business environment in which firms operate (Reder and Ulman, 1993; Streeck 
and Schmitter, 1991). Integration of product markets may be the outcome of 
several processes: product market liberalisation due to changing policy paradigms 
(as in the case of Reagan and Thatcher administrations); intensified global 
competition from newly industrialised (and low-cost) countries; or -as in the 
European Union context- liberalisation stemming from the single market 
programme. As barriers to trade across countries are eliminated, capital controls 
abolished, and protection of industries removed, competition within the (national) 
product markets is increased and extended across the EU-wide single market. 
 
The integration of product markets is expected to weaken the logic of ‘taking 
wages out of competition’ within the nation-state (Marginson et al., 2003; 
Swenson, 1989:29) and bring about decentralisation of bargaining. More 
specifically, the increasing integration of product markets across countries erodes 
the institution of wage bargaining as a positive sum game. Trade unions are 
unable to enforce wage agreements beyond the national product market. Although 
wages are kept ‘out of competition’ within the geographical area that a wage 
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agreement covers, it does not keep wages out of competition from neighbouring 
product markets. As a result, the most likely outcome of increased product market 
competition is expected to be breakdown of centralised bargaining. 
 
2.3.2.2. Internal Pressures:  Introduction of Flexible Working Practices 
 
The second hypothesis entails a more diverse list of factors, which allude to 
changes in the internal organisation of firms and stem from the diffusion of 
flexible working practices. One could include the adoption of new production 
strategies in response to changes in technology (Katz, 1993:14-15; Pontusson and 
Swenson, 1996:235; Wallerstein and Golden, 1997:700-701), the need to link 
closely pay with performance and alter pay systems (Brown and Walsh, 1991:51-
53; Iversen, 1996:406-407; Pontusson and Swenson, 1996:236-237) and the 
diversification of corporate structure and shift towards multi-divisional forms 
with flatter management hierarchies (Brown and Walsh, 1991:49-51; Katz, 
1993:15-16). The common implication is that the framework of sectoral wage 
agreements becomes increasingly rigid and inhibits the implementation of the 
above changes; or significantly reduces the benefits to firms. Again this set of 
explanations points to the changing needs of the firms. 
 
Changes in product market demand or production technology require adoption of 
new work organisation strategies. Individual firms are expected to prefer suiting 
work organisation changes to their respective needs. Industry-wide bargaining 
will be regarded as too ‘inflexible’ to accommodate these firm-specific 
requirements. This ‘inflexibility’ will be more pronounced when there are 
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‘information asymmetries’ between the higher and lower levels of bargaining. In 
other words, the firm level actors may possess information about changes needed, 
which central bargainers cannot acquire (Zagelmeyer, 2005:1630) or even if they 
do, they may not be able to reconcile different firms’ needs. In sum, this will alter 
the incentives of firms, and firms are expected to prefer abandoning sectoral wage 
bargaining and seek decentralisation to the firm level. One should note of course, 
that changes in production technologies have a more direct impact on the way 
that industrial production is organised, and therefore on work organisation in 
manufacturing rather than services (see Mueller and Purcell, 1992). Still, ‘best 
practice’ models in manufacturing (e.g. lean production or ‘just in time’) are 
adjusted and transferred to services sectors (e.g. total quality management - 
TQM). Additionally, increasing other ingredients of work organisation flexibility 
(e.g. working time flexibility) is commonly sought in both manufacturing and 
services sectors. Finally, automation and new technologies have been also 
introduced into services sectors. 
 
Furthermore, the widespread adoption of new pay systems has been put forward 
as an important pressure towards destabilisation of bargaining. Central 
negotiators can only set wages in broad job descriptions/classifications 
(Zagelmeyer, 2005:1630). However, this practice is expected to be insufficient, 
when remuneration is linked with performance at even lower levels such as the 
branch/plant level (workgroup incentive schemes and bonuses) or individual 
level. These schemes are expected to have firm-specific or group-specific 
characteristics and manifest a trend towards individualisation of pay. Sectoral 
wage bargaining will be regarded as constraining such ‘pay flexibility’ and 
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therefore firms will likely seek decentralisation (cf. Traxler et al., 2008:406-407). 
Trade unions’ are expected to oppose the introduction of ‘variable pay’ because it 
contradicts the ‘common rule’ for its members (Marginson et al., 2008:329). 
Their concerns over procedural justice skew their preferences towards seniority-
based rules both in pay and promotion (Baron and Kreps, 1999:127). 
 
Finally, corporate restructuring and the shift towards flatter management 
hierarchies is expected to alter the preferences of firms. The decentralisation of 
firms’ internal organisational structure may act as a precursor of wage bargaining 
decentralisation (Katz, 1993), since the former ‘fits’ better with the latter. A 
related argument holds that companies which diversify their business across 
sectors may find the provisions of different sectoral agreements conflicting 
(Marginson et al., 2003:165). In either case firms are expected to prefer 
abandoning sectoral wage bargaining and seek decentralisation. Overall, the 
above hypotheses held well in the literature. Nevertheless, they can be criticised 
on theoretical grounds for leaving blind spots. The next section elaborates on this 
critique. 
 
2.3.3. Critique and Blind Spots: the Need to Refine Earlier Theoretical 
Conjectures 
 
To begin with, the hypotheses appear overly functionalist. Functionalist 
explanations are based on the doctrine that actors have ‘needs’ and that we can 
explain institutions in terms of the ‘functions’ they perform for the actors that 
support them. Therefore, institutions are expected to change when the needs of 
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the actors change. In the instance of wage bargaining, centralised bargaining is 
expected to be abandoned because of the changing needs of firms. The main 
problem with functionalist explanations is that they assume a simplistic causal 
chain between changing needs and changing institutions. Thus, they are likely to 
miss crucial mediating factors that facilitate, obstruct or transform the nature of 
institutional change. As I will argue in the next chapter, actors’ coalitions are 
likely to operate as mediating factors, which moderate destabilising pressures and 
alter the expected direction of institutional change.  
 
Related to the above critique, is that these functionalist explanations assume a 
mechanistic response of actors to external stimuli. Based on the above theoretical 
conjectures, for instance, whenever one sees a shift to performance related pay 
systems, one should also expect to see breakdown of wage bargaining. This 
expectation misses the point that rational actors themselves are ‘creative’ 
(Streeck, 1997) and therefore their responses are far from mechanical. The 
relevant example of a ‘creative response’ here is what Franz Traxler (1995:7) 
dubbed as ‘organised decentralisation’. In this case the sectoral level of 
bargaining is retained, albeit reformed. Firms’ needs for flexibility are 
accommodated at the lower levels of bargaining, while the industry-level sets 
uniform minimum standards for all firms in a sector. This point resonates with the 
Weberian insight that really resilient institutions ‘could perform many different 
functions and even restructure themselves quite substantially in order to survive’ 
(Schmitter and Grote, 1997:6). 
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Furthermore, the hypotheses are overly focused on firms, whereas the ability of 
labour to shape changes is downplayed and the state’s role is almost entirely 
missing. The role of trade unions and their ability to shape institutional change is 
downplayed because of the generalised trend of union membership decline, which 
signified a loss of power.  However, this conception miss the fact that trade 
unions’ power may stem from its investment in links with political parties as 
happens in the Mediterranean model of capitalism (Molina and Rhodes, 2007). 
Thus, the unions may be able to compensate for falls in membership with an 
increase in their political influence. 
 
Finally, the focus of the above literature was solely on one direction of change: 
breakdown of centralised wage bargaining and generalised decentralisation. 
Given the determinism of the earlier theoretical conjectures, this was the only 
possible direction of change. Thus, we lack of a conceptual framework to 
understand other (theoretically possible) trajectories of change: reform of 
centralised wage bargaining or even centralisation of wage bargaining. The next 
section documents how reality proved to be inconsistent and with this 
deterministic expectation. 
 
2.4. The Empirical Puzzle 
 
How has wage bargaining centralisation evolved across Europe in light of the 
pressures from liberalisation and flexibility? A seminal study on the plausibility 
of the ‘decentralisation thesis’ by Michael Wallerstein, Miriam Golden and Peter 
Lange (1997:396-7) concluded that ‘overall the data indicate that recent 
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institutional change is less universal’ and that ‘a general process of 
decentralisation is not evident’. However, they qualified their argument admitting 
that ‘wage setting may become much more decentralised...in the future. Our point 
is that such a change has not happened yet’ (Wallerstein et al., 1997:398). The 
aim of this section is to partly replicate and partly extend this seminal study. 
 
The differences between the Wallerstein et al. (1997) article and this section are 
summarised as follows. First, Wallerstein et al. looked at a time period from 1950 
until 1992, while this section picks the thread from 1992 onwards. This will allow 
the analysis to inquire Wallerstein et al. qualification that ‘decentralisation may 
happen in the future’. Second, Wallerstein et al. looked at a sample of eight 
Northern and Central European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). By contrast, this section looks 
at the whole range of EU15 countries, which were affected by the completion of 
the Single Market Programme since 1992. Third, Wallerstein et al. took for 
granted the hypothesised changes in product markets and work 
organisation/payment systems. Instead, this section provides empirical evidence 
from novel OECD indicators and European survey data that these changes have 
indeed taken place. Finally, Wallerstein et al. used various proxies of wage 
bargaining centralisation (interconfederal concentration, statutory authority, 
collective bargaining coverage) to measure the centralisation level and gauge the 
plausibility of the ‘decentralisation thesis’. The section presents a novel 
composite indicator on wage bargaining centralisation available from the 
ICTWSS database. The use of this composite indicator is superior to the previous 
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proxies, because it was developed to capture precisely the phenomenon under 
study and thereby has increased validity (cf. footnote 7). 
 
The next sub-section starts by examining the trends towards liberalisation of 
product markets across EU15, before gauging the extent of diffusion of flexible 
working practices. Finally, the section presents the trends of wage bargaining 
centralisation across Europe using novel indicators. It shows that a generalised 
decentralisation has not still happened. Instead, divergent trajectories of change 
are observed across Europe. 
 
2.4.1. Systemic Pressures to Wage Bargaining Institutions across 
Europe 
2.4.1.1. Single Market and the Liberalisation of European Product 
Markets 
 
As regards product markets liberalisation5 in Europe there was a decisive impact 
of the Single Market programme launched by the European Commission. The 
Single European Act of 1986 aimed at constructing a single market within the 
European Union and had a direct impact on the regulatory frameworks of national 
product markets, requiring the removal of protection from sectors and dissolving 
of monopolies. Therefore ‘network industries’ such as transportation (railways, 
shipping, airlines), energy (electricity, gas), telecommunications, and financial 
                                                 
5
 The concept of liberalisation is preferred over the concept of deregulation. The single market 
indeed abolished restrictions, however, leading to a reregulation of product markets, rather than 
complete ‘deregulation’; cf. Thatcher (2007a:33,fn57). 
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services became part of the agenda of EU liberalisation (Begg and El-Agraa, 
2004).  
 
The single market has brought about harmonisation of technical standards not 
only in products but also in production processes, which were largely seen as not-
tariff barriers to trade (Young, 2005:109). On balance the completion of the 
internal market has led to substantial restructuring of industries facilitating greater 
competition in a wide range of sectors (Mercado et al., 2000:101). Indeed, the 
effects of the single market completion are reflected on product market indicators 
developed by the OECD (Table below). 
 
Table 2.1. Product Market Regulation across EU15, 1998 - 2008. 
Year AT BE DK FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK 
1998 2.33 2.17 1.59 2.08 2.52 2.06 2.99 1.65 2.59 .. 1.66 2.25 2.55 1.93 1.07 
2003 1.76 1.59 1.18 1.30 1.75 1.60 2.58 1.35 1.81 1.48 1.36 1.64 1.68 1.49 0.82 
2008 1.45 1.43 1.06 1.19 1.45 1.33 2.37 0.92 1.38 1.56 0.97 1.43 1.03 1.30 0.84 
Source: Wölf et al. (2009). 
 
In almost all European countries – with the exception of Luxembourg – there is a 
downward trend in product market regulation. However, the extent of 
liberalisation varies from one country to another. By 2008 the LMEs of United 
Kingdom and Ireland are the member-states with the least economy-wide product 
market regulation. In contrast, Greece has reduced the regulation of product 
markets compared to late 1990s, but remains still one of the most regulated in 
Europe. 
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2.4.1.2. The Internationalisation of Flexible Working Practices and their 
Diffusion in Europe 
 
The internationalisation of ‘best management practices’ and their diffusion across 
Europe has been the outcome of best practice benchmarking and more generally 
mimetic modelling. For instance, Ronald Dore (2002:117) insists that the 
diffusion of best practice methods and principles can be partly attributed to 
business schools teachings which are universalised through their Masters in 
Business Administration (MBA) graduates. While the term ‘globalisation’ has 
been a popular buzzword to describe this process, the thesis takes 
internationalisation as a more appropriate term. Indeed, research suggests that 
‘global’ practices are usually transformed considerably when they are introduced 
into domestic economies (Ferner et al., 2005). Hence, the weak development of 
globally oriented firms is consistent with a continuing internationalising 
economy, but much less so with a rapidly globalising economy (Rees and 
Edwards, 2011:19-21). This line of argument concurs with other scholars who 
criticised the strong ‘globalisation’ thesis (see also Thatcher, 2007a:34). 
 
Flexible working practices entail a range of different types of flexibility: (i) 
functional flexibility, (ii) numerical flexibility; (iii) temporal or working time 
flexibility and (iv) financial or pay flexibility (Casey et al., 1999:71; Procter and 
Ackroyd, 2009:497-8; Treu, 1992). Functional flexibility denotes a qualitative 
adjustability in work organisation such as team-work and task rotation between 
employees with polyvalent skills, who may carry out different tasks in responses 
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to fluctuations in demand. Unfortunately, the extent to which these practices have 
surfaced in European manufacturing and services sectors is difficult to measure. 
 
However, there is evidence that the other three types of flexibility have been on 
the ascendance in Europe. Forms of numerical flexibility (such as fixed-term 
contracts, part-time work, and temporary/agency work) have been increased in 
Europe during the 1990s (Brewster et al., 1997; Tregaskis and Brewster, 
2006:121). Additionally, working time flexibility (e.g. flexitime) and pay 
flexibility (e.g. performance-related pay systems or PRP) have been increasingly 
used by European firms. Regrettably, there are no longitudinal data on the 
magnitude of change since the 1990s. Instead, a recently released survey from the 
European Foundation for Working and Living Conditions provides compelling 
evidence on how widespread they are in Europe (Tables below). The data refer to 
companies with 10 or more employees. This sampling does not pose a problem 
for our hypotheses, because workplaces with less than 10 employees are likely to 
be outside the remit of wage bargaining agreements anyway. 
 
Table 2.2. Percentage of Companies (%) with Flexi-time across EU15, 2009. 
 AT BE DE DK EL ES FI FR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK 
Industry 48.8 46.5 51.3 68.4 38.4 52.8 78 46.9 49.5 38.7 48.3 55.3 42.9 60.3 64.6 
Services 54.7 55.8 61 69.7 33 56.9 84.8 52 63.1 56.6 61.5 59.6 50.9 68.7 71.1 
All 53.1 53.8 58.5 69.4 34.3 55.6 82.8 50.8 60.6 48.8 58 58.7 48.1 67 70.1 
Source: European Foundation (2009). 
 
Indeed, flexitime practices are widespread across Europe, with Greek companies 
having the lowest percentage of companies (34 per cent) and Finish companies 
having the highest percentage (83 per cent). Notably, in twelve out of fifteen 
European countries the majority of companies over 10 employees use flexitime 
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arrangements. Interestingly, there are no significant differences between services 
and manufacturing sectors. 
 
Table 2.3. Percentage of Companies (%) with Employees Receiving 
Performance related Pay across EU15, 2009. 
 AT BE DE DK EL ES FI FR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK 
Individual Performance Related Pay Systems 
Industry 85.7 84 89.5 85.8 93.8 95.7 79.5 86.3 89 94.7 95.9 88.8 92.6 67.6 81.1 
Services 86.5 88.5 92.3 87.5 92.7 90.6 81.7 94.1 92.6 91.2 94.2 94 89.8 73 86.5 
All 86.3 87.6 91.6 87.1 93 92.1 81 92.2 92.1 92.6 94.6 93 90.6 71.4 85.6 
Group Performance Related Pay Systems 
Industry 44.4 59.9 43 49.6 34.9 50.3 64.2 54.2 61.9 47.2 34.9 45.9 51.5 54.6 66 
Services 47.8 67.2 41.5 53 29.5 62.4 59.4 59.3 59.7 43.2 26.8 60.6 63.1 51.3 56.5 
All 47 65.8 41.9 52.2 30.6 58.8 60.8 58.1 60 44.8 28.7 57.8 59.5 52.3 58.1 
Source: European Foundation (2009). 
 
Similarly, the table above provides evidence for the widespread application of 
performance related pay systems in both services and manufacturing sectors. The 
percentage of firms utilising individual-based performance related pay ranges 
from 71 per cent in Sweden to almost 95 per cent in Luxembourg. Similarly, there 
are very high percentages of firms using group-based performance related pay 
systems ranging from 30 per cent in Greece to 66 per cent in Belgium. 
 
2.4.2. Divergent Trajectories of Change in Wage Bargaining 
Centralisation 
 
The expectation for a generalised breakdown of centralised bargaining was also 
associated with a generalised trend of decline in union membership across 
advanced industrial countries (Katz, 1993). Indeed the decline has taken place not 
only in Anglo-Saxon countries, but also across Europe. The next table 
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substantiates this constant decline in union density6 across EU15 since the 1990s. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that in fourteen out of fifteen European countries 
union density has been in constant decline since the 1990s. Only Spain managed 
to increase union members by a few percentage points between 1990 and 2006. 
Still, Spain and France share the lowest union densities in Europe, standing at 15 
per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively. The countries which recorded the greatest 
losses (ranging from 10.4 per cent to 20.8 per cent) are Greece, Portugal, Austria, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Ireland.  
 
Table 2.4. Union Density Rates across EU15, 1990 - 2006. 
Year AT BE DK EL ES FI FR DE IE IT LU NL PT SE UK 
1990 40.5 53.9 75.3 37.5 12.5 72.5 10.1 31.2 56.7 38.8 47.3 24.3 31.7 81.5 39.3 
1991 40.2 54.3 75.8 37.0 14.7 75.4 9.9 36.0 56.9 38.7 46.5 24.1 30.0 82.8 38.5 
1992 39.6 54.3 75.8 36.5 16.5 78.4 9.9 33.9 57.0 38.9 45.7 24.8 29.0 85.0 37.2 
1993 37.6 54.3 77.3 36.3 18.0 80.7 9.6 31.8 55.6 39.2 44.6 25.3 28.0 87.1 36.1 
1994 35.0 53.8 77.5 35.0 17.6 80.3 9.2 30.4 54.0 38.7 44.0 25.6 27.0 87.4 34.2 
1995 32.7 55.7 77.0 33.6 16.3 80.4 9.0 29.2 52.3 38.1 43.4 25.2 25.4 86.6 32.6 
1996 31.1 54.7 77.4 32.0 16.1 80.4 8.3 27.8 49.1 37.4 42.8 24.9 25.0 85.1 31.7 
1997 30.3 54.6 75.6 31.0 15.7 79.5 8.2 27.0 49.1 36.2 42.3 24.4 24.3 82.0 31.0 
1998 28.1 53.7 75.5 29.2 16.4 78.0 8.0 25.9 45.5 35.7 43.6 23.8 23.0 82.3 30.1 
1999 25.7 51.8 74.9 29.0 16.2 76.3 8.1 25.3 42.6 35.4 43.5 23.5 22.0 81.6 29.8 
2000 24.7 50.5 74.2 28.0 16.9 75.0 8.2 24.6 40.8 34.7 43.4 23.1 21.0 80.1 29.7 
2001 24.5 50.8 73.8 27.0 16.1 74.5 8.1 23.7 39.7 34.2 43.3 22.6 20.0 78.0 29.3 
2002 23.1 51.9 81.4 26.0 16.4 73.5 8.2 23.5 39.8 33.6 43.2 22.4 18.9 77.7 29.2 
2003 23.0 52.9 72.4 26.3 16.4 72.9 8.4 23.0 39.5 33.5 43.1 22.5 16.6 77.2 29.3 
2004 22.7 52.9 71.7 25.0 16.0 74.1 8.4 22.1 38.1 34.0 43.0 22.4 17.0 78.0 28.8 
2005 22.4 52.5 71.8 23.1 15.5 73.3 8.5 21.6 35.9 34.4 43.0 22.3 17.0 76.5 29.0 
2006 20.3 .. 69.4 23.0 15.1 72.4 8.5 20.9 .. 34.8 .. 21.8 17.0 75.3 28.4 
Source: Visser (2007). 
 
Nevertheless, this picture of generalised decline in union density is not matched 
by a generalised breakdown of centralised wage bargaining. Despite the 
liberalisation of markets across Europe and the introduction of flexible working 
                                                 
6
 Union density is the conventional indicator of the strength of union membership. It is derived as 
follows: actual members in trade unions divided by the potential members (i.e. total of employed 
wage earners). 
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practices, which were documented in the previous subsections, the evidence 
below suggest that wage bargaining centralisation held well, even if it took 
divergent trajectories of change. Taking advantage of a newly constructed 
indicator7 from the ICTWSS database, we are able to gauge the trends in wage 
bargaining centralisation across EU15 countries since 1992. 
 
                                                 
7
 According to Visser (2007) this indicator is a summary measure of centralisation of wage 
bargaining, which takes into account both union authority and union concentration at multiple 
levels. It is derived from Iversen’s centralisation index, taking values from 0 to 1.The formula is 
given by the equation: √[( Cfauthority* Hcf ) + (Affauthority* Haff )], where: Cfauthority: 
authority of union confederation over its affiliates; Hcf: Membership concentration at central or 
confederal level (Herfindahl index at central level); Affauthority: authority of affiliate over their 
local or workplace branches and representatives; Haff: Membership oncentration at the industry 
level, within union confederations (Herfindahl index at sectoral level). 
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Table 2.5. Wage Bargaining Centralisation across EU15, 1992 - 2006. 
Year AT FR PT LU UK EL SE BE DK IT NL ES IE DE FI 
1992 0.523 0.269 0.391 0.419 0.299 0.462 0.519 0.512 0.425 0.375 0.583 0.376 0.451 0.438 0.396 
1993 0.534 0.278 0.389 0.417 0.298 0.470 0.520 0.513 0.430 0.389 0.573 0.373 0.450 0.438 0.422 
1994 0.441 0.287 0.385 0.412 0.296 0.463 0.521 0.514 0.430 0.389 0.563 0.373 0.450 0.438 0.420 
1995 0.440 0.283 0.385 0.412 0.298 0.457 0.518 0.514 0.429 0.390 0.573 0.373 0.449 0.438 0.421 
1996 0.414 0.273 0.385 0.408 0.301 0.457 0.516 0.514 0.429 0.388 0.593 0.373 0.505 0.436 0.465 
1997 0.416 0.272 0.382 0.405 0.302 0.452 0.548 0.514 0.429 0.388 0.594 0.374 0.505 0.434 0.465 
1998 0.424 0.268 0.382 0.415 0.299 0.449 0.546 0.514 0.429 0.388 0.643 0.375 0.504 0.502 0.459 
1999 0.424 0.268 0.382 0.412 0.302 0.447 0.550 0.514 0.427 0.388 0.642 0.376 0.502 0.516 0.459 
2000 0.424 0.267 0.377 0.412 0.302 0.447 0.541 0.514 0.427 0.388 0.643 0.367 0.502 0.518 0.460 
2001 0.420 0.263 0.378 0.407 0.303 0.453 0.537 0.515 0.426 0.388 0.641 0.375 0.503 0.538 0.461 
2002 0.420 0.265 0.379 0.407 0.303 0.458 0.534 0.528 0.426 0.389 0.640 0.417 0.503 0.528 0.460 
2003 0.421 0.261 0.377 0.401 0.303 0.465 0.532 0.529 0.425 0.389 0.632 0.416 0.503 0.527 0.460 
2004 0.421 0.257 0.377 0.407 0.302 0.465 0.531 0.529 0.421 0.389 0.632 0.418 0.503 0.501 0.472 
2005 0.421 0.255 0.377 0.407 0.301 0.464 0.529 0.530 0.442 0.388 0.631 0.419 0.503 0.498 0.471 
2006 0.421 0.252 0.377 n.a. 0.300 0.465 0.529 0.530 0.440 0.389 0.629 0.419 0.501 0.497 0.470 
1992-06 
(∆) 
-0.102 -0.018 -0.014 -0.012 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.046 0.043 0.051 0.059 0.073 
1992-06  
(%) 
-19.55% -6.53% -3.64% -2.86% 0.24% 0.75% 1.78% 3.37% 3.47% 3.60% 7.84% 11.41% 11.24% 13.43% 18.54% 
Trajectory  
Decentralisation  
(< -3.5%) 
Stability  
(± 3.5%) 
Centralisation   
(> 3.5%) 
Source: Visser (2007). 
The evidence against the ‘decentralisation thesis’ is overwhelming. In spite of 
liberalisation of markets and internationalisation of flexible working practices, 
there is no generalised trend towards breakdown of centralised bargaining 
across Europe. This confirms the earlier finding of Wallerstein et al. (1997:398) 
that there is little evidence to support this claim and that the expectation of 
decentralisation was not borne out (Ferner and Hyman, 1998). Instead, a picture 
of divergent trajectories emerges, with some countries experiencing 
decentralisation and some others centralisation, while most are somewhere in the 
middle with stability in the centralisation of bargaining. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was, first, to set out the theoretical frame dwelling on 
comparative political economy and comparative employment systems, examining 
institutional change generally and wage bargaining institutions more specifically. 
The earlier theoretical conjectures were criticised for leaving blind spots thus 
outlining the gap to be filled. A preliminary examination of wage bargaining 
trends across Europe strengthened the empirical underpinnings of the puzzle. 
There is no generalised trend towards breakdown of centralised bargaining across 
Europe, despite the systemic pressures from markets liberalisation and 
internationalisation of flexible working practices. 
 
The review of earlier literature elaborated on the causal mechanism of the two 
main hypotheses that stipulate the pressures to wage bargaining institutions: 
liberalisation and flexibility. The first dwells on changes external to the firm, 
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whereas the second emphasises changes inside the firm. These explanations were 
criticised for being overly functionalist, based on a simplistic causal chain. Thus, 
they are likely to miss mediating factors or ‘creative responses’ of actors to 
reform the wage bargaining institution in order to meet new needs. Moreover, 
they suffer from a determinism that allows only for a single direction of change, 
while we totally lack a conceptual framework to understand alternative 
trajectories of change in wage bargaining institutions. Finally, they downplay the 
role of collective actors such as the state. The next chapter develops a coalitional 
approach to wage bargaining change so as to refine the earlier hypotheses and 
address their weaknesses. 
 Chapter 3 A Coalitional Approach to Wage Bargaining 
Change 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The main criticism of the thesis to earlier theoretical conjectures is that they 
missed an important part of the dynamics of wage bargaining change; they 
overplayed the power of structural changes – the intensification of competition 
due to liberalisation and the internationalisation of flexible working practices – 
and downplayed the mediating role of agency on the part of collective actors. The 
previous chapter examined why wage bargaining as an institution rested on a 
‘cross-class coalition’ in the Fordist era, and how the structural changes in the 
post-industrial age are expected to put pressures and disturb the coalition of 
unions and employers that underpin centralised bargaining (Swenson, 1989:30). 
This chapter contends that the coalitional perspective is best suited to understand 
wage bargaining dynamics in light of the structural pressures, and thus puts 
collective actors and their coalitions at the centre of the analysis. 
 
It is not surprising that earlier literature downplayed the role of employers 
associations or ignored the role of the state in wage bargaining change. The 
starting points of institutional collapse were located on Liberal Market 
Economies. In this institutional context, employers associations were generally 
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weak or inexistent, and the state never assumed an interventionist role in the 
industrial relations sphere. However, employers associations remain important in 
the post-Fordist era in a wide range of countries, and they may cater their 
members’ changed needs by striking new compromises with the unions. 
Similarly, trade unions may be losing members in the last two or three decades, 
but their political clout has not fallen accordingly. They may shape the direction 
of institutional change via forging coalitions with other actors such as the state. In 
a nutshell, the thesis suggests that new coalitions may be forged to reform the 
institution of wage bargaining or just save the institution from collapsing. In sum, 
a coalitional approach is used to shed light on the dynamics of change in wage 
bargaining. 
 
3.2. An Alternative Perspective: Collective Actors and Coalitions 
 
The coalitional perspective is not entirely new in the comparative political 
economy field. Indeed, it has been strongly recommended by comparative 
political economists8 to explain institutional change (Hall and Thelen, 2009). 
Moreover, it has been fruitfully applied to explain change or inertia in several 
spheres such as corporate governance (Cioffi and Höpner, 2006; Deeg, 2005) or 
regulatory institutions (Thatcher, 2007b). Still, the application of the coalitional 
perspective to explain changes in wage bargaining institutions is novel and forms 
part of the conceptual contribution of the thesis. 
                                                 
8
 The coalitional approach examining the interactions between trade unions and employers 
associations is certainly also a political economy approach, since trade unions and employers are 
the political expressions of supply and demand in the labour market. I wish to thank Waltraud 
Schelkle for pointing this out to me. 
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3.2.1. Employer Associability: A Coalition of Large and Small Firms 
 
This section introduces the concept of ‘employer associability’. Employer 
associability is defined as having two fundamental properties (i) member firms 
have delegated the legal competence to negotiate labour relations issues to a 
representative association and (ii) a coalition between large and small firms’, so 
that decision making processes can take into account both large and small firms’ 
interests. Thus, employer associability is missing if an association does not have 
the legal competence to represent firms in labour relations, or if a group of firms 
dominates the decision making process. 
 
The concept relies on received wisdom from the business associations’ literature. 
Schmitter and Streeck (1999:13) have argued that ‘collective interest 
associations’ are in a better position than individual firms to appreciate and 
protect the long-run interests of their membership; even if this requires ‘enforcing 
their decisions upon reluctant or resisting members’. Drawing on these insights, I 
argue that an employers association is better able to appreciate the continued 
benefits of industry-wide wage bargaining in the post-Fordist era. Thus, an 
employers association may strike a compromise between the standardisation of 
costs at the sectoral level and flexibility at the firm level. 
 
It is important to note that trade associations (also called product market 
associations) do not have legal competence to negotiate labour relations issues, 
and their representation is based on a much narrower set of interests (Traxler, 
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2001). Their main aim is to influence or lobby the product market regulation of a 
sector. Therefore, in the sphere of labour relations their members’ relationships 
are competitive. In contrast, firms which have delegated the legal competence to 
negotiate labour relations to their employer associations are bonded with a much 
wider set of common interests. 
 
The representation of firms in the labour market realm is not totally independent 
of their representation in the product market realm. The link between the two is 
exemplified with the case of ‘whipsawing tactics’ of unions which may lead to 
unfair competition. Crucially, the employer association can protect member-firms 
from ‘whipsawing tactics’ of unions, because of the peace obligation that is 
usually part of wage agreements. In sharp contrast, a trade association cannot 
protect its members from such an occasion. 
 
The logic of the argument can be explicated as follows. Suppose that in a given 
sector we have two firms: firm A and firm B. In this hypothetical example, the 
two firms are members of a trade association, so wage bargaining is decentralised 
at the firm level. In the long run this risks creating situations of ‘unfair 
competition’. For example, if firm A concludes an agreement with its firm level 
union, but firm B has difficulties in reaching an agreement, and then the firm 
level union in firm B is likely to call a strike. While firm B is closed down, firm 
A monopolises the market and will likely capture some of the market share from 
firm B. These kinds of disruptions in competition and production led to the self-
organisation of employers in the first place. The argument of the thesis is that 
these kinds of disruptions are likely to reappear even in the post-Fordist era. 
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The second fundamental characteristic of ‘employer associability’ relates to the 
dynamics that may occur between the associations’ members. Most commonly, 
the divide between firms in a sector is based on market power, i.e. between large 
and small firms. For instance, large firms may be averse to sectoral centralised 
bargaining, because they do not need the peace clause. They can keep their 
employees content by paying a premium wage in firm level agreements. If 
employees are strongly organised in smaller firms, their unions may create 
disruptions in the operation of small firms, by asking for comparable wages to 
those in larger firms. Thus, the large firms may indirectly drive small firms out of 
the market in a ‘cut throat competition’ situation. But the opposite preference is 
possible as well. Large firms in a sector may prefer centralised bargaining to keep 
their firm level unions peaceful. By negotiating wages at the industry level, they 
may avoid disruptions to their own production process.  
 
The same logic can be applied to smaller firms’ preferences, which will depend 
on the how far the wage set at the sectoral level is affordable for them. For 
instance, if the wage level set is too high, small firms may prefer not to have 
centralised bargaining, because they cannot afford to pay it. In contrast, if the 
wage-level set is affordable for smaller firms, the latter may prefer to participate 
in sectoral-bargaining, so as to take advantage of the ‘social peace’ clause. 
 
Following from the above analysis it is clear that the specific preferences of large 
and small firms cannot be defined ex post (cf. Ulman, 1966:37-42), and the 
relative preferences will depend on several factors: e.g. the intensity of 
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competition and relative market shares, the unionisation in small and large firms, 
and the level of wages that the industry agreement sets. However, the concept of 
employer associability suggests that whatever the relative preferences, small 
firms and large firms reach compromises that cater the collective interests of both 
groups without one group dominating another. 
 
The case of reforming the sectoral bargaining institution to meet new needs is an 
instance of such a compromise, which has been dubbed as ‘organised 
decentralisation’ (Crouch, 2000b; Traxler, 1995). It is clear by now, that the 
pressures coming from liberalisation and flexibility may upset traditional 
arrangements in wage bargaining institutions. Organised decentralisation denotes 
a shift in the relative importance between sectoral and firm level bargaining. 
More (and more substantial) issues are not rigidly regulated in sectoral 
agreements, but are delegated to firm level bargaining. Thus, the firms in a sector 
can get the ‘best of both worlds’: they can still take advantage of the benefits of 
the centralised bargaining, and at the same time, ‘loosen the straightjacket’ of 
sectoral agreements. The continued benefits of sectoral wage bargaining is that it 
minimises transaction costs, it safeguards social peace and sets a level-playing 
field ensuring fair inter-firm competition via standardisation of costs at the lowest 
common denominator. At the same time, the locus of flexibility shifts towards the 
firm level, where firms agree changes in work organisation to suit their individual 
needs. The above reasoning is formulated in a hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis I: Whilst pressures from liberalisation and flexibility may act as 
triggers changing individual firms’ preferences towards abandoning centralised 
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bargaining, the presence of ‘employer associability’ will likely moderate 
destabilising pressures and lead to a  reform of  the institution. 
 
3.2.2. Labour-State Coalitions:  Labour Unity and Government 
Agenda 
 
This section introduces the concept of a ‘labour-state coalition’ to further shed 
light on the coalitional dynamics that underpin wage bargaining change. A 
labour-state coalition is implicit and is defined as a congruence of preferences 
between organised labour and the state vis-à-vis a specific issue – in this case 
wage bargaining. A labour state coalition possess two fundamental properties (i) 
labour is able to speak ‘with a single voice’ despite organisational or ideological 
fragmentation and therefore can steer the interest of the state (ii) the state is 
interested in forging a coalition with labour not only for electoral benefits, but 
also for tactical policy trade-offs to advance the government agenda. 
 
The ability of labour to speak with a ‘single voice’ echoes what Wallerstein and 
Golden (1997:701) called as ‘capacity of trade unions to act collectively’. 
Conventional accounts linked the move to the service economy and the decline in 
union membership with a reduced capacity of unions to act collectively, and 
mobilise members for strikes. However, this conceptualisation neglects the 
possibility to invest in ‘political power’ through links with political parties and 
the state (Molina and Rhodes, 2007:27-28). Although unions’ ability to put 
pressure to employers via industrial action may have weakened, I argue that this 
can be compensated by an increase in their political clout.  
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Notably, trade unions have to be able to speak with a single voice, in order to 
steer the interest of different political parties in government. Single voice refers to 
unions’ actual ability to come up with a common negotiating platform or organise 
coordinated actions (e.g. strikes) to support sectoral wage bargaining. If their 
links can go both ways, either to the Left or to the Right, then they are able to use 
state’s coercive (and persuarive) power to put pressure to individual firms. In this 
case, the ‘market pressure’ that is exerted to firms via strikes may be 
complemented with ‘political pressure’ via government’s intervention. This 
mechanism is likely to hold in the Mediterranean model of capitalism where 
organised interests invest in ‘one kind of asset - political power’ (Molina and 
Rhodes, 2007:227-228). But putting the state at the centre of the coalitional 
analysis is also based on a wider literature of social pacts across Europe. 
 
Indeed, the importance of the role of the state in steering social bargaining and 
reviving neo-corporatism was highlighted by the literature on social pacts 
(Baccaro and Lim, 2007; Crouch, 2000a:213-220; Fajertag and Pochet, 2000; 
Hassel, 2003; Rhodes, 2001). One of the most useful insights of this literature is 
that this new form of ‘competitive corporatism’ took place in the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ namely the shadow of the state (Rhodes, 2001:177). Subsequent 
accounts of welfare reform and social pacts fleshed out the causal mechanism that 
led to neo-corporatist revival, pinpointing the role of party politics and electoral 
pressures as a motivation behind state steering the pacts (Green-Pedersen, 2003; 
Hamann and Kelly, 2007; Van Wijnbergen, 2002:13-18). These insights support 
a priori the plausibility of the hypothesis that the coalition between state and 
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labour is likely to go a long way towards explaining the dynamics of wage 
bargaining change. 
 
But why would the state be interested in supporting unions and the institution of 
sectoral wage bargaining? State motivation will likely entail electoral concerns, 
but those should not vary along partisan identity (left/right), because unions 
which speak with a single-voice do not neatly fit as voting constituencies of either 
centre-left or centre-right parties.9 Thus, government’s interests will likely be 
more state-functional including tactical policy trade-offs in government agenda. 
Siding with the unions for an institution that is not costly for the government 
coffer will likely leave more ‘room for manoeuvre’ in other policy-domains 
(privatisation, labour market, welfare state reform). However, if labour appears 
unable to speak with a single-voice then the government will have little interest in 
supporting centralised wage bargaining. Still, the state may forge (narrower) 
coalitions with segments of organised labour to advance its government agenda. 
The above reasoning leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis II: Whilst pressures from liberalisation and flexibility may act as 
triggers changing individual firms’ preferences towards abandoning centralised 
bargaining, the presence of a ‘labour-state’ coalition will likely moderate 
destabilising pressures and lead to a survival of  the institution. 
 
                                                 
9
 This contrasts with British Trade Union Congress (TUC) which was clearly a constituency of the 
Labour Party during the Margaret Thatcher Downing Street years. Instead, in most of Europe, 
trade unions have been more diversified politically, with some coming from Catholic/Christian-
democratic traditions, others from Socialist/Social-democratic and others linked with Communist 
parties. 
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The next section considers the system pressures from liberalisation and flexibility 
which were common across European banking and telecommunications sectors. 
 
3.3. Sector-specific Pressures across European Banking and 
Telecommunications Industries 
3.3.1. The Liberalisation of European Banking 
 
Banking sectors across Europe have been strongly influenced in the 1990s by 
developments in European economic integration. The principle of ‘mutual 
recognition’ for the Single Market was followed by the European Commission to 
establish a Single Financial Market. More specifically, the Second Banking 
Directive (89/646/EEC) ‘represented a regulatory breakthrough’ (Pagoulatos, 
1999:80), because it amended several provisions of the First Banking Directive 
(77/780/EEC) and effectively removed obstacles for the further integration of 
national financial markets.  
 
A major innovation was the provision of a ‘single banking licence’, whereby any 
bank licensed in one country was allowed to open a branch in any other EU 
country, thereby encouraging EU-wide branching (Story, 2000:94). Notably, 
there was a convergence towards the German-type of ‘universal banking model’ 
across the European Union (Pagoulatos, 1999:75). This permitted banks to 
undertake both commercial and investment banking activities and left to 
independent national regulators to control financial conglomerates, the ownership 
structure of banks, and their relationship with industry (Dermine, 1996:341).  
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Overall, the new regulatory framework set out that the licensing, regulation, and 
supervision were all retained by the home country; thereby, host country’s powers 
in restricting entry were reduced, limiting national discretion to open or close 
their markets. The barriers to new market entrants were withdrawn, restrictions to 
free portfolio management carried out by banks were abolished, and international 
capital movements were liberalised (Pagoulatos, 1999:74). The next table 
documents the European Directives and Regulations which fostered the opening 
up of European banking sectors up until the late 1990s. 
 
Table 3.1. The European Regulatory Impact on Banking in the 1980s & 1990s. 
Year Directive Main Provisions 
1977 First Banking Co-ordination Directive  
Freedom of EC banks to set up branches in 
member states; authorisation and 
supervision remain with host-country 
authorities and national legislation 
1983 Supervision on a Consolidated Basis 
Supervising authority of the parent bank 
must apply the financial data of the whole 
group in monitoring compliance by the 
bank with its supervisory standards 
1986 Annual and Consolidated Accounts 
EC-wide harmonisation of accounting 
standards for credit and financial 
institutions 
1989 
Publication of Annual Accounting 
Documents 
Branches no longer required to publish 
separate annual reports as long as parent 
bank publishes them 
1989 Own Funds 
Defines items to be included in the 'own 
funds' calculation; defines common rules 
on core and supplementary capital 
1989 Second Banking Co-ordination Directive 
Single banking licence; home country 
control; mutual recognition; basic 
supervisory standards (minimum 
capitalisation, limit on investments, control 
of major shareholders) 
1989 Solvency Ratio 
Establishes minimum solvency ratio at 8 
per cent of bank's own funds; sets risk 
weights on on-balance and off-balance 
sheet assets 
1991 Prevention of Money Laundering 
Regulates against activities associated with 
illegal money laundering 
1992 Consolidated Supervision 
Supervision, including review of financial 
statements, risk exposure and management, 
must take place annually on a consolidated 
basis 
1992 Controlling Large Exposures Harmonisation of monitoring and 
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controlling of large exposures; sets limits 
on large exposure of banks by category of 
borrowers 
1993 Investment Services 
Establishes rules governing the minimum 
amount of capital required by investment 
firms against exposure to market risks and 
foreign exchange risks 
1994 Deposit-Guarantee Schemes 
Home-country responsibility to be applied 
to deposit protection arrangements; 
establishes minimum level of protection 
1995 'Post-BCCI' Directive 
Defines terms regarding bank head offices, 
rules of secrecy, disclosure of information, 
cooperation of supervisory authorities 
1997 Cross-Border Credit Transfers 
Regulates conditions of transparency and 
minimal obligations in cross-border credit 
transfers 
1998 Settlements Finality 
Regulates against systemic risk in 
interbank funds and security transfers 
Source: Pagoulatos (1999:78). 
 
By the mid-2000s the evidence suggest that a level playing field was created, with 
a regulatory convergence toward a minimum set of regulations on banking 
license, capital, and large exposure limits (Dermine, 2006:63). Of course the 
integration of the financial markets was an ongoing process that continued over 
the 2000s. After the introduction of the single currency across Eurozone member-
states, there was renewed momentum in the further integration of financial 
markets with the ‘Lamfalussy process’. The process was a hard fight between a 
‘market-making’ and a ‘market-shaping’ advocacy coalition and the resultant four 
Lamfalussy Directives marked the completion of the single market in financial 
services (Quaglia, 2010:1017). 
 
3.3.2. The Internationalisation of Flexible Working in Banking 
 
Banking sectors across advanced industrial nations were rapidly changing already 
in the 1980s. Banking has been a services-sector organised along Fordist lines 
and was challenged by post-Fordist pressures for greater flexibility. The transition 
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was anything but smooth, as it clashed with the tradition of banks having ‘internal 
labour markets’ (Grimshaw et al., 2001) based on job security, internal career 
ladders and seniority-based pay.  
 
The introduction of new technology reshaped the way banking transactions are 
carried out. On the one hand, there was a rapid expansion of automated teller 
machines (ATMs). Customers would no longer need to go to the teller to gain 
access to simple banking services. The exponential expansion of ATMs across all 
European countries is shown on the Table below. On the other hand, the 
increasing use of phone banking and internet banking since the mid-1990s gave 
the choice to carry out transactions without even visiting a local branch. The 
introduction of new technologies led to self-service and remote banking, and 
facilitated the separation of back-office operations from branches (Arrowsmith et 
al., 2010:2717). ATMs and Internet banking are classic examples of substitution 
of labour by capital; as the access to these services was spreading, fewer 
employees were necessary than before. In other words, the prospect of 
redundancies following automation did not only hit classic manufacturing, but 
also labour-intensive services sectors such as banking. 
 
Table 3.2. Number of ATMs per 1 mil. Inhabitants across EU15, 1993 - 2009. 
Year AT BE DK FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK 
1993 324 280 108 829 327 308 82 220 262 294 292 283 557 255 321 
1999 660 606 496 422 535 563 290 381 524 711 424 886 1,062 291 476 
2009 1,005 1,415 533 548 851 1,010 813 760 902 941 514 1,618 1,336 356 1,006 
Source: EMI (1996) and ECB (2001; 2010). 
 
Apart from new technologies, work organisation patterns were deemed as 
necessary to change. Banks gradually realised that their opening times were not 
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optimally arranged to match fluctuation in demand. Increased competition pushed 
banks to try meeting customer demand by increasing opening hours (O’Reilly, 
1992:46). This change towards more working time flexibility clashed with 
standard working patterns outlined in wage agreements and being part of a 
‘Fordist’ organisation of work. 
 
Finally, banks adopted performance related pay systems, which altered the ratio 
between fixed and variable part of total pay. European banks introduced pay 
flexibility (Arrowsmith et al., 2010; Traxler et al., 2008), so as to link pay with 
attainment with objectives (e.g. achieving sales targets in loans or credit cards). 
The change itself followed from the gradual change in the job content of the 
typical banking employee. Employees have been transformed ‘from tellers to 
sellers’, being much more ‘customer-oriented’ (Regini, 1999). This alignment of 
pay with ‘performance’ (sales) clashed with detailed pay scales set out in wage 
agreements and the seniority-based pay structures of the earlier period. 
 
3.3.3. The Liberalisation of European Telecommunications 
 
The liberalisation programme in European telecommunications was influenced by 
two concurrent transnational developments: tehnological advances and overseas 
reforms (Thatcher, 2007a). On the one hand, sweeping technological change 
greatly accelerated over the 1980s and 1990s, allowed the application of 
computing (e.g., the digitisation of switching and transmission), new methods of 
transmission (e.g. optical fibre cables and satellites) for quicker, cheaper 
telephony and provision of new value added services (Humphreys and Simpson, 
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2008:851; Thatcher, 2004:765). On the other hand, overseas reforms during the 
1970s and early 1980s altered the traditional conception that telecommunications 
were a ‘natural monopoly’. The first mover was the United States, with a speedily 
reformed telecommunications market. AT&T’s monopoly was reduced, new 
entrants emerged (e.g., MCI and Sprint), and then AT&T was broken up in 1984 
into seven “baby Bells” (Ramirez et al., 2007:500). Similarly, the monopoly of 
British Telecom in Britain ended in 1984, after the Conservative government 
gave to Mercury a 25 year licence as a public operator (Thatcher, 2007a:169). 
 
The reforms in US and Britain unleashed a global dynamic of international 
‘regulatory competition’ and ‘competitive emulation’ and the Continental 
Europeans became persuaded that liberalisation was unavoidable if they were to 
retain their international competitiveness (Humphreys and Simpson, 2008:851). 
After overcoming disagreements between member-states in the late 1980s 
(Schneider, 2001), the European Commission accelerated the implementation of 
its liberalisation agenda particularly targeted to dissolving national telecom 
monopolies. A series of Commission Directives necessitated their gradual 
abolition within a finite deadline on the 1
st
 of January 1998 (Table below). 
 
Table 3.3. The European Regulatory Impact on Telecommunications in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
Year Directive/Regulation 
1983 
Commission outlines strategies for a common telecommunications policy. Establishment 
of expert group SOGT. 
1984 Council recommendation on harmonisation in the field of telecommunications. 
1986 Council directive on mutual recognition of terminal equipment. 
1987 Green Paper on the Common Market for telecommunications services and equipment 
1988 
Commission Directive on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal 
equipment  
1989 
Council decision to gradually liberalize telecommunication with the exception of 
telephony and public infrastructures 
1990 Commission Directive on telecommunications services liberalizing all services with the 
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exception of telephony, mobiles and satellite communications. Council Directive on Open 
Network Provision requiring the separation of operating and regulating functions 
1993 Council Decision to open all telecommunications services to competition as of 1.1.98 
1994 
Council Resolution on universal service principles. Commission Directive extending 
competition to satellite communication. Council decision to liberalize 
telecommunications infrastructures as of 1.1.98 
1995 Commission Directive liberalizing the use of alternative infrastructures as of 1.7.96 
1996 
Commission Directive extending competition to mobiles. Commission Directive to 
implement full liberalisation of the telecommunications market 
Source: Schneider (2001:64). 
 
The opening up of the market was gradual, first targeting specific segments such 
as satellite communications and mobile telephony, until the whole range of 
telecommunications services was fully liberalised. The resultant re-regulation in a 
wide range of ‘network services’ sectors, is reflected on an OECD indicator, 
which measures product market regulation of non-manufacturing industries 
(Table below).  
 
Table 3.4. Product Market Regulation on Non-manufacturing Sectors 
(telecoms, electricity, etc) across EU15, 1990 - 2007. 
Year AT BE DK FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK 
1990 4.4 5.5 4.8 4.6 5.2 4.7 5.7 5.6 5.8 .. 5.4 5.3 4.8 4.6 3.0 
1991 4.4 5.2 4.7 4.4 5.2 4.6 5.7 5.6 5.7 .. 5.3 5.3 4.8 4.2 2.8 
1992 4.4 5.2 4.5 4.3 5.2 4.6 5.7 5.6 5.7 .. 4.4 5.3 4.7 3.8 2.8 
1993 4.2 4.9 4.1 4.2 4.9 4.3 5.5 5.3 5.3 .. 4.1 5.1 4.5 3.6 2.2 
1994 4.2 4.7 4.0 3.8 4.9 4.0 5.5 5.3 5.2 .. 3.7 5.0 4.4 3.4 1.9 
1995 4.0 4.2 3.5 2.9 4.9 3.9 5.5 5.2 4.9 .. 3.6 4.8 4.3 3.2 1.7 
1996 4.0 4.1 3.4 2.8 4.8 3.4 5.4 5.1 4.9 .. 3.4 4.5 4.1 2.8 1.6 
1997 4.0 4.1 3.2 2.7 4.6 3.3 5.3 5.1 4.7 .. 3.2 4.4 3.9 2.7 1.6 
1998 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.8 4.4 2.8 5.3 4.4 4.7 3.9 2.9 4.3 3.6 2.6 1.4 
1999 3.5 3.3 2.7 2.6 4.0 2.3 5.1 4.0 4.1 3.7 2.5 4.1 3.1 2.5 1.2 
2000 3.1 3.0 2.4 2.6 3.9 2.2 5.0 3.7 3.9 3.5 2.3 3.6 2.9 2.3 1.2 
2001 2.7 2.7 1.9 2.6 3.8 2.0 4.7 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.2 3.2 2.6 2.3 1.1 
2002 2.6 2.5 1.7 2.5 3.4 1.8 4.1 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.1 2.9 2.2 2.3 1.1 
2003 2.5 2.4 1.6 2.4 3.0 1.7 4.0 3.2 2.9 2.9 1.9 2.8 2.0 2.1 1.1 
2004 2.2 2.3 1.5 2.4 2.8 1.6 4.0 3.1 2.8 2.9 1.8 2.7 2.0 2.0 1.0 
2005 1.9 2.0 1.2 2.3 2.4 1.3 3.4 3.1 2.0 2.5 1.8 2.7 1.6 1.8 0.9 
2006 1.7 1.9 1.2 2.3 2.3 1.2 3.3 2.8 2.0 2.5 1.8 2.6 1.6 1.8 0.9 
2007 1.7 1.8 1.2 2.2 2.2 1.1 3.2 2.7 2.0 2.4 1.6 2.4 1.6 1.7 0.9 
Source: Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
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Again there are variable paces in the liberalisation path across European 
countries. However, there is not a single country which has not reduced the 
regulation of network industries. Again UK is at the forefront, having the least 
regulation of network industries, with Germany having the second lowest 
regulation. On the other hand Greece and -perhaps surprisingly- Ireland have also 
reduced regulation, but to a lesser extent than other countries. As a consequence 
of the European liberalisation programme, dozens of incumbents telecom 
operators –previously perceived by some as inefficient ‘lame ducks’ fit only for 
privatisation– rapidly transformed into world class multinational corporations 
(Clifton et al., 2010:988). The process of domestic liberalisation triggered a 
strategy of internationalisation of several of the incumbent telecoms operators. 
Thus, the previously bureaucratic organisations were quickly transformed into 
internationally competitive firms which adopted flexible management practices. 
 
3.3.4. The Internationalisation of Flexible Working in 
Telecommunications 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the lead in technological change was 
observed in the United States and Britain, which liberalised their telecoms sectors 
already in the 1980s. Conventional cable networks were digitised, shifting 
towards fibre optics (Katz, 1996). In addition to that, rapid technological change 
was observed in the mobile telephony networks with a gradual upgrading from 
analogical signal (1G), to GSM or DCS (2G) in the 1990s, and finally to 3G in 
the 2000s. In both fixed telephony and mobile telephony the new technologies 
afforded higher capacities, necessary to accommodate an increasing demand for 
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services. In parallel, the 1990s marked the expansion of Internet in constantly 
higher speeds and bandwidths (from PSTN to ISDN and finally xDSL 
technologies). This in turn allowed the parallel transmission of voice and data 
over broadband, and the trend towards a ‘combined business model’ that led to 
industry convergence (Katz and Woroch, 1997) tying together telephony 
operators and Internet providers (the so-called ‘double-play’ services), and more 
recently cable TV (‘triple-play’ services).10 
 
These profound changes in technology were destined to affect work organisation 
within the telecoms firms. The differences are monumental, if one considers that 
most of European telecoms operators in the 1980s were an extended part of slow 
moving public bureaucracy, sometimes merged with the postal office (Thatcher, 
2007a). At that time, work organisation was characterised by high job security, 
internal labour markets, seniority-based promotion and pay, and a strict job 
classification system (Katz and Darbishire, 2000). By the early 2000s the ex-
monopolies found themselves operating in very competitive markets, and 
employment practices shifted towards new performance management and work 
redesign with increased working time flexibility (Doellgast, Nohara et al., 
2009:387-389). 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 ‘Converge or else: the future for the industry lies in the convergence of products and services’ 
Business Europe (The Economist Intellignence Unit), (1 July 2004), p.2. 
  
93 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The main aim of this chapter was to develop a coalitional approach to wage 
bargaining change, thus addressing the inadequacies of earlier theoretical 
conjectures. It was argued that earlier literature missed an important part of the 
dynamics of wage bargaining change by overplaying structural changes – the 
intensification of competition due to liberalisation and the internationalisation of 
flexible working practices – and rather downplaying the mediating role of agency 
on the part of collective actors.  
 
Following from this, the role of ‘employer associability’ and ‘labour-state 
coalitions’ in mediating change in wage bargaining was elaborated. It was argued 
that collective interest associations of firms which posses the legal competence to 
negotiate labour relations issues and take into account the interests of both large 
and small firms in a sector are likely to moderate the pressures arising from 
liberalisation and flexibility. Instead, they are most likely to strike new 
compromises restructuring the institution to meet new needs. Thereby, their 
members’ may get the ‘best of both worlds’ standardisation and fair competition 
at the sector level and flexibility at the firm level. 
 
In addition, it was argued that labour alone cannot stem the firms’ challenge on 
wage bargaining arrangements. Still, if labour is able to speak with a single voice 
it may forge a coalition with the state, steering its electoral interest. That said, the 
state will not only be interested due to electoral incentives, but also for tactical 
policy trade offs in the government agenda. If state sides with the unions to 
  
94 
support an institution that is not costly for the state’s budget, then it can gain 
‘room for manoeuvre’ in other policy domains (privatisation, labour market 
reform, pension reform, etc.). 
 
Finally, the chapter examined the systemic pressures to banking and 
telecommunications sectors across Europe. On the one hand, these sectors 
experienced the European Union regulatory impact which required their opening 
up and liberalisation. On the other hand, the international diffusion of flexibile 
working practices altered the internal work organisation of banks and telecom 
operators, which were modernised adopting new management practices. The next 
chapter begins with an examination of the Greek banking sector.  
  
Chapter 4 The Breakdown of Centralised Wage Bargaining 
in the Greek Banking Sector 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters set out the theoretical context of the thesis and 
presented a coalitional approach that helps throw light on divergent paths of 
change. More specifically, the theoretical background dwelled on the debate of 
institutional change within and across varieties of capitalism, with a focus on 
change of wage bargaining institutions. In brief, the earlier theoretical conjectures 
expected a generalised pull towards breakdown of institutions. The fourth chapter 
begins with the empirical examination of the Greek banking sector. The trajectory 
of change has followed the Anglo-Saxon path of breakdown of centralised wage 
bargaining. However, within-case variation suggests the pertinence of the 
mediating conditions of ‘employer associability’ and labour state coalitions. 
 
The Greek banking sector is exemplary of an industry in which sectoral wage 
bargaining was the norm before the liberalisation of the market. Wage bargaining 
agreements were concluded in the Greek banking sector since 1974. However, the 
pressures from the liberalisation of the sector and the need to introduce flexible 
working practices during the 1990s led to a trajectory of institutional convergence 
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to the Liberal Market model of decentralised bargaining. Before the liberalisation 
of the sector, there were few competitive pressures and the market resembled an 
oligopoly dominated by state-owned enterprises. In this context, bargaining 
flourished at the sector level and employees from both public and private banks 
were represented by a strong sectoral trade union. The opening up of the sector 
started in the late 1980s and by the late 1990s new players had entered the 
market. At the same time, public banks were privatised and banks’ internal work 
organisation was modernised towards adopting more flexible management 
practices. As a consequence of the dual pressures from liberalisation and 
flexibility, tensions over the institution surfaced in the early 2000s. Although the 
sectoral wage bargaining institution survived until the mid 2000s, it finally broke 
down in the late 2000s. What can possibly account for this trajectory of change? 
The aim of the chapter is to answer this question with the backdrop of the 
coalitional framework developed in the previous chapter. 
 
The first factor explaining this trajectory of change is the absence of employer 
associability which would have been able to strike compromises between firms 
towards the reform of the wage bargaining institution. Firms were organised in a 
trade association which lacked the legal competence to negotiate labour relations 
issues, and the employers’ side was marked by divisions between large and small 
banks. Yet, an implicit labour-state coalition was able to prevent the collapse of 
sectoral wage bargaining until the mid 2000s. The labour side was able to speak 
with a single voice in a unitary sectoral association, despite ideological divisions. 
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The sectoral trade union (OTOE) managed to steer the government’s interest in 
supporting the institution of wage bargaining, irrespective of political party in 
government. It retained links with the both centre-right and centre-left parties and 
invited the government to intervene when negotiations were blocked. Thus, a 
labour-state coalition saved the institution from collapsing. The government’s 
interest did not only lay in electoral concerns, but also in advancing the 
government agenda for privatisation and pension reform. As the chapter shows, 
when the government agenda priorities shifted, this was the end of the labour-
state coalition, and employers’ drive towards the breakdown of sectoral wage 
bargaining was left loose. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will first provide an overview of the 
wage bargaining system in Greece presenting the main actors and the major 
turning point of Law 1876/1990. Then I will turn to the banking sector, briefly 
examining developments until the 1980s. Afterwards I will provide an overview 
of the sweeping structural changes that are observed during the 1990s, namely the 
EU liberalisation, the privatisation of state owned banks, and the intensification 
of competition. The next section, gauges the pervasive introduction of flexible 
working practices in both privatised and private banks. Following from this, the 
chapter will shift the focus on changes observed in the representation of labour 
and business. Finally, the account of events during the 2000s will pay close 
attention to the interactions between the main actors leading up to the collapse of 
centralised bargaining at the end of the decade. The final section concludes. 
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4.2. The Greek Wage Bargaining System: Continuity and Change 
 
Scholars of the Greek system of industrial relations have traditionally assigned it 
a very statist character and dubbed it either as state corporatism (Mavrogordatos, 
1988:57) or étatisme (Ioannou, 2000:220). The state’s intervention in the system 
and especially in trade unions’ internal politics has been historically pervasive. In 
the turbulent period between the end of World War II and the restoration of 
democracy in 1974, the Greek society went through a civil war, an interlude of 
‘restricted democracy’ and a seven-year dictatorship (1967-74). The state 
patronage of organised labour in this period has been so direct to the point that 
unions’ internal democracy was scrapped; and union officials were directly 
appointed by the Minister of Labour (Ioannou, 2000:222; Kritsantonis, 
1998:514). 
 
After the restoration of democracy in 1974 and until the ‘freeing’ of wage 
bargaining in 1990; political patronage remained, albeit took more indirect forms. 
The socialist PASOK government pushed reforms to democratise trade unions 
during the 1980s, establishing a proportional representation voting system in their 
internal elections. But democratisation was accompanied by extreme involvement 
of political parties. Elections took place among competing union factions, which 
had clear party affiliation. Political parties manipulated organised interests 
through the development of a dense web of clientelistic relations, patronage and 
political favours (Featherstone, 2005:229-230) and acted largely as ‘transmission 
belts’ of political parties’ will (Mavrogordatos, 1988:56). For sure, Greek unions 
were deprived of the ‘autonomy’ that -for instance- German trade unions gained 
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soon after the end of the war. Thereby, the antagonistic relations between 
different parties in the political arena were mirrored, more often than not, in the 
relations between employees’ representatives. 
 
The crucial turning point for the Greek wage bargaining system is manifested by 
Law 1876/1990. The law was enacted by the 1990 coalition government11, known 
as ‘ecumenical’, under Prime Minister Xenophon Zolotas. Apart from all political 
parties, the law’s provisions were also endorsed by all social partners: the peak 
labour confederation (GSEE) as well as the three peak employers associations 
(SEV, GSEVEE, ESEE).12 Although this monumental institutional change was 
passed as a Law and did not take the form of a ‘social pact’ (as the equivalent 
1993 Tripartite Accord in Italy, see next chapter), it is certainly considered as a 
functional equivalent of a ‘social pact’ (cf. Ioannou, 2010). This is justified by the 
wide-ranging consensus it enjoyed; not only from social partners, but also from 
parties across the political spectrum, including the ‘Unified Left’. 
 
The main thrust of this Law reformed and modernised the wage bargaining 
system in several respects: (i) social partners ‘autonomy’ was restored and two 
levels of wage bargaining were formally recognised (industry-level and firm 
level) assuming priority over the outdated craft/occupational levels 
(omoioepaggelmatikes); (ii) the scope of wage bargaining was expanded to 
                                                 
11
 Coalition governments, and especially all-party coalitions, is a rare event in the Greek political 
history. The 1990 coalition was only the second time that such a coalition was formed after the 
1974 ‘national unity’ government during the transition to democracy. The 1990 government was 
formed amidst political scandals, included all parties, but was short-lived lasting for only four and 
a half months. 
12
 Opinion of the Economic and Social Council. ‘Social Dialogue in Greece: Evaluation – Trends 
– Prospects’ 1(86), (18 December 2002), p.17. (In Greek). 
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include more non-wage issues (e.g. health and safety, working time, etc.); (iii) 
labour tribunals were abolished and compulsory arbitration13 abandoned, while a 
modern system of mediation and arbitration was introduced with the 
establishment of the Organisation for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED).14 
 
Following this institutional change, the prospects for the Greek system of social 
dialogue looked promising. The much sought ‘freeing’ of wage bargaining (i.e. 
freeing from state patronage) was eventually attained, while social partners’ 
autonomy was restored, converging to West European norms. Additionally, the 
institution of Economic and Social Council (see Table below) was put in place in 
1994, directly transposed as ‘best practice’ from the EU-level Economic and 
Social Committee. This institution replaced for good a range of similar Councils 
that appeared in Greece from the 1930s until the 1980s (see Ioannou, 2000:222), 
which can at best be viewed as parodies of social dialogue venues. The Greek 
industrial relations system was thought to be well on a trajectory of modernisation 
and convergence to the European model of social partnership. 
 
Table 4.1. Main Organisations in the Greek Interest Representation System. 
Organisation Function Membership 
Economic and 
Social Council 
of Greece 
(OKE)  
Est. 1994 
Advisory council to the government; 
set up by government via Law 
2232/1994; modelled after the EU 
Economic & Social Committee; Govt 
may request advice from OKE, but it is 
not binding; OKE can publish advisory 
documents and opinions on its own-
initiative. 
Employers: SEV (4); GSEVEE (4); ESEE (4); 
Hellenic Banks Association (1); Hotel-owners 
Federation (1); Ship-owners Association (1); 
Construction Firms Association (1). 
Employees: GSEE (11); ADEDY (5). 
Various Interests: Farmers Associations: 
PASEGES & GESASE (7); Professionals 
Chambers: lawyers, doctors, engineers, 
economists, agricultural scientists (4); 
Consumer Organisation (1); Local 
                                                 
13
 Compulsory arbitration was not a unique feature of Greek industrial relations. For instance, this 
practice was also prevalent in Australia. 
14
 Opinion of the Economic and Social Council. ‘Social Dialogue in Greece: Evaluation – Trends 
– Prospects’ 1(86), (18 December 2002), p.17. (In Greek). 
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Government: KEDKE (3). 
Organisation of 
Mediation & 
Arbitration 
(OMED) 
Est.1990 
Public authority; set up by govt (Law 
1876/1990); Provides mediation & 
arbitration services at the request of at 
least one of parties; cannot start 
arbitration/mediation on its own 
initiative, but arbitration decisions are 
legally binding. 
Government appointed Experts; The Body of 
Mediators and Arbitrators has 21 members; 
mediators and arbitrators are chosen either 
after agreement of the parties or via drawing 
lots. 
Greek General 
Confederation 
of Labour 
(GSEE) 
Est.1918 
Peak trade union confederation 
representing all employees under 
private law contracts; Signatory to the 
National General wage agreement, 
setting min. wages. 
74 Sectoral Trade union Federations & 83 
Regional Labour Centres; Total of 529,331 
active members (2001).  
Confederation 
of Greek Civil 
Servants’ Trade 
Unions 
(ADEDY) 
Est.1926 
Peak trade union confederation 
representing all civil servants working 
under public law contracts; is not 
allowed to bargain wages, only non-
wage issues. 
Sectoral Federations; Total of 240,463 active 
members (1998). Union factions:  
-PASKE (PASOK) -DAKE (ND) 
-PAME (KKE) -AP (SYN) -PSK (Leftist) 
 
 
Hellenic 
Federation of 
Enterprises 
(SEV)  
Est.1907 
Peak employers association 
representing (traditionally) big 
industrial firms; Signatory to the 
National General wage agreement, 
setting min. wages. 
Includes both individual firms and sectoral 
associations. 
Hellenic 
Confederation 
of Artisans 
(GSEVEE) 
Est.1919 
Peak employers association 
representing small-medium artisan 
firms and self-employed; Signatory to 
the National General wage agreement, 
setting min. wages. 
28 Sectoral Federations; 58 Regional 
Federations 
 
 
 
National 
Confederation 
of Greek 
Commerce 
(ESEE) 
Est.1987 
Peak employers association 
representing small-medium 
commercial firms & self-employed; 
Signatory to the National General wage 
agreement, setting min. wages. 
13 Regional Federations;  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
4.3. Greek Banking until the 1980s: Oligopoly and State ownership 
 
The industrial relations context of the banking sector resemble this ‘excessive 
statism’ that is characteristic of the national-level institutional arrangement. On 
the one hand, the majority of banks have been state-owned in the post-war period. 
Effectively, the state occupied the seat of the employer, but it also arbitrated 
relations between government-appointed management and employees. On the 
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other hand, the trade union officials came from party-affiliated union factions.15 
The ‘state interventionism’ was obvious until 1990 and the Minister of Labour 
was among the signatories of the sectoral agreement, which was concluded at the 
premises of the Ministry. 
 
The government intervention in the sector’s wage bargaining during the 1980s is 
far from surprising. This intervention is circumscribed in the outdated 
institutional framework that prevailed until the 1990s. According to Law 3239 of 
1955, wage agreements become legally binding only after a ministerial decision, 
adjudicated by the Minister of Labour. But there is another reason, why the 
government had a direct stake in arbitrating wage agreements in this sector. Since 
the majority of banks were state-owned, a potential loss in the balance sheets of 
banks16 would carry a burden for the government budget. Thereby, the process of 
mediation in wage bargaining was indirectly part of government’s incomes 
policy.17 
 
The turning point of Law 1876/1990 had also implications for wage bargaining 
arrangements in the sector, since it made a special reference to banking (Art. 3, 
paragraph 4): 
                                                 
15
 The banking trade union (OTOE) was dominated by leftist union factions in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, so antagonisms surfaced both with the Constantine Karamanalis centre-right 
government (1974-1981) and the Andreas Papandreou socialist government (1981-1989). Since 
the mid-1980s the socialist faction is dominant in OTOE. 
16
 Nevertheless, banks had traditionally retained very high profit margins. 
17
 Although the majority of banks have been state-owned, it should be clarified that they were 
legal entities subject to private law provisions. Therefore, the banking trade union was affiliated to 
the General Confederation of Workers (GSEE) and not the Civil Servants Confederation 
(ADEDY). This allowed OTOE to bargain over wages, as opposed to civil servants, whose wages 
were set unilaterally by the government. 
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Industry-wide wage agreements are concluded between [sectoral trade unions]… 
and employers associations, but specifically for the employees in banks, in the event 
that there is no sectoral employer association, [agreements are signed] by individual 
employer firms which are represented by [a] jointly authorised representative[s], 
only if these employers cover at least 70 per cent of employees in the sector 
(emphasis added).18 
The banking trade union managed to incorporate this provision, in the knowledge 
that the Hellenic Banks Association (EET) was not willing to act as an employers 
association. Nearly two decades later, this provision would be at the heart of the 
dispute between trade unions and employers. 
 
The banking sector trade union (OTOE) was in the vanguard of the modernisation 
of trade unions and convergence to West European norms in many different 
respects. OTOE was established in 1955 and was among the first to organise 
employees at sectoral level. This contrasted sharply with the outdated 
organisation of workers according to craft/occupation, which was a residual of the 
medieval ‘guild system’. OTOE established a research institute (Institute of 
Labour-OTOE) to assist negotiators with scientific expertise in line with modern 
practices elsewhere in Europe. Additionally, it pursued closer cooperation with its 
European counterparts; it strengthened its coordination with banking unions in 
Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Cyprus) and developed with 
them a Mediterranean conference under the auspices of the EU-level sectoral 
organisation EURO-FIET. In a similar vein, it developed bilateral relations with 
trade unions in the Balkan region. Finally, it actively sought to participate in 
                                                 
18
 Law 1876/1990 ‘Free Collective Bargaining and Other Provisions’ Government Gazette (FEK) 
No.27/Α/1990. 
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European Works Councils of multinational banks operating in Greece, taking 
advantage of the innovative European Union Directive on Works Councils.19 
Since the early 1990s the institution of sectoral wage bargaining worked rather 
well and wage agreements were uninterruptedly signed for more than a decade, 
without interference from the Minister of Labour, and social partners’ autonomy 
was preserved. Yet, the liberalisation of the market, the intensification of 
competition and the introduction of flexibility would put strong destabilising 
pressures to the institution of wage bargaining. The next section starts with the 
pressures arising from liberalisation. 
 
4.4. Greek Banking in the 1990s: State Withdrawal and the Market 
Unbound 
4.4.1. EU Liberalisation, Privatisation and Intensification of 
Competition 
 
The liberalisation of the financial market in Greece was launched later than other 
OECD countries, but progressed rapidly from the second half of the 1980s. The 
liberalising initiative had five main elements: abolition of capital movement 
restrictions; freeing of interest rates; end to credit controls; allowing 
Bancassurance activities; and creation of a vast market in government securities 
(Soumelis, 1995:40-41). The opening up of the market and the removal of 
barriers to entry facilitated the appearance of new players in the sector. There was 
an aggressive expansion strategy from foreign banks entering the market by 
                                                 
19
 On the European Works Councils Directive (94/45/EC) see Falkner (1996). 
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setting up branches (not subsidiaries) in the early 1990s such as HSBC, Citibank 
and Bank of Cyprus, taking advantage of the EU ‘single licence’ (Eichengreen 
and Gibson, 2001:545-546). Indeed, the sector has been one of the most popular 
sectors in Greece in terms of attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a 
result of the liberalisation of the market (Filippaios, 2006). Increased competition 
from new entrants is also documented by the rate of growth in foreign banks’ 
branches network20 and the expansion of foreign banks was much more intensive 
than the average expansion of both domestic and foreign banks (Table below). 
 
Table 4.2. Penetration of Foreign-owned Banks in Greece, 1996 - 2005. 
 1996 2002 2005 ∆% 96-05 
 Firms 
All Banks 39 43 43 10,26% 
Foreign-owned 22 21 22 0,00% 
 Bank Branches Network 
All Banks 2676 3107 3358 25,49% 
Foreign-owned 130 188 242 86,15% 
 Employees 
All Banks 56407 58237 59131 4,83% 
Foreign-owned 4144 4795 5381 29,85% 
Source: OECD (2008:268).  
 
Simultaneously two other processes were taking place: privatisation of state-
owned banks and successive mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Privatisation of 
Greek banks accelerated in the early 1990s (Pagoulatos, 1996) and was largely 
completed by the early 2000s. Privatisation of state-owned banks was part of the 
agenda of both centre-right New Democracy government (1990-93) and 
continued with the socialist party government (1993-2004). Predictably, the trade 
                                                 
20
 It is likely that the percentage increases would be even more impressive, if there were available 
data since the early 1990s. 
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unions in the sector tried to resist privatisation initiatives with a series of strikes. 
However, the strike barricades were unable to stop the tide towards privatisation. 
On the one hand, concerns were raised over banks low efficiency in spite of high 
profitability (Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001). Inefficiency was attributed not only 
to the oligopolistic structure of the market, but also to the ‘civil servant culture’ 
of banking employees. On the other hand, the proceedings from privatisation 
were expected to reduce national debt and budget deficit, and thereby assist in the 
national target of entry to the Economic and Monetary Union (Pagoulatos, 1996). 
Finally, privatisations were only resisted from smaller leftist parties, which had 
minor parliamentary power. In the absence of strong political allies, the trade 
unions could not stem the process of privatisation. In parallel, mergers and 
acquisitions spanned the whole period until the late 2000s (see Table below). The 
two processes were not necessarily distinct. For example, the state-owned Ionian 
Bank was privatised through a competitive bid by the privately-owned Alpha 
Bank. Then a merger followed between the two banks. 
 
Table 4.3. Merger & Acquisition Activity in Greek Banking, 1996 - 2007. 
Year Target Acquired by/Merged with 
2007 Egnatia Bank, Popular Bank, Marfin Bank Marfin Popular Bank 
2004 Investment Bank Commercial Bank 
  Geniki Bank Societe General 
2002 ETEBA National Bank of Greece 
  Unit Bank EFG Eurobank 
  ETBA Piraeus Bank 
2001 Telesis Investment Bank EFG Eurobank 
2000 Commercial Bank Credit Agricole 
  Novabank BC Portugues 
1999 Ionian Bank Alpha Bank 
  Ergobank EFG Eurobank 
  10% EFG Eurobank Deutsche Bank 
  NatWest (GR) Piraeus Bank 
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  Dorian Bank Telesis Investment Bank 
1998 Mortgage Bank of Greece National Bank of Greece 
  Creta Bank, Bank of Athens EFG Eurobank 
  
Macedonia-Thrace, Xiosbank,  
Credit Lyonnais (GR) 
Piraeus Bank 
  Bank of Central Greece  Egnatia Bank 
1997 National Housing Bank Mortgage Bank of Greece 
  Chase Manhattan (GR) Piraeus Bank 
1996 Interbank EFG Eurobank 
Source: Author’s compilation from Pagoulatos (2003:189) & Hellenic Banks Association web-
site www.hba.gr. 
 
Crucially, this increased market concentration through M&As may cast doubt to 
the idea that competition has increased within the market.21 However, studies for 
the Greek banking reach the conclusion that competition has increased since the 
1990s due to single market liberalisation (Hondroyiannis et al., 1999; 
Mamatzakis and Remoundos, 2003). The picture of increased competition 
following from liberalisation is further warranted by examining the rapidly 
changing market shares of the ‘Big 5’ (Table below). 
 
Table 4.4. Market Shares (%) of Larger Banks in Greece, 1991 - 2005. 
Banks Loan Market Share (%) Deposit Market Share (%) 
  1991 1995 2000 2005 1991 1995 2000 2005 
National Bank 48.3 36.7 24.5 20.3 56.8 49.5 35.2 28 
Commercial Bank 20.2 18.5 11.2 11 16 15.1 10.7 10.1 
Ionian Bank 8.7 8.1 - - 7.4 8.8 - - 
Alpha Bank 9.3 14.5 19.6 18.1 8.4 10.6 19.2 13.2 
Ergobank 4.3 6.3 - - 4.4 5.6 - - 
EFG Eurobank    13.3 18.1    11.8 16.8 
Pireaus Bank    7.8 10.9     7.6 7.8 
Source: Mamatzakis & Remoundos (2003:86) and Eurobank Research (2006:8). 
 
                                                 
21
 In the relevant economics literature, there is a debate as to whether concentration (small number 
of firms) may co-exist with competition in a market, which is usually called a ‘contestable 
market’. However, entering into the debate of whether the banking sector is an example of a 
contestable market goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. The studies and data cited next 
suffice to warrant the conclusion of increased competition. 
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The above data complement interview evidence that competition intensified after 
the market liberalisation.22 The banks were caught in the wave of rapidly falling 
interest rates as part of the process of convergence to the Maastricht criteria. As a 
result, ‘price wars’ burst out between them reducing the interest rates of loans and 
diversifying financial products. The next section examines the changes observed 
in the internal organisation of Greek banks. 
 
4.4.2. Restructuring the Banks: Working Time Flexibility, Pay 
Flexibility and Downsizing 
 
In the 1980s Greek banks are characterised by the pattern of ‘internal labour 
markets’ (Petrinioti, 1998) with high job security, standardised working time 
patterns, and seniority-based pay and promotion rules. However, there was an 
additional reason why job security was guaranteed within the Greek banks. These 
firms were not only the large corporations that offered ‘jobs for life’ a la IBM (an 
exemplar of the ‘internal labour market’ model). Greek banks were also state-
owned enterprises with high profit margins, and therefore the chance of 
redundancy was minimal. The introduction of flexible working practices, after the 
privatisation and technological modernisation of state-owned banks, was bound to 
change those favourable conditions. 
 
The challenges stemming from the ‘fading out’ of Fordism are reflected in the 
working time changes during this period. The flagship ‘non-wage’ demand of the 
                                                 
22
 Author’s interviews with: sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010); with sectoral 
business representative 1 (3 June 2010); with  sectoral business representative 2 (21 July 2010). 
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General Confederation of Workers (GSEE) was the implementation of 35 hour 
working week without pay reductions à la française.23 A committee with experts 
from employers and trade unions was set up in 1999 to study the potential 
implementation of the 35 hour week. As the issue gained some momentum, the 
banking sector was in the vanguard, agreeing a pilot implementation of the 35 
hour week.24 However, negotiations within the national committee reached a 
stalemate as the employers’ side raised insurmountable concerns over the impact 
of such a measure on competitiveness, judging it as ‘premature’.25 
 
Apart from this short-lived experiment over 35-hour week, banking wage 
bargaining rounds are marked by a permanent conflict over working time changes 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.26 On the one hand, the employers’ side 
pursued an extension of banks’ opening hours. On the other hand, this went 
against trade unions flagship demand for shortening working week. However, the 
conflict over flexibility in work organisation was not sufficient to lead to the 
                                                 
23
 Such a measure was expected not only to improve working conditions for employed, but also to 
boost job creation reducing the persistently high unemployment rate. Certainly, the additional cost 
would mainly burden employers squeezing profit margins. But the estimates of this cost were 
variable, taking into account shorter breaks and expected increases in productivity. 
24
 ‘New banking agreement introduces pilot 35-hour week’ , European Industrial Relations 
Observatory, (June 1999), available at:  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1999/06/feature/gr9906135f.htm [last retrieved: 25 
September 2011]. 
25
 ‘Work of expert committee on working time reduction reaches impasse’ European Industrial 
Relations Observatory, (January 2000), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/01/inbrief/gr0001159n.htm [last retrieved: 25 
September 2011].  
26
 ‘Collective agreement signed for banking sector 1997/8’, , European Industrial Relations 
Observatory, (June 1997), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/06/inbrief/gr9706117n.htm [last retrieved: 25 
September 2011]; ‘New banking agreement introduces pilot 35-hour week’ , European Industrial 
Relations Observatory, (June 1999), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1999/06/feature/gr9906135f.htm [last retrieved: 25 
September 2011]; ‘New agreement signed for banking sector’ , European Industrial Relations 
Observatory, (June 2002), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2002/06/inbrief/gr0206102n.htm [last retrieved: 25 
September 2011]. 
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breakdown of wage bargaining. Facilitated by state intervention, compromises 
were eventually reached. The formula entailed increasing opening hours in line 
with employers’ demand, in exchange for a slight reduction in weekly working 
hours. In other words, work reorganisation squeezed the time for ‘back office’ 
operations (clearance, settlements, etc.) extending the ‘front office’ time. Finally, 
the introduction of incentive pay systems was also part of banks re-structuring 
strategy in order to align pay with performance. These changes were mostly 
reflected on the content of firm level bargaining during the 1990s, which 
introduced performance-related bonuses by business product unit. 
 
In sum, the Greek banks in the 1990s caught up with international trends towards 
corporate re-structuring and streamlining operations. Privatisation facilitated the 
technological modernisation and adoption of modern management techniques. 
The strong ‘internal labour markets’ that characterised the earlier era were 
weakened, and banks adopted a ‘segmented approach to hiring with multiple 
entry levels’ (Panopoulou, 2005:19). Banks’ human resources were replenished 
with younger graduates, shedding out senior labour through early retirement. Job 
content became more customer-oriented, transforming bank employees ‘from 
tellers to sellers’.27 Finally, working time was adjusted to meet customer demand, 
while pay systems were aligned to results. However, neither the pressures from 
intensified competition after liberalisation, nor the introduction of flexible 
working practices provided the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
breakdown of wage bargaining. Instead, the introduction of flexible working 
                                                 
27
 ‘Banks: fewer tellers, more sellers’ Ta Nea, (17 August 2002). 
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practices was just a trigger for change in the preferences of individual banks.28 
Despite conflict and disagreements during negotiations, and even more the bitter 
climate and personal antagonisms29 following privatisations and mergers, the 
institution of industry wage bargaining was not questioned in the 1990s. Before 
delving into the account of events that led to the breakdown of wage bargaining 
in the late 2000s, the next section examines the structure of interest representation 
of labour and business. 
 
4.5. The Representation of Labour and Business 
4.5.1. Labour: Single Voice despite Internal Divisions 
 
International studies of the decline in trade unions’ power emphasise the fall in 
union membership, but also the sharpening of divisions between blue-collar 
workers in manufacturing and white-collar workers in services (Katz, 1993). 
Given that banking is a services sector such divisions are expected to be more 
subtle; for instance, between lower-skilled clerical employees and higher-skilled 
executives. The individualisation of pay determination is expected to favour the 
latter, since they have higher stock of human capital, thereby able to gain higher 
(increases in) wages than those set in wage agreements. This begs the question: 
how far have these (or other) divisions hindered the conclusion of wage 
agreements?  
 
                                                 
28
 Author’s interviews: with industrial relations expert 1 (2 February 2010); with industrial 
relations expert 2 (11 February 2010); with sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010). 
29
 Author’s interview with industrial relations expert 2 (22 February 2010). 
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As it was mentioned above, banking employees were represented by a unitary 
trade union federation (ΟΤΟΕ). Yet, behind this ‘veil of unity’, there lies a 
multiple fragmentation. The first division is along ideological lines. Internal 
union factions are affiliated with opposing political parties and acted often as 
their ‘transmission belts’, reproducing the antagonisms in the political system. 
Banks also offered fertile ground for the development of clientelistic practices. 
Getting a ‘job in a bank’ would become one of the best career options for some 
generations. It was associated with high social status and prestige, and combined 
near-civil service job security with competitive remuneration and promotion 
opportunities. As a result, both socialist and centre-right governments distorted 
banks’ recruiting processes to cater clientelistic relationships, and up until the 
early 1990s banking personnel was often appointed with political criteria 
(Papandreou, 1991). These practices gave rise to ‘us and them’ attitudes within 
the banks, since promotion criteria through the internal career ladder included 
‘political acquaintances’ in the governing party. These practices were destined to 
change after the 1990s. 
 
The extent of partitocrazia within OTOE was partly reduced, due to the rise of 
autonomous and apolitical union factions. The latter were concentrated in 
privately-owned banks and were a result of the generalised disenchantment with 
the political system. Political union factions remained important, but lost much of 
the support they enjoyed in the 1980s, accruing much lower percentages in the 
internal elections. Additionally, developments in the political system were 
reflected in union factions. Notably, the splitting up of the ‘Unified Left’ in the 
early 1990s into a pro-European Left party (SYN) and an anti-European 
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Communist party (KKE) weakened the general influence of the Left in the unions 
and allowed the rise of the socialist (PASKE) and centre right (DAKE) factions. 
Furthermore, the Communist party (KKE) nurtured separatist tendencies within 
OTOE through its trade unionist wing (PAME), which is still the most militant. 
This was in line with the permanent strategy of KKE to discredit official trade 
union leaders, accusing them for being ‘sold out’ (poulimenoi). The separatist 
tendencies led to the establishment of a new federation for employees in the 
Finance sector (see table). However, this communist trade union never sought to 
sign agreements, remaining focused on organising separate strikes and protests. 
Paradoxically, PAME continued to exist also as a union faction within OTOE, 
taking part in the elections and trying to bring the leadership of OTOE into 
disrepute. 
 
The second division within OTOE is along occupational lines. Affiliate members 
include firm level unions organising the lower echelons of ‘clerical personnel’ as 
well as the higher-skilled ‘scientific personnel’. This fragmentation is a residual 
of the historical uneven and segmented development of unions within banks. In 
the early 1980s, the so-called ‘university graduates problem’30 almost endangered 
the complete break-up of OTOE (Tsakiris, 2006:274-278). These internal 
divisions faded out gradually, but still exist. For instance, there are still separate 
firm level unions within banks (mainly ex-state-owned); some organising 
‘clerical and technical personnel’ and other for ‘scientific personnel’. A final 
dividing line is between firm level unions of banks which merged. Firm level 
                                                 
30
 In short, the points of contention were the differential promotion criteria and allowances (i) 
between university graduates coming from different disciplines and (ii) between university and 
high school graduates.  
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union mergers did not keep pace with banks mergers, and as a result there are still 
unions of ‘ex-banks’. The reluctance to promote mergers between unions is 
attributed to the fact that trade unionists are attached to ‘holding an office’ or just 
because of sentimental attachment to one’s old bank.31 
 
One would reasonably expect that the multiple fragmentation sketched out above, 
would pose a severe threat to the labour’s ability to speak with a ‘single voice’. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case. Instead, a broader political consensus is usually 
achieved spanning from the left faction (AD) to the centre-right faction (DAKE); 
and from the apolitical factions (e.g. ASKE) to the dominant socialist faction 
(DΗSΥE/PASKE). As a result, the signing of sectoral wage agreements was 
consistently approved during the 1990s within the General Council with broad 
majorities. The next table summarises the labour representation in the Greek 
banking sector. 
 
Table 4.5. Main Trade Union Organisations in the Greek Banking Sector. 
Organisation Function Membership/Affiliation 
Hellenic 
Federation of 
Bank employee 
Unions 
(OTOE) 
Est. 1955  
Representative Employees 
Association; Signatory to sectoral 
wage agreement 
24 firm level trade unions; Union density 85 
per cent (in ex-state owned banks nearly 100 
per cent); 
Union factions: DHSYE (PASOK); DAKE 
(ND); AD (SYN); PAME (KKE); ASKE 
(apolitical). 
Trade Union of 
Employees in 
Finance of 
Attica 
Separatist sectoral union of PAME; 
non-signatory to the sectoral wage 
agreement 
Affiliate with the communist party(KKE) 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
                                                 
31
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010). 
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4.5.2. Business: The Lack of Employer Associability 
 
The association that historically represented the interests of domestic and foreign 
credit institutions operating in Greece has been the Hellenic Bank Association 
(EET). The association was established in 1928, with the objective to self-
regulate the sector. Thus, it filled gaps in the institutional framework and set rules 
governing the fierce competition between banks themselves, and between banks 
and non-financial firms (Kostis, 1997). Its main functions are: (i) to provide 
advisory input to the regulatory process of the financial sector, (ii) to participate 
in the decision-making procedures of international, European and national law-
preparing and technical committees, and (iii) to cooperate with other countries' 
organisations and associations of the financial sector in the context of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. 
 
The association was borne as a trade association (or lobbying group) providing 
input in the regulatory issues (taxing, accounting standards, supervision, 
consumer protection, deposit guarantees). The resolve of the bankers to retain this 
status for the association is evidenced by the change in the statute in 1990. When 
the unions managed to insert the provision in Law 1876/1990, that in the absence 
of an employers association the banks would bargain with representatives from 
banks covering 70 per cent of employment, the Hellenic Banks Association 
responded to this by clearly stipulating in its statute that it was not an employers 
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association.32 Still, the ‘labour-state’ coalition at the time managed to create 
quasi-employer associability with this provision.33 
 
In the years that followed, the Hellenic Bank Association remained focused on 
narrow interests’ representation, acting more as a lobbying group.34 The EET 
studied the import and domestic implementation of international regulations (e.g. 
laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) as 
well as European regulations and Directives. Therefore, it lacked historically the 
legal competence to negotiate labour relations issues on behalf of its members. 
Although there were some internal deliberations with regard to changing the 
association into an employers association, the larger banks, and especially the 
National Bank of Greece, were strongly against such delegation of 
competences.35 The motivation lied on an unwillingness to mix ‘apolitical’ 
regulatory issues with politically-laden labour relations issues.36 
 
The decision making process within the bankers association was and remains 
skewed towards favouring larger banks. The majority of important decisions are 
taken by the presidium which involves the general secretary, the president and the 
three-vice presidents, all of whom are coming from the larger banks.37 While in 
the sub-committees there is an effort for consensus, the decision making process 
in the association is ‘certainly not meant to be democratic’; instead, market power 
determines weight in the decision making process, and the smaller banks had 
                                                 
32
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 2 (21 July 2010). 
33
 Author’s interview with government representative 2 (2 May 2011).  
34
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 1 (3 June 2010). 
35
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 2 (21 July 2010). 
36
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 2 (21 July 2010). 
37
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 2 (21 July 2010). 
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little say in the Hellenic Banks Association.38 In practice, smaller banks’ interests 
were ‘beyond the radar screen’ of the larger banks and EET was mainly the 
playfield of large banks.39  
 
Table 4.6. Main Business Associations in the Greek Banking Sector. 
Organisation Function Membership 
Hellenic Bank 
Association 
(EET) 
Est.1928 
According to by-laws “trade 
association” (not “employers 
association”) But, holds a permanent 
seat on the employers’ side within the 
Economic and Social Council 
21 regular members (banks); 6 associate 
members. 
Association of 
Co-operative 
Banks of Greece 
(ESTE) 
Est.1995 
According to by-laws “trade 
association” (not “employers 
association”) 
17 regular members (regional co-operative 
banks); 8 associate members (regional credit 
co-operatives) 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
4.6. Greek Banking in the 2000s: Tensions and the Breakdown of 
Centralised Wage Bargaining 
4.6.1. A Near Breakdown of Wage Bargaining in the mid 2000s 
 
The uninterrupted sequence of concluding sectoral wage agreements was first 
broken in the early 2000s, when the initial tensions over the institution of wage 
bargaining appeared. In 2002 OTOE invited the banks to start negotiations over 
the new wage agreement. This was in line with the customary pattern of sending 
an invitation to employers; when the previous agreement was near to expire. 
Employers came reluctantly to the bargaining table, and soon after, negotiations 
broke down. In the face of this, the trade unions followed a two-pronged strategy. 
                                                 
38
 Author’s interviews with: sectoral business representative 1 (3 June 2010) and sectoral business 
representative 2 (21 July 2010). 
39
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 1 (3 June 2010). 
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On the one hand, they broke the ‘peace-clause’ attached to the previous 
agreement calling a strike. This was a tactical manoeuvre to put pressure to firms 
to sign an agreement. On the other hand, they asked from the Minister of Labour 
of the socialist governing party, Dimitris Reppas, to intervene. Indeed, only after 
the mediation by the Minister was it possible to resume negotiations and finally 
conclude a wage agreement.40 The same pattern is also observed in the next 
bargaining round of 2004. The union invited the employers to start bargaining for 
a new agreement, employers joined reluctantly, but negotiations reached a 
stalemate. In both instances the major point of contention was working time 
changes. Employers wanted an increase in banks’ opening hours, a change that 
clashed with union’s demand for shortening working week. The trade union 
announced sector-wide strikes and asked the government to intervene, so that 
negotiations are resumed.  
 
Interestingly, government intervention did not stop with the change of 
government to the centre-right New Democracy party. The new Minister of 
Labour, Panos Panagiotopoulos, had only taken up his post a couple of months 
earlier. One of the first hurdles he had to overcome was ensuring social peace in 
the banking sector. Therefore, he invited OTOE and the representatives of the 
larger banks in the Ministry so that they resume negotiations. As mentioned 
above, the compromise entailed increasing ‘opening hours’ in line with banks 
                                                 
40
 ‘New agreement signed for banking sector’, European Industrial Relations Observatory, (June 
2002), available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2002/06/inbrief/gr0206102n.htm [last 
retrieved: 25 September 2011]. 
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demand, and squeezing the slot of time for ‘back office’ functions. Again, only 
after the mediation of the Ministry an agreement was made possible.41  
 
There is something puzzling about this intervention, though. OTOE leadership 
has been dominated by the socialist faction for years, controlling usually half or 
even more of the seats in the Executive Secretariat. Why would the Minister of a 
newly elected centre-right government be interested in assisting a trade union that 
is considered as a stronghold of socialists? Part of the explanation lies with the 
minister’s political profile. Panagiotopoulos belonged to the party segment that is 
dubbed as ‘popular right’.42 In other words, he had a ‘social-liberal’ leaning, 
looking favourably upon social rights, trade unions and welfare state, which gave 
him the nickname ‘Red Panos’. But there were deeper motives likely explaining 
the Minister’s action. The centre-right union faction in OTOE was already torn by 
internal divisions, including a split in the early 2000s.43 The expectations from the 
newly elected centre-right government were high. If the government had chosen 
not to side with the unions, it would have been a fatal blow for their union 
faction. In sum, in the first half of the 2000s destabilising tensions over the 
institution appeared, however, the labour-state coalition saved the institution from 
collapsing. But the bankers’ pressures to abandon the institution intensified in the 
second half of the decade. 
 
                                                 
41
 ‘New agreement signed for banking sector’ European Industrial Relations Observatory, 
(October 2004), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/10/inbrief/gr0410102n.htm [last retrieved: 25 
September 2011]; ‘Banks, two-year agreement’, Ta Nea, (18 June 2004). 
42
 Author’s interview with industrial relations expert 2 (11 February 2010). ‘Greek popular right’ 
is more union-friendly and close to French ‘Gaullist right’ or German ‘Christian-democracy’. 
43
 ‘DAKE divided’, Ta Nea, (17 October 2000). 
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Indeed, on the bankers’ side, there were discussions over ‘loosening the 
straightjacket’ of sectoral agreements already since the early 2000s.44 However, 
only after the majority of banks were privatised did they reveal their preference to 
abandon the institution. The initiative was taken by the CEO of the leading 
National Bank, Mr. Takis Arapoglou. In 2006 six identical letters were mailed 
from the heads of the ‘Big 6’ banks to OTOE.45 In those letters it was clearly 
stated that ‘the firms would no longer be willing to bargain an industry-wide 
agreement’. Instead, they would only sign separate agreements with firm level 
unions in each bank. The rationale behind this preference was based on the 
structural changes in the sector. They contended that the times that sectoral 
agreements were the norm were a thing of the past; state ownership in the sector 
has been minimised, competition has intensified, while banks have diversified 
their operations beyond national borders’.46 The letters emphasised that when 
banks were under state control, there was one major shareholder (the state), 
making it easier to aggregate preferences.47 This was no longer feasible. 
Indicatively, the letters which were addressed to the unions stated: 
You have failed to grasp that market conditions have changed, competition has 
increased, and customer needs differentiated, while individual banks have very 
diverse business plans.48 
 
                                                 
44
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 1 (3 June 2010). 
45
 ‘Bankers’ bomb for collective agreements’, Kathimerini, (1 February 2006); The six larger 
banks were: National Bank of Greece, Agricultural Bank, Commercial Bank, Eurobank, Alpha 
Bank, and Pireaus Bank. 
46
 ‘We are not discussing industry-agreements because… state-owned banks have been reduced’ 
Eleftherotypia, (1 February 2006); Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 1 (3 
June 2010). 
47
 ‘We are not discussing industry-agreements because… state-owned banks have been reduced’ 
Eleftherotypia, (1 February 2006). 
48
 ‘We are not discussing industry-agreements because… state-owned banks have been reduced’ 
Eleftherotypia, (1 February 2006). 
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Clearly, the pressures arising from liberalisation and increased need for flexibility 
were manifesting themselves. Banks were willing to keep up bargaining, but only 
at the firm level. Unlike their Italian counterparts, the Greek bankers were not 
interested in ensuring a level-playing field in competition and standardisation of 
costs across the sector.49 Instead, cut-throat competition was very much welcome, 
even if that led to greater concentration, with larger banks pushing smaller banks 
out of the market.50 To show their resolve, the CEO of the leading National Bank 
of Greece, Takis Arapoglou, rushed to sign a firm level agreement with the 
company union, before a sectoral agreement was even discussed. This was in 
sharp contrast with the tradition of firm level bargaining taking place after the 
sectoral agreement was concluded. 
 
The reaction from OTOE was swift and ferocious. The challenge to the institution 
of wage bargaining threatened the main function and –by implication– the 
existence of the sectoral association itself.51 A sense of a crisis mobilised the 
union officials to take action. On the one hand, the leadership of OTOE called the 
convention of the Executive Secretariat with the agenda of calling a national 
strike and going to an ‘extraordinary congress’. The strategy of the trade unions 
was reached by consensus between the different political factions, and unions 
appeared able to speak with a single voice, especially the socialist PASKE and 
the centre-right DAKE.52 Moreover, the union leaders pursued meetings with 
opposition parties’ leaders to gain their support. Forging wider ‘political 
                                                 
49
 Author’s interview with government representative 2 (2 May 2011). 
50
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 1 (3 June 2010). 
51
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010). 
52
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010). 
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coalitions’ was a very conscious strategy from the part of the trade unions to stem 
the employers’ offensive.53 The peak confederation (GSEE) issued statements of 
support towards OTOE, condemning the bankers’ refusal to bargain. The refusal 
was perceived by GSEE as a ‘Thatcherite union-busting strategy’54 that sought to 
break up its strongest affiliate. The peak confederation was also very concerned 
over the domino effects from such a development. If their strongest affiliate was 
busted, then weaker unions in other sectors would be unable to withstand a 
similar threat.55 Even more, they feared of a ‘decentralisation spiral’ going all the 
way to the challenge of the national general agreement setting minimum wages. 
Indeed, these concerns were not completely unfounded, since a few months 
earlier the peak employers association (SEV) suggested the ‘opt-out’ of high 
unemployment areas from the minimum wage.56 
 
Despite the ability of unions to speak with a ‘single voice’ even between 
competing union factions, the initial reactions from the government signify the 
congruence between employers’ plans and government agenda.57 The very next 
day George Alogoskoufis, Minister of Finance, stated that: 
‘We cannot, on the one hand, tell the banks “to compete among yourselves”, to the 
benefit of consumers, firms, employment, and economy generally, and on the other 
hand, tell them “get together and cooperate on labour relations issues”. Banks will 
                                                 
53
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010). 
54
 ‘Support of mobilisation from George Papandreou’ Kathimerini, (18 February 2006). 
55
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010). 
56
 ‘Public Outcry for SEV’, Ta Nea, (22 December 2005). 
57
 ‘PASOK allegations against Alogoskoufis’ Ta Nea, (7 February 2006); ‘With the blessing of 
Alogoskoufis the coup d’ etat in banks’ Ta Nea, (3 February 2006); ‘Alogoskoufis in favour of 
abandoning industry-agreements’ Eleftherotypia, (3 February 2006); Author’s interview with 
sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010); and with government representative 2 (2 May 
2011). 
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either compete or cooperate with each other. When the banking system was state-
owned, there was some logic in cooperation under the state umbrella’.58 
 
The official party line from the Prime Ministerial Office (Megaro Maximou) was 
that the government would not intervene in wage bargaining mediating the 
conflict and the government spokesman, Evangelos Antonaros, confirmed this 
stance during the regular press briefing.59 
 
In the following weeks, OTOE mustered the valuable allies among opposition 
parties. George Papandreou, the socialist party leader, met with OTOE 
representatives and extended his support to the union’s mobilisation. He 
condemned the Karamanlis government for ‘attacking a basic social right, the 
right to bargain collectively; undermining social peace and cohesion; and making 
Greece a cheap-labour country’.60 The socialist party’s support to the unions is 
also evidenced by earlier initiatives taken up by socialist members of Parliament. 
Initially the MPs requested an official hearing of Mr. Arapoglou by the 
Parliamentary Committee for Economic Affairs to explain his refusal to negotiate 
a wage agreement with OTOE.61 Subsequently, socialist MPs addressed 
parliamentary questions to both the Minister of Finance and Minister of Labour, 
regarding the refusal of the three banks in which the state was still holding 
                                                 
58
 ‘Alogoskoufis in favour of abandoning industry-agreements’ Eleftherotypia, (3 February 2006); 
‘With the blessing of Alogoskoufis the coup d’ etat in banks’ Ta Nea, (3 February 2006). 
59
 ‘They «wash their hands» of OTOE’, Ta Nea, (2 February 2006); ‘Concern and discomfort in 
government’ Kathimerini, (2 February 2006). 
60
 ‘G.Papandreou: Dark Ages in Employment’ Kathimerini, (2 February 2006); ‘Support of 
mobilisation from George Papandreou’ Kathimerini, (18 February 2006). 
61
 ‘PASOK calls Arapoglou in the Parliament’ Eleftherotypia, (2 February 2006). 
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shares.62 Those banks were also called ‘banks of state interest’ (trapezes kratikou 
endiaferontos).63 
 
The issue attracted considerable publicity amidst strikes and protests and climbed 
high up in the political agenda. The trade unions accused the government for not 
disciplining the government appointed CEOs in the three ‘banks of state interest’. 
The government responded that banks operate under ‘private sector management’ 
criteria and the state is only a minority shareholder. Trade unions and opposition 
parties targeted the Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis, because the appointment 
of Mr. Arapoglou as the National Bank’s CEO was the PM’s personal choice. 
 
Soon, the first cracks appear in the government's united front behind the ‘non-
intervention’ policy. The Minister of Labour, Panos Panagiotopoulos, acting at 
the margins of the party line, attempted meetings with the six banks’ heads, but 
they were fruitless. After the failure of mediation ‘Red Panos’ admitted that ‘the 
government lacks the mechanisms and tools to put pressure to the bankers’.64 
Concerns were also raised from other members of the Cabinet over the 
repercussions from the escalating conflict in the forthcoming elections.65 Even 
more outrageous were trade unionists affiliated with the centre-right party. They 
openly accused the Minister of Finance, George Alogoskoufis, for steering the 
‘Big 6’ initiative to abandon sectoral wage bargaining.66 Indicatively, a leading 
union official in the centre-right faction (DAKE) stated that ‘I cannot imagine 
                                                 
62
 ‘PASOK allegations against Alogoskoufis’ Ta Nea, (7 February 2006).  
63
 The ‘banks of state interest’ were at the time: the National Bank of Greece, the Commercial 
Bank of Greece, and the Agricultural Bank of Greece. 
64
 ‘With the blessing of Alogoskoufis the coup d’ etat in banks’ Ta Nea, (3 February 2006). 
65
 ‘Tactical manoeuvre after the reactions’, Ta Nea, (1 March 2006). 
66
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010). 
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that the heads of 3 ‘banks of state interest’ would make simultaneously and 
autonomously the same thought, had they not consulted their political overseer’.67 
Voices were also raised against the ‘non-intervention’ policy from the New 
Democracy party’s backbenchers. Two years earlier, the government managed to 
avoid waging a war with the unions, but was now trapped in the middle of a 
battle. It was not only suffering casualties from opposition parties, but was also 
receiving ‘friendly fire’ coming from within the party. A tactical manoeuvre 
would become an absolute necessity. 
 
The change in government stance coincided with a change in the Minister of 
Labour. In the aftermath of the revelation of a phone tapping scandal68 a cabinet 
reshuffling was decided. Panos Panagiotopoulos was said to have very bad 
relations with George Alogoskoufis, Minister of Finance, while cooperation with 
his deputy ministers was inexistent.69 Thus, he was replaced with the non-
confrontational and more communicative Savvas Tsitouridis. The policy change 
was heralded by the Minister of Finance, George Alogoskoufis, who made –for 
the first time since the outbreak of the banking dispute– positive statements in 
favour of wage agreements.70 Soon after, the three ‘banks of state interest’ 
accepted to start negotiations and privately-owned banks followed suit. The new 
Minister of Labour (Savvas Tsitouridis) was charged with ending the conflict, 
                                                 
67
 Interview with sectoral labour representative at ‘They «wash their hands» of OTOE’, Ta Nea, (2 
February 2006). 
68
 The phone-tapping scandal involved the spying of Prime Minister’s and Ministers’ mobile 
phones. For more information cf. ‘Athens Olympics phone tapping revealed’ The Guardian, (3 
February 2006); ‘Suicide mystery in Greek spy scandal’ The Times, (5 February 2006). It still 
remains a mystery who was behind this ‘Greek Watergate’. 
69
 ‘A pre-announced lay-off: cabinet reshuffling because of phone-tapping’, Ta Nea, (15 February 
2006). 
70
 ‘Tactical manoeuvre after the reactions’, Ta Nea, (1 March 2006). 
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taking initiatives for tripartite meetings between the Ministry, the bankers, and 
OTOE representatives. The path towards the signing of a new wage agreement 
turned out to be rocky. In total it took more than eight months and several 
meetings between OTOE and banks’ representatives. Negotiations broke up 
several times, while bitter accusations were ejected from either side. The final 
agreement was a flimsy compromise facilitated by an even more reluctant support 
by the government. 
 
What can possibly account for the government’s U-turn between initial policy of 
non-intervention and the final decision to intervene? Two major events seem to 
have influenced the reversal in government’s stance. First, the strong pressures 
from the trade union wing of the centre-right party so that the government 
mediates the conflict, especially in the prospect of local council elections.71 
Second, two ‘hot potatoes’ were high up in the government agenda: pension 
reform and privatisation. Interestingly, part of these reforms would need to pass 
through the banking trade union, and therefore the government was motivated by 
this tactical policy trade-off.72 On the ‘pension reform’ side, it was the belated 
consolidation of separate banks pension funds into a single insurance fund (IKA-
ETAM). On the privatisation side, it was the complete sale of the final chunk of 
the state’s shares in Commercial Bank to the French Crédit Agricole. These 
schemes were already under way when the conflict over the sectoral wage 
agreement broke out. Continuing the ‘non-intervention’ policy would be 
equivalent to waging a three-front war with the unions, while also receiving 
                                                 
71
 Author’s interviews with sectoral business representative 1 (3 June 2010) and with industrial 
relations expert 2 (11 February 2010). 
72
 Author’s interview with industrial relations expert 2 (11 February 2010). 
  
127 
‘friendly fire’. A truce on the sectoral wage agreement front was deemed as 
necessary, so that the rest of the agenda proceeds. It turned out that the priorities 
in government agenda did not quite correspond with employers’ plans. A 
‘Thatcherite attack on all fronts’ was simply not in the range of options. 
 
4.6.2. The Complete Breakdown of Wage Bargaining in the late 2000s 
 
The flimsiness of the 2006/7 sectoral agreement, and the fragility of the ‘labour-
state coalition’ on which it rested, would be proven in the next bargaining round. 
In May 2008 OTOE invited the employers to start negotiations over a new wage 
agreement. This time there was a severe split on the bankers’ side. The larger 
banks (National Bank, Alpha Bank and Eurobank) refused to authorise a joint 
representative to bargain with the unions, but the smaller banks (Agricultural, 
Piraeus, Commercial, Marfin) were willing to bargain.73 As a result, the requisite 
percentage of banks authorisations covering 70 per cent of employees was not 
reached. The banks’ rationale was unaltered from the arguments used two years 
earlier. Only difference perhaps was that the 2007 global financial crisis made 
their desire to ‘loosen the straightjacket’ of industry-wide agreements even 
stronger.74 To back up their resolve to go all the way towards decentralisation of 
bargaining, the two leading banks, National Bank of Greece and Alpha Bank, 
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 Author’s interview with industrial relations expert 2 (11 February 2010); ‘OTOE wages war for 
the new contract in banks’ To Vima, (17 April 2008).  
74
 Author’s Interviews with sectoral business representative 1 (3 June 2010); with industrial 
relations expert 2 (11 February 2010). According to interviewees, until 2008 the main criterion of 
international financial markets to assess banks’ performance was market share; however, after 
2008 international financial markets focused on profitability. 
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announced unilateral wage increases, bypassing sectoral and firm level 
bargaining. 
 
This development only infuriated the trade unions, since the wage increases were 
even lower than the minimum increases set by National General Collective 
Agreement, and therefore, technically illegal. Trade unions announced ‘rolling 
strikes’ targeted to the large banks which did not provide authorisations.75 This 
strategy meant to ‘reward’ –so to speak– the banks which did provide 
authorisations, sanctioning only those that did not. Along the familiar pattern, the 
unions asked from the new Minister of Labour of the centre-Right New 
Democracy government, Fani Petralia, to intervene in the conflict and sought to 
forge wider political coalitions with opposition parties. This time the government 
was resolved not to intervene. While the Minister of Labour accepted to meet 
with OTOE representatives, and made some ‘window dressing’ statements of 
support to wage bargaining, there was not a single initiative to meet with the 
bankers and mediate the conflict as in the past.76 The government no longer 
needed ‘room for manoeuvre’ in the government agenda, since it had completed 
the selling of Commercial Bank’s last shares to Crédit Agricole, whereas the 
banks pension funds were consolidated into the national social insurance system 
(IKA-ETAM).77 Additionally, electoral concerns were of secondary importance 
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 ‘Controversy over sectoral bargaining in banking’ European Industrial Relations Observatory 
(July 2008), available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2008/07/articles/gr0807039i.htm 
[last retrieved: 25 September 2011].  
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 Author’s interviews with: sectoral labour representative 1 (3 March 2010); with industrial 
relations expert 2 (11 February 2010); and with government representative 2 (2 May 2011). 
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 Author’s interviews with industrial relations expert 2 (11 February 2010) and with government 
representative 2 (2 May 2011). 
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since the government was at the start of its second term in office and the next 
elections seemed far away.78 
 
Given government unwillingness to intervene, the banking union (OTOE) altered 
its strategy, turning to the Organisation of Mediation and Arbitration (OMED). 
This time OTOE sent an invitation, not only to individual banks, but also to the 
Hellenic Banks Association and the peak employers association (SEV), since 
banks were also members of SEV. However, the bankers’ resolve to go all the 
way with the break up of sectoral wage bargaining is backed up by their response 
to abandon membership in SEV in 2009. The reason why the banks defected from 
the peak employers association was, because SEV did have the legal competence 
to represent its members on labour relations issues and would be compelled to 
join the bargaining table at OMED.79 
 
The handling of the banking dispute would become the ‘single most difficult case 
of industrial dispute in the 20-year history of OMED’.
80
 This statement is 
understood by the sheer power of the two sides. On the one hand, OTOE was and 
remains the stronger trade union in the country (a ‘bastion’ of trade unionism 
with about 85 per cent union density) and also the country’s historical wage 
leader and pattern-setter in wage bargaining.81 On the other hand, the banks not 
only occupied a strategic position in the Greek economy, but were also conceived 
as the more dynamic and profitable segment of Greek business, being the fore-
runners in business expansion to the Balkans. 
                                                 
78
 Author’s interview with government representative 2 (2 May 2011). 
79
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 2 (21 July 2010). 
80
 Author’s interview with industrial relations expert 1 (2 February 2010). 
81
 Author’s interview with industrial relations expert 2 (11 February 2010). 
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The independent mediator from OMED called both sides to join the bargaining 
table thus starting a mediation process. The bankers again refused to join the 
bargaining table, while the Hellenic Banks Association denied its role as an 
employers association. The failure of the mediation process triggered the 
arbitration process in which the arbitrator sought to hear both sides’ views. The 
banks refused again to send representatives and this led to the issuing of an 
arbitration decision setting wages for 2008 in the absence of bankers.82 
 
One of most striking developments, backing up bankers’ resolve to go ahead with 
the break-up of sectoral wage bargaining, was challenging the validity of the 
arbitrators’ decision to the courts. Their legal case was based on the premise that 
the Hellenic Bank Association (EET) has never been an employers’ association 
(only a trade association) and therefore cannot act as one.83 A storm of lawsuits 
burst out, creating a bitter climate and making the political settlement of the 
dispute even more unlikely.84 The battle over institutional change was no longer 
fought in the political arena, but was passed over to the courts. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
The case study suggests how the coalitional approach can explain the trajectory of 
change in the wage bargaining institution of the Greek banking sector. During the 
                                                 
82
 ‘Strikes in banks for the new contract’ Ethnos, (17 June 2009). 
83
 ‘Controversy over sectoral bargaining in banking’ European Industrial Relations Observatory 
(July 2008), available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2008/07/articles/gr0807039i.htm 
[last retrieved: 25 September 2011].  
84
 Author’s interview with industrial relations expert 1 (2 February 2010). 
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1990s liberalisation and privatisation altered the landscape of Greek banking. 
Markets protection was reduced and competition intensified with foreign banks 
entering the market and dominant banks losing rapidly market shares. At the 
same time the internationalisation of flexible working practices, especially in 
working time and pay flexibility were introduced in the previously bureaucratic 
organisations. The introduction of flexible working practices was facilitated by 
the withdrawal of the state and privatisation. But these developments did not 
translate automatically into a breakdown of wage bargaining. Instead, these 
factors were triggers of a preference change for individual firms. The institutional 
change would be determined more by the coalitions between and within actors, 
rather than the structural changes in the sector. 
 
The chapter showed that employer associability was historically missing. 
Therefore, a reform of wage bargaining like the Italian banking sector (see next 
chapter) was simply not within the range of options. The Hellenic Banks 
Association was not willing to become anything more than a ‘trade association’. 
Not only it lacked the legal competence, but the representation of interests was 
severely skewed towards larger banks. In the end, the major banks withdrew even 
from the peak employers association, in an effort to avoid the involvement of 
SEV in the conflict as an employers association. Thus, the lack of ‘employer 
associability’ precluded a path towards reform of the institution as in the Italian 
case. Yet, a ‘labour-state coalition’ was sufficient to put a break to 
decentralisation drives the previous years and facilitate compromises, even if 
flimsy. 
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Indeed, tensions over the institution of sectoral wage bargaining appeared in the 
early 2000s. In the face of deadlocks during negotiations, the socialist 
government was willing to intervene on the side of the unions and enable 
compromises with respect to more flexibility in working time and the 
restructuring of the sector. Interestingly, this pattern of government intervention 
does not cease with the change of government to the centre-right, but surely the 
decision to do so is more hesitant. 
 
The fragility of a labour-state coalition with the centre-right party is demonstrated 
in the near breakdown of 2006. Initially, the government decided not to intervene, 
but the electoral pressures mounted from both within the party-members and 
affiliated trade unionists. The tactical policy trade-off was to ensure peace in the 
sector, so that privatisation and pension reform programmes are advanced, 
whereas support for wage bargaining was an institution that was not costly to 
government budget. The bargaining round of 2008, however, marks the break-up 
of the fragile labour-state coalition on which wage bargaining rested.  
 
Was the government able to intervene? Nothing changed much in the range of 
tools available than the situation two years before. The institution was saved by 
using the state’s coercive and persuasive power over employers. However, the 
government was no longer willing to save the institution from collapsing. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the Minister of Labour does not even pursue a meeting 
with the bankers. Yet, in the two previous rounds the Ministers of the government 
did meet the bankers and eventually resolved the dispute. 
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What can account for this change in government’s willingness to intervene? The 
changed preferences of the government lie on the weakened electoral pressures 
and absence of tactical policy trade-offs in government’s agenda.  To put it in 
other words, the offensive launched from the big banks was an ‘irresistible force’ 
that did not meet an ‘immovable object’. The traditional weapon of trade unions 
(strikes) could only act as short-term pressure and OTOE could not hold out in a 
prolonged conflict. Banks used legal means to challenge the decision from the 
Organisation for Arbitration, but none of these strategies could be as effective as 
the political pressure from a labour-state coalition. 
 
  
134 
 
Chapter 5 The Reform of Centralised Wage Bargaining in 
the Italian Banking Sector 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the trajectory of change in the wage bargaining 
institution of Greek banking. It was shown that after the liberalisation and 
privatisation of the sector, the destabilising pressures altered the preferences of 
individual banks to the direction of abandoning centralised bargaining 
arrangements. Notably, the business association lacked historically the legal 
competence to negotiate labour relations issues, and was dominated by larger 
banks. As a result, the smaller banks’ preferences were ignored, and larger banks 
preferred a ‘cut-throat competition’ regime. As long as there was a labour-state 
coalition supporting sectoral bargaining, the institution survived. However, when 
the government agenda priorities changed and electoral incentives weakened, 
then employers’ drive towards decentralisation was left loose.  
 
Similarly to the Greek banking, the Italian banking sector is an instance of a 
heavily state-owned and protected sector, in which wage bargaining flourished. 
Wage bargaining agreements are negotiated in the sector since 1948. Like many 
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other Italian industries, state-ownership dominated until the late 1980s, whereas 
the prospect of the integration of the Italian banking system into the European 
financial area prompted the restructuring of banks. In parallel with the EU 
liberalisation, there was a modernisation of banks’ internal work organisation 
with adoption of flexible employment practices. These changes provided strong 
pressures towards the destabilisation of the wage bargaining institution, yet, there 
was no breakdown. Instead, wage bargaining was reformed so as to meet new 
needs, taking the path that has been dubbed as ‘organised decentralisation’. As 
mentioned in earlier chapters, this more nuanced institutional change entailed a 
shift in the relative importance between the sectoral and firm level of bargaining. 
The sectoral level set minimum standards for the whole sector, while the much 
sought flexibility was deferred to the firm level. 
 
What can account for this particular trajectory of institutional change? This 
question will be answered with the backdrop of the theoretical framework 
outlined in the second chapter. More specifically, this chapter seeks to throw light 
on the mediating factors which moderated the pressures in wage bargaining, and 
facilitated the reform of the institution. On the one hand, developments on the 
side of business associations, transformed the fragmented representation of 
business interests into an encompassing employers association. Associazione 
Bancaria Italiana acquired the legal competence to represent its members in 
labour relations, mediating the interests of both large banks and smaller banks. 
On the other hand, the institution rested firmly on a labour-state coalition. 
Individual firms’ preferences towards abandonment of sectoral wage bargaining 
did not receive support from the state. Instead, the state supported the use of wage 
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bargaining as medium for the restructuring of banks. The latter strategy was not 
only congruent with the government agenda on privatisation, but also with the 
preferences of the unions. Italian unions were pragmatic, accepting the 
inevitability of EU liberalisation, but seeking to ease the social repercussions 
from the restructuring process. They achieved this via a collectively agreed 
redundancy fund (fondo esuberi). In other words, wage bargaining was used as an 
instrument to ease the (social) cost of adjustment to new market conditions. The 
financial cost of the redundancy fund was totally borne out by business and 
labour, without any compensation from the state. Still, the government mediated 
the process of negotiation. Overall, the case study presented here suggests the 
relevance of ‘employer associability’ and ‘labour-state coalitions’ in explaining 
the dynamics of change in wage bargaining. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will first provide a brief overview of 
the continuity and change in the Italian wage bargaining system, introducing the 
main actors at the national level. Then I will shift the focus to the sectoral level, 
examining the sweeping structural changes in the business environment and in the 
banks’ internal work organisation. Thereby, I pin down the strong pressures for 
destabilisation of the wage bargaining institution, coming from the processes of 
liberalisation and the pervasive introduction of flexibility. Next, the chapter 
examines the structure of representation of labour and business and shows how 
employer associability strengthened during the 1990s, and simultaneously, the 
unions were able to speak with a ‘single voice’ despite organisational 
fragmentation. Finally, the account of wage bargaining rounds in the late 1990s 
pays close attention to the interactions between the three major actors: business, 
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labour and the state, shedding light on the strategies, motivations and coalitions 
between them. 
 
5.2. The Italian Wage Bargaining System: Continuity and Change 
 
The Italian system of interest representation has fascinated scholars with its many 
facets and colourful contradictions. The state had assumed an important role 
(Regalia and Regini, 1998:480) either as an employer in the IRI complex (Istituto 
per la Ricostruzione Industriale) or as a public mediator during industrial 
disputes. Consensus and conflict have been interchangeable features of the 
system. In the 1970s there were very high levels of strike activity (Regalia and 
Regini, 1998:485). In the early 1980s there was a return to concertation with 
corporatist incomes policies; and from mid-1980s onwards there was a renewed 
shift to militancy and employers’ drives for the breakdown of centralised 
bargaining (Baccaro and Pulignano, 2011:139). 
 
Another feature of the system was that industrial relations were traditionally 
embedded into the Italian political system. Since the end of the second World 
War the ideological differentiation of the three confederal (peak-level) trade 
unions laid the ground for strong dependence of the interest associations on 
political parties, something which was dubbed as collateralismo (Mattina, 1997 
cited in Vatta, 2007:207). Indeed, CGIL was historically linked to Communists; 
CISL linked to Catholic/Christian Democrats; and UIL linked to the Socialists 
(Regalia and Regini, 2004). Trade unions’ membership was and remains skewed, 
however, not towards public sector as in Greece. Instead, pensioners comprise a 
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sizeable part of Italian unions’ members (see figures in Baccaro et al., 2003:45; 
Schmitter, 1995:311). 
 
These characteristics of the Italian industrial relations system endure to differing 
degrees, while elements of renewal are also observed. The most important rupture 
with the past was a result of the political scandals in the early 1990s known as 
‘Tangentopoli’ (translated into English as ‘Bribesville’).85 Following the ‘Mani 
Pulite’ (‘Clean Hands’) investigations, many prominent Italian political figures 
went on trial or were jailed. These events shook the Italian political system like an 
earthquake. The Christian-democratic party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) and the 
socialist party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) were dissolved. In addition, the 
second major party in Italy, PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano), split in 1991, as a 
result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Traditional political parties went into 
disrepute, and this contributed considerably to the distancing of trade unions from 
political parties. All three confederal unions formally broke their organic links 
with the old parties and avoided to develop formal links with the new political 
parties that entered the scene.  
 
As a result, the acute political differences among the three main union 
confederations were eased, and this political rapprochement favoured the 
resumption of centralised wage bargaining (Locke and Baccaro, 1998:31-32). 
                                                 
85
 Tangentopoli began on 17
 
February 1992, when Judge Antonio Di Pietro ordered the arrest of 
Mario Chiesa (member of the PSI) for accepting a bribe from a Milan firm. The socialist party 
leader, Bettino Craxi, distanced himself from Chiesa, but Chiesa was angered with this treatment 
by his ex-colleagues, and gave more information about politicians involved in corruption 
scandals. The ‘Mani Pulite’ investigations were the outcome of a literally exponential expansion 
of accusations. Minor party members were accused and got caught; major party members were 
dropping their support to them; and the former felt betrayed, giving information involving even 
more politicians. 
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Since the unions upheld their autonomy, their membership became more 
diversified ideologically. For instance, it is not uncommon that leftist unionists 
are elected as trade union officials by Christian democratic members and vice 
versa.86 In other words, the dividing lines were blurred. All three confederal 
unions shared a respect for their roots, history, and traditions, but there was no 
more a clear alignment between union organisations and political parties. 
 
The resurgence of concertation in the early 1990s started with the signing of the 
July 1993 Accord. The Accord was signed consensually by all three major 
confederal unions (CGIL, CISL, and UIL), the major employers associations, and 
the ‘technocratic’ government of Carlo Ciampi. It introduced two institutional 
breakthroughs: the abolition of wage indexation (scala mobile) to address the 
long-standing problem of price instability (see Culpepper, 2008:18-26) and the 
reform of the bargaining framework, introducing the two-tier system: nation-wide 
sectoral bargaining and a second-level of bargaining (Bordogna, 2003:286). At 
the second-level, agreements could be either firm level or territorial level. The 
latter were used when the firms in a region were not large enough to conclude 
separate agreements. Therefore, to save on transaction costs, wages and 
conditions were bargained for a territory covering many different small firms. 
The motivation behind this provision was to address problems of representation 
and increase coverage of small and medium sized enterprises that dominate the 
Italian economy. 
 
                                                 
86
 Author’s interviews with sectoral labour representative 2 (18 May 2010); with industrial 
relations expert 3 (26 May 2010); and with industrial relations expert 4 (23 November 2010). 
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The tripartite Accord of 1993 was followed by an era of concertation, which 
made Italy an exemplary case of ‘competitive corporatism’ (Baccaro and 
Pulignano, 2011; Rhodes, 2001). During the 1990s and 2000s, a series of social 
pacts at the ‘inter-confederal’ level set the pace of consensual reform in the 
pension system, labour market, and tax-system (see Negrelli, 2000; Regalia and 
Regini, 2004). Despite ideological and organisational divisions, the three major 
confederations managed to speak with a ‘single voice’. Even more, the prospect 
of uniting under a single banner came very close to be realised in the late 1990s 
(Baccaro et al., 2003:56). Although this prospect did not materialise, the three 
confederations kept up coming up with common platforms during negotiations. 
The next table summarises the main actors at the national level in the Italian 
industrial relations system. 
 
Table 5.1. Main Organisations in the Italian Interest Representation System. 
Organisation Function Membership 
Consiglio 
Nazionale 
dell'Economia 
e del Lavoro 
(CNEL)  
Est. 1957 
Advisory council to the chambers and 
the government; set up via Law n. 
33/1957. Reformed via Law 
n.936/1986 and Law n.383/2000; it 
can initiate legislation and may 
contribute to drafting economic and 
social legislation according to the 
principles and within the limits 
prescribed by law. 
12 Experts 
44 Representatives of Employees  
18 Representatives of self-employed 
37 Representatives of Business 
10 Representatives of various associations and 
voluntary organisations. 
 
Board members serve for five years and are 
appointed by Decree of the President of the 
Republic on proposal of the Prime Minister, 
after consideration by the Cabinet. 
 
Confederazione 
Generale Italiana 
del Lavoro 
(CGIL)  
Est. 1906 
Italy’s oldest and largest trade union, 
one of the three representative 
confederations; signatory at the inter-
confederal level; with some 6 million 
members. Historically affiliated with 
the communist party. 
13 sectoral federations,  
134 Territorial & Regional Labour Chambers 
Confederazione 
Italiana Sindacati  
Lavoratori (CISL)  
Est.1950 
Italy’s second largest trade union, one 
of the three representative 
confederations; signatory at the inter-
confederal level; with 4.427.037 
members in 2007. Historically 
following catholic values and 
affiliated with the Christian 
democratic party. 
19 nation-wide Sectoral Federations (e.g. 
metalworkers, chemical, textile workers, 
public employees, service, agricultural 
workers)  
9 other federations (occupational) 
21 Regional Labour Chambers 
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Unione Italiana 
del Lavoro (UIL)  
Est.1950 
Italy’s third largest trade union, with 
 2,184,911 members in 2010; 
one of the three representative 
confederations; signatory at the inter-
confederal level; Historically 
affiliated with the Social-democratic 
party. 
15 nation-wide Sectoral Federations (e.g. 
metalworkers, chemical, textile workers, 
public employees, service, agricultural 
workers)  
21 Regional Labour Chambers  
1 other federation (atypical workers) 
Unione Generale 
del Lavoro (UGL)  
Est.1950 
Italy’s fourth largest trade union; 
Affiliated with the neo-fascist party 
‘National Alliance’. 
26 nation-wide Sectoral Federations 
20 Regional Labour Chambers 
4 other federations (occupational) 
Confindustria Est. 
1910 
Peak employers association 
representing a total of 146.046 
industrial companies of all sizes; 
signatory at the inter-confederal level 
18 regional Confindustrias 
23 sectoral Federations    
3 special purpose Federations    
97 trade Associations    
20 Associate members 
 
INTERSIND 
Est. 1958 
 
Peak employers association 
representing all state-owned 
enterprises in the IRI group; 
signatory at the inter-confederal 
level. 
Absorbed by Confindustria 1994-1998; 
Dissolved in 1998. 
Confapi 
(Confederazione 
italiana della 
piccola e media 
industria privata) 
Est. 1947 
Represents the interests of industrial 
SMEs; With about 120,000 members; 
signatory at the inter-confederal 
level. 
20 regional Federations 
13 sectoral Federations    
 
Confcommercio 
Est. 1945 
Represents more than 700,000 
enterprises in commerce, tourism, 
transport services and the 
professions; signatory at the inter-
confederal level, 
20 Regional Federations;  
132 Sectoral/ Occupational Federations. 
 
 
Confederazione 
Nazionale 
dell'Artigianato e 
della Piccola e 
Media Impresa 
(CNA) 
Est. 1946 
Represents the interests of artisanal 
SMEs; with about 670,000 members; 
signatory at the inter-confederal 
level. 
19 Regional Branches; 
CNA Pensioners (about 230,000); 
10 National Associations (Food, Traditional 
Art, Health and Wellbeing, Construction, 
Installation & Equipment. 
4 Groups: Young Entrepreneurs, Women in 
Business; Small Business 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
5.3. Italian Banking until the 1980s: Oligopoly and State ownership 
 
The state ownership in the banking sector dates back to the early 1930s. In the 
context of the Great Depression, the fascist government decided to nationalise the 
banking system (with the exception of some private banks) and more generally 
introduce more protection and state intervention in the economy. The Italian 
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Banking Law no.38 of 1936 governed the sector for about 50 years and stipulated 
the separation of banks between different categories (commercial banks, savings 
banks, and cooperative banks). This process is described by Giani (2008:14): 
‘IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) and IMI (Istituto Mobiliare Italiano) 
were two holding companies totally owned by the State. IMI was created in 1931, in 
order to avoid the failure of the main important Italian banks, and IRI (1933) 
became the owner of large part of the Italian industrial system, originally owned 
jointly by the failed banks.’ 
 
One important principle of the 1936 legislation was mandatory specialisation and 
the main objective of the Italian banking regulation was to foster local 
development (Carletti et al., 2005:35). As a result, the Italian banks concentrated 
their operations in specific regions and only few banks developed a nation-wide 
presence (Knights et al., 1992:202). This contributed to the proliferation in the 
number of credit institutions, of which, the state ended up controlling about 80 
per cent (Giani, 2008:14-16). Credit institutions could be specialised in one 
particular sector – e.g. agriculture, building, public works, industry- or a region, 
for example, the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) (Carletti et al., 2005:35). Overall, 
the regulatory framework preserved this multi-dimensional fragmentation of the 
banking system until the late 1980s. The fragmentation was bound to be reduced 
with the advance of European economic integration and the liberalisation of 
financial markets. 
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5.4. Italian Banking in the 1990s: State Withdrawal and the Market 
Unbound 
5.4.1. EU Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Intensification of 
Competition 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters the EU regulatory impact on member-
state’s banking sectors has been significant. In Italy, privatisation went hand in 
hand with liberalisation since the late 1980s. The Commission’s Directive 
allowed the banking system to move towards the universal bank model, in which 
deposits, loans and insurance are provided by all banks (Pradhan, 1995). At the 
same period, the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the sector transformed the 
erstwhile regional banks into larger national players. 
 
Table 5.2. Merger & Acquisition Activity in Italian Banking, 1996 - 2007. 
Year Target Acquired by/Merged with 
2007 Capitalia UniCredit 
 Banca Antonveneta Banco Santander 
 Banco Popolare di Verona Banco Popolare 
 Banca Popolare Italiana Banco Popolare 
2006 Sanpaolo IMI Intesa Sanpaolo 
 Banca Intesa Intesa Sanpaolo 
 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro BNP Paribas 
2005 Banca Antonveneta ABN AMRO Bank 
2002 Banca di Roma Capitalia 
 Bipop-Carire Capitalia 
 Banco di Sicilia Capitalia 
2001 Banca Commerciale italiana Banca Intesa 
1999 Banca Nazionale del'Agricoltura Banca Antonveneta 
 Banca Commerciale Italiana  Banca Intesa 
1998 CRPL Banca Intesa 
 Banco Ambroveneto Banca Intesa 
 Unicredito Unicredito Italiano 
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 Credito Italiano Unicredito Italiano 
 Cassa di Risparmio di Torino Unicredito Italiano 
 Rolo Banca 1473  Unicredito Italiano 
 Istituto San Paolo di Torino Sanpaolo IMI  
 IMI Sanpaolo IMI 
1997 Interbanca Banca Antonveneta 
 CRPL Banca Intesa  
 Banco Ambrosiano Veneto Banca Intesa  
1996 Banca Antoniana Banca Antonveneta 
 Banca Popolare Veneta Banca Antonveneta 
Source: Based on Giani (2008) & Dermine (2006:68). 
 
This increased market concentration through mergers and acquisitions may cast 
doubt to the expectation that competition would intensify after the liberalisation of 
the market.  However, a number of studies find that there is an increase in 
competitive pressures since 1992 (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2000; Magri et al., 
2005) and even more find no evidence that banks involved in mergers and 
acquisitions gained market power (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2000). Although the 
number of banks was higher before the liberalisation, most of the banks’ 
operations used to be localised, forming regional oligopolies. The mergers and 
acquisitions activity reduced the total number of banks in Italy (see table below), 
but expanded their presence across the whole country. Therefore, more banks 
were competing with each other at the national level than before. 
 
Table 5.3. Trends in the Number of Italian Banks, 1990 - 2003. 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
All Banks  
 
1156 1108 1073 1037 994 970 937 935 921 876 841 830 814 788 
Banks  
(except for  
Co-operative) 
441 400 373 366 351 351 346 352 359 345 342 356 353 343 
Source: Banca Intesa (2004:7). 
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Furthermore, competitive pressures did not only come from domestic banks 
which abandoned their regional specialisation. They also stemmed from the 
entrance of foreign banks in the sector. The opening up of the market and the 
removal of barriers allowed British, French and German companies to enter the 
closed Italian market (Knights et al., 1992:216). Indeed, from 1992 onwards the 
entry flows of foreign banks in Italy increased dramatically compared to previous 
decades (Magri et al., 2005). This penetration is also evident by the high rate of 
employment growth in foreign banks during the period 1996-2005. Overall 
employment in the sector remains almost stable, and this suggests that the 
downsizing of domestic banks was partly offset by employment growth in foreign 
banks (Table below). 
 
Table 5.4. Penetration of Foreign-owned Banks in Italy, 1996 - 2005. 
 1996 2002 2005 ∆% 96-05 
 Firms 
All Banks 296 313 309 4.39% 
Foreign-owned 57 60 66 15.79% 
 Bank Branches 
All Banks 20067 23030 24153 20.36% 
Foreign-owned 89 106 108 21.35% 
 Employees 
All Banks 270675 277096 271240 0.21% 
Foreign-owned 3055 3943 4450 45.66% 
Source: OECD (2008:238).   
 
The European Union’s liberalisation programme clearly triggered the opening up 
of the financial sector and steered the intensification of competition, but the 
restrictions on state aid favoured privatisation policies. The Maastricht criteria 
provided additional stimuli for the privatisation of state-owned banks, since the 
  
146 
Italian governments expected to raise important revenues from their privatisation 
programme and thereby reduce national debt.  
 
The main changes in the regulatory framework included the ‘Amato Law’ (Law 
218/1990), which introduced the joint-stock company as the basic organisational 
entity in the banking system. The state-owned banks transferred their shares to 
Fondazione Bancaria, which were owned by local authorities. The privatisation 
was given further impetus in 1994, when the ‘Dini Law’ (Law 474/1994) 
repealed the obligation for the foundations to keep control of their joint-stock 
companies, and introduced substantial tax concessions for those foundations 
willing to dispose of their banking shares in the following four years (Carletti et 
al., 2005:35). Finally, the completion of the privatisation of the system was 
specified by the ‘Ciampi Law’ (Law 461/1998), which fixed a four-year time 
limit within which the foundations were expected to sell off their shares in 
banking companies. Indeed, the local authorities sold all their shares or decreased 
substantially their participation by 31 December 2005 (Giani, 2008:16-26). Thus, 
the 70-year period of state-dominated ownership in Italian banks ended. The table 
below documents the substantial reduction in state ownership of banks since the 
early 1990s. 
 
Table 5.5. Government Ownership of Banks in Italy, 1992 - 2003. 
1992 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
68% 25% 18% 12% 12% 10% 10% 9% 
Note: the percentages refer to share of assets held by foundations with a majority interest in 
an Italian bank. 
Source: Carletti et al. (2005:33).  
 
  
147 
5.4.2. Restructuring the Banks: Working Time Flexibility, Pay 
flexibility and Downsizing 
 
In the 1980s Italian banks were characterised by the pattern of ‘internal labour 
markets’ with long job tenures, standardised working time patterns, and seniority-
based pay and promotion rules. The state ownership and long employment 
tenures contributed to the development of a ‘civil service culture’ among bank 
employees (Regini et al., 1999). However, the pressures arising from 
liberalisation and privatisation set in motion a process of change which was 
bound to transform the bureaucratic organisations into competitive firms. 
 
Throughout this process the comparisons with the more advanced industrialised 
countries in Europe were widely used. The Second Banking Directive entailed the 
prospect of direct competition with foreign banking conglomerates, and Italian 
banks’ efficiency was frequently compared to German, British and French banks. 
The comparisons were used instrumentally by the banks to support their agenda 
for restructuring.87 The restructuring plans included, on the one hand, downsizing 
to reduce labour costs, and on the other hand, introducing work organisation 
flexibility to improve productivity. Introducing greater flexibility in work 
organisation appeared in the agenda of employers already in the early 1990s. The 
employers association for savings banks (Acri) and the association for 
commercial banks (Assicredito) came up in the bargaining table with three 
demands: (i) introduction of working time flexibility via extending opening hours 
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and introduce Saturday opening; (ii) making management hierarchies flatter, via 
reducing job classifications and loosen rigid career patterns; and (iii) discussing 
the process of redundancies due to introduction of new technologies.88  
 
Initially, unions and employers were unable to agree on the necessary changes 
and unions responded with a two-pronged strategy: calling a strike and inviting 
the government to intervene. Indeed, unions conducted several days of rolling 
strikes and the Minister of Labour of the technocratic government, Mr. Donat 
Cattin, mediated the negotiations for two months.89 After the mediation, an 
agreement was finally reached and the compromise entailed an increase in weekly 
opening hours, while the issues of altering productivity bonuses and revising the 
job classification system were deferred to the next bargaining round. 
 
The 1990/92 agreement expired at the end of 1992, and there was a vacuum with 
no agreement up until December 1994. During this period, the problems of the 
sector relating to flexibility and redundancies were difficult to reconcile, and 
strike action was frequent.90 In the meantime the first Berlusconi government 
came to power. The new government assured the confederal unions and 
employers’ associations that the wage bargaining framework agreed on the July 
1993 Accord would be maintained.91 The negotiations between banking trade 
unions and employers were lengthy and unions again resorted to their strategy of 
putting a double pressure to employers: strikes and inviting the government to 
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89
 ‘Threat to settlement of banks dispute’ European Industrial Relations Review, No.197, (June 
1990), p.7. 
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intervene.92 The shift of the government to centre-right did not stop the pattern of 
intervention. An agreement was possible, only after the mediation of the 
negotiations by the Minister of Labour, Clemente Mastella. Importantly, the 
1994/95 agreement which was signed on 16 November 1994 constitutes a turning 
point for the sector (Regini et al., 1999:161,174), because it represents the first 
significant step towards the reform of the wage bargaining institution towards 
‘organised decentralisation’. In the wage contract it was agreed that the sectoral 
wage agreement would set the minimum standards in wages across the country, 
however, the non-wage issues (normative) relating to working time and pay 
flexibility were delegated to firm level bargaining so as to suit the needs of 
individual banks. 
 
More specifically, the previous agreement provided for a ‘productivity bonus’ 
across the sector (irrespective of individual banks’ profitability) and this was 
abolished. Instead, it was replaced by ‘company bonuses’ to be negotiated at the 
level of individual banks and would be based on the attainment of targets.93 At 
the same time, the number of ‘seniority increments’ was significantly reduced for 
new recruits signifying the decreasing importance of seniority-based pay. The 
agreement also reformed work organisation in response to needs for flatter 
management hierarchies and flexibility. The previous job classification system 
had twelve grades, but was replaced by four ‘professional areas’.94 Additionally, 
working time flexibility was increased by allowing the Saturday opening of 
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branches which were inside busy commercial stores, and also increasing opening 
hours for branches residing in tourist areas. Finally, the agreement provided for a 
special procedure of information and consultation to deal with the prospect of 
redundancies.95 This prepared the ground for the discussion of the most difficult 
issue in the sector: downsizing the overstaffed banks. However, the concertation 
method was favoured and it was agreed that both sides would examine a wide 
range of possible instruments to ease the repercussions from redundancies (e.g. 
voluntary early retirement; part-time work; setting limits to overtime and new 
recruitment; solidarity contracts; and internal mobility).96 
 
In sum, the responses of Italian unions and employers to increased competition 
after the liberalisation of the sector were to introduce ‘negotiated flexibility’ in 
the previously bureaucratic organisations.
97
 The Italian banks caught up with 
international trends towards re-structuring and streamlining of operations. The 
adoption of modern management techniques included a more customer-oriented 
approach, thus transforming the bank employees ‘from tellers to sellers’ (Knights 
et al., 1992:212; Regini et al., 1999). Additionally, working time was adjusted to 
meet customer demand, while pay systems were aligned to results. As the next 
sections show, despite the destabilising pressures from liberalisation, intense 
competition and flexibility, the wage bargaining system did not break down. The 
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changes in the representation of banks and the ability of labour to speak with a 
single voice were critical. 
 
5.5. The Representation of Labour and Business 
5.5.1. Labour: Unity despite Fragmentation 
 
The representation of labour in Italian banking is very fragmented along multiple 
lines. Banking employees are represented by no less than nine different 
organisations (see Table below). This is because autonomous unions were 
organised in regional banks or represented specific occupational categories, and 
developed alongside the unions which were organically linked with political 
parties. Thus, this line of fragmentation has not only been organisational, but also 
ideological. On the one side, FISAC-CGIL was affiliated with the communist 
party, FIBA-CISL with the Christian democrats, UILCA-UIL with the socialists. 
On the other side, the autonomous unions in the sector (FABI, FALCRI, 
SILCEA, SINFUB, and Dircredito) retained their autonomy from political parties. 
Another type of fragmentation followed occupational lines. While most of the 
organisations’ membership includes lay employees, two of the unions in the 
sector (Dircredito and SILCEA) represented only executive personnel (dirigenti) 
and used to sign until the mid 1990s a separate wage agreement for this category 
of employees. 
 
One would reasonably expect that the multiple lines of fragmentation would pose 
a severe threat to banking unions’ ability to speak with a ‘single voice’. 
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Surprisingly, this is not the case. Ideological and organisational fragmentation has 
not been a hindrance to the conclusion of wage agreements. Instead, the unions’ 
managed to put aside their political or other differences and came up with 
common platforms during negotiations with employers. The system of 
‘competitive collaboration’ sets clear boundaries: unions compete among 
themselves for members, but collaborate for the representation of sectoral 
interests at the workplace.98 This is achieved via frequent meetings between 
different unions’ representatives. The lead in negotiations comes from FISAC, 
FIBA, UILCA (which are affiliated with the confederal unions) plus the 
autonomous FABI (which has a high membership in the banking sector). After a 
draft wage agreement is reached, the rest of the unions in the sector approve the 
agreement ex post. Indeed, as several labour informants mentioned:  
‘There is a fundamental difference between the three representative trade unions: 
CGIL likes to think itself as representing the whole ‘working class’ and interested 
in playing a role in the political arena, whereas CISL and UIL want to represent 
only their members and focus on workplace-issues. This is the main obstacle for 
organisational unity. Still, these differences play out more at the national level. 
When it comes to sectoral wage bargaining, the sectoral unions put their differences 
aside, and focus on getting the best deal for all their members on economic and 
normative issues.’99 
The table below summarizes the main organisations in Italian banking. 
 
                                                 
98
 Author’s interviews with sectoral labour representative 3 (25 May 2010) and with sectoral 
labour representative 4 (25 May 2010). 
99
 Author’s interviews with sectoral labour representative 2 (18 May 2010); with sectoral labour 
representative 3 (25 May 2010); with sectoral labour representative 4 (25 May 2010); with 
sectoral labour representative 5 (26 May 2010); with industrial relations expert 4 (23 November 
2010); and with industrial relations expert 5 (23 November 2010). 
  
153 
Table 5.6. Main Trade Union Organisations in the Italian Banking Sector. 
Organisation Function/Affiliation Membership/Structure 
Federazione Italiana 
Sindacale dei lavoratori 
delle Assicurazioni e del 
Credito (FISAC/CGIL) 
Est. 1948 as FIDAC 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Affiliated to ex-communist 
CGIL 
21 Regional associations 
Members: n/a. 
Federazione Italiana 
Bancari Assicurativi 
(FIBA/CISL) 
Est. 1951 as FIB 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement;  Affiliated to Christian 
democratic/catholic CISL 
21 Regional associations 
Members: 90,000 (2009) 
UIL Credito Esattorie e 
Assicurazioni 
(UILCA/UIL) 
 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Affiliated to social 
democratic UIL 
21 Regional associations 
Members: 44, 698 (2009). 
UGL Credito 
Est.1997 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Affiliated to neo-fascist 
UGL; 
Members: n/a. 
19 Regional associations; 
73 Provincial offices. 
Federazione Autonoma 
Bancari Italiani (FABI) 
Est. 1948  
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Autonomous, but inspired 
by Catholic social doctrines. 
97 Provincial offices; 
Members: 92,000 (2009) 
 
Federazione Autonoma 
Lavoratori del Credito e 
del Risparmio Italiani 
(FALCRI) 
Est.1952 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement;  Autonomous; initially 
organizing savings banks employees; 
in 1983 extends to whole banking 
sector 
Members: 20,000 (2009). 
96 Provincial offices; 
 
Federazione Nazionale 
Sindacati Autonomi – 
Personale di Credito, 
Finanza e assicurazioni 
(SINFUB) 
 Members: 7,680 (2009). 
Sindacato Italiano 
Lavoratori Credito Enti 
Assimilati (SILCEA) 
Est.1971 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Independent. Represents 
the interests of managers and executive 
personnel. 
Members: n/a. 
Associazione Sindacale 
Nazionale dell’Area 
Direttiva e delle Alte 
professionalità del 
Credito (Dircredito Fd) 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Independent; Represents 
the interests of managers and executive 
personnel.  
Members: n/a. 
20 Regional associations; 
 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
5.5.2. Business: From Organisational Fragmentation to Unitary 
Employer Associability 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the processes of liberalisation and 
privatisation were on the ascendance, the associational representation of Italian 
banks was fragmented. Assicredito represented the majority of public sector 
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banks, Acri represented the savings banks, and Assbank was representative for 
private banks (see Table below). It should be noted that the first two associations 
possessed the legal competence to negotiate wage contracts for their members, 
but Assbank did not; so Assicredito was negotiating on its behalf. Finally, ABI 
(Associazione Bancaria Italiana) operated as an umbrella association. Since its 
restoration after the World War II its main task was to influence the regulation in 
the sector, representing all banks as a trade association. It did not have a legal 
competence to bargain with unions, however, its membership comprised of banks 
from all sizes (large-national and smaller regional), and of different types 
(commercial banks, investment banks, cooperative and savings banks). 
 
As mentioned above, the liberalisation process pushed Italian banks to converge 
towards the ‘universal bank model’, in which all transactions (insurance, credit, 
savings, investment, commercial, etc) were allowed to be carried out by one bank. 
This, in turn, reduced the differences between different categories of banks, and 
triggered the process of mergers between banks. As individual banks converged 
to the ‘universal bank model’ the necessity of having different associations to 
represent them faded out. At the same time the increased competition put 
pressures to make redundancies in overstaffed banks. This process was hard to 
negotiate with a continuation of the fragmented representation of banks. 
Therefore, the operation ‘Grande ABI’ was set in motion under the leadership of 
Tancredi Bianchi, who was elected as president in both Assicredito and ABI in 
1992.100 The motivation behind their decision to merge the two associations was 
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to aid the privatisation process, increase the efficiency of banks, and ultimately 
prepare them to survive the more competitive environment. This motivation was 
also shared by the government’s Minister of Finance, Guido Carli, who was 
condemning the bankers for allowing the increase in labour costs and warned that 
the excessive labour costs ‘would lead to failure any company exposed to foreign 
competition’.101 Thus, privatisation, labour costs containment, and banks’ 
downsizing was a shared interest for both bankers and the government.  
 
The operation ‘Grande ABI’ started when the executive board of Assicredito 
decided to gradually transfer the legal competence of representation in labour 
relations to Associazione Bancaria Italiana.102 This transformation was not easy 
or without obstacles. The smaller savings banks which were members of Acri, 
were rather reluctant to be subsumed in a ‘Confindustria of banks’, fearing that 
larger banks would dominate the decision making process.103 To convince 
reluctant and resistant members towards the merger of the associations, Tancredi 
Bianchi, managed to pass an amendment in the statute of ABI so that smaller 
banks’ interests are taken into account in the decision making processes. Indeed, 
the new representation criteria for the Executive Board and the Executive 
Committee increased smaller banks’ representation in the Executive organs.104 
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By June 1997 Assicredito was fully absorbed by ABI.105 ABI was the ‘single 
voice’ of the banking industry for negotiations with the unions and Assicredito 
was dissolved. Even more, the successor of Tancredi Bianchi in the presidency of 
ABI was for the first time the managing director of a small family bank, Maurizio 
Sella.106 Sella’s long experience in labour relations issues was also one of the 
trump cards in favour of his election: the forthcoming negotiations with the 
unions over the restructuring of the sector and inevitable redundancies would 
certainly be hard.107 Subsequently, ABI also fully absorbed the labour relations 
department from the smaller savings banks’ association Acri (although Acri was 
not dissolved and continued to exist as a separate association). In sum, ABI 
assumed the responsibility of bargaining with the unions for the whole banking 
sector108 and the interests of small savings banks and larger commercial banks 
were well represented in the Executive Board and the Executive Committee. This 
ended the fragmentation in the associational representation and strengthened 
employer associability in Italian banking. 
 
Table 5.7. Main Business Associations in the Italian Banking Sector. 
Organisation Function Membership 
Associazione Bancaria 
Italiana (ABI)  
Est. 1919 
Represents the interests of the whole 
banking system; Employers 
Association since 1997; Signatory to 
national wage agreement;  
1075 member companies (2010): 757 
banks (of which 241 Ltd. companies; 
460 cooperatives; 55 branches of 
foreign banks); 230 Financial 
institutions (leasing, factoring, and 
brokerage); 13 associations. 
Associazione Sindacale 
fra le Aziende di Credito 
(Assicredito)  
Represented the interests of most 
commercial banks; as an employers 
association until 1997; Signatory to 
Absorbed by ABI in 1997 
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Est. 1947 national wage agreement until 1997. 
Associazione Fra Le 
Casse Di Risparmio 
Italiane (Acri) 
Est. 1912 
Represented the interests of savings 
banks as an employers association until 
1997; Signatory to national wage 
agreement until 1997. 
labour relations dept. incorporated to 
ABI by 1999 
Associazione 
nazionale aziende 
ordinarie di credito 
(AssBank) 
Est.1953  
Representing the interests of private 
banks as a trade association. 
 
Federazione nazionale 
delle banche di credito 
cooperativo (Federcasse) 
Representing the interests of 
cooperative banks; Employer 
association for cooperative banks. 
480 Member companies 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration 
 
5.6. Italian Banking since the mid 1990s: Tensions and the Reform of 
Centralised Wage Bargaining  
5.6.1. The Path towards the Reform of Centralised Wage Bargaining 
 
In the bargaining round for the 1996/97 agreement, the effects of the sector’s 
liberalisation and increased competition surfaced again in negotiations. A draft 
agreement reached on May 1996 was approved by the major unions; however, a 
split appeared on the side of the employers. On the one hand, the employer 
association of savings banks (Acri) was willing to accept an increase in wages to 
the level of 9.25 per cent. On the other hand, the employer association of big 
commercial banks (Assicredito)  considered that this settlement was too costly 
and did not accept it, arguing that labour costs represented a high proportion of 
total costs (some 70 per cent) and redundancies should also be part of the 
agenda.109 The conflict triggered internal disagreements within Assicredito and 
led to resignations of senior officials. 
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In the meantime, the leader of the centre left coalition L’Ulivo, Romano Prodi, 
was elected as Prime Minister. The intervention to wage bargaining did not stop 
with the shift of government to the centre left. The deadlock in the negotiations 
between unions and employers was resolved once again after the mediation by the 
Minister of Labour, Tiziano Treu. The compromise entailed an agreement on the 
‘lowest common denominator’ with affordable increases for both savings and 
commercial banks.110 However, the most pressing problem for employers was not 
the actual level of wage increases, but the means to reduce the employees in 
overstaffed banks. In their argumentation they frequently referred to comparisons 
with European standards. According to representatives from commercial banks: 
‘…the ratio of labour costs to the total amount of money managed by Italian banks 
is 40 per cent higher than the European average. Italian bank employees have […] 
low productivity because they are too numerous and their labour costs are on 
average 15 per cent higher than elsewhere in Europe. Increasing competition and 
the opening up of banking to market forces are exacerbating these problems.’111 
 
The need to ‘converge’ to European standards in labour costs was considered as a 
conditio sine qua non for Italian banks to survive the liberalisation of the market. 
Although there were divisions and disagreements (as the one regarding the actual 
level of wage increases), these faded out, when the banks resolved their 
representation problems. As the previous section showed, ABI absorbed 
Assicredito and assumed the legal competence to represent all banks in labour 
relations. Additionally, it amended its statute to improve the representation of 
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smaller banks interests. After these changes took place, the strengthened ABI 
announced plans for job cuts to the level of 12 per cent of the whole banking 
workforce and raised complaints that previous agreements’ provisions on 
flexibility were not implemented.112 The president of ABI, Tancredi Bianchi, 
stressed the need to completely reform the national wage contract in banking ‘in 
order to have new forms of flexibility and mobility’.113 These announcements 
spurred the conflict between unions and employers and blocked negotiations. 
 
Responding to this breakdown, high level representatives from the centre-left 
Prodi government sought to mediate the conflict. Not only the Minister of 
Labour, Tiziano Treu, but also the Minister of Finance, Carlo Ciampi, and the 
Secretary to the Prime Minister, Enrico Micheli, were involved in the talks. The 
desire to abandon centralised wage bargaining was voiced by individual firms in 
the talks with the government.114 However, the reaction of the government 
signifies the tightness of the labour-state coalition. The government would not 
support the breakdown of centralised wage bargaining, as long as unions did not 
agree with such a path.115 
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The unions were of course against any discussion to abandon the two-tier 
bargaining system set out in the July 1993 Accord. Thus, employers were faced 
with a strong labour-state coalition and the path towards the breakdown of 
centralised bargaining and Anglo-Saxon decentralisation was blocked. The 
government was very willing to mediate the conflict and facilitate compromises 
to improve the banks’ ability to face the new more competitive environment. 
However, it was not willing to support the breakdown of bargaining arrangements 
against trade unions will; unions were too important electorally to be provoked 
this way.116 
 
Indeed, after the government’s consultation with the two sides, the Minister of 
Labour proposed a plan to resolve the deadlock. The most impressive evidence 
for the existence of a labour-state coalition was that the Minister of Labour 
drafted the plan together with the trade unionists.117 The plan included inter alia: 
negotiating a single contract covering executive management staff and other 
employees, introducing performance-related pay at the firm level, and increasing 
working time flexibility.118 
 
The government’s plan was taken up by employers and on 4 June 1997 an Accord 
was signed. More specifically the accord envisaged the establishment of national 
fund to provide income support and training for redundant bank employees; 
linking pay rises to performance, thus introducing performance-related pay at 
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firm level bargaining; introduction of stock-ownership plans; move towards the 
negotiation of a single national contract for both lay employees and executive 
personnel; introduce part-time working; and finally continue privatisation as a 
way to improve the efficiency and size of the sector.119 In response to this the 
Minister hailed the accord as a ‘historic milestone in the country’s economic 
policy’.120 Importantly, it envisaged the reform of the institution of sectoral 
bargaining with a split in negotiations between national industry and individual 
bank level.121 The former would deal with general terms and conditions, while 
flexibility issues would be determined at the firm level.  
 
Following this Accord, negotiations over ways to tackle the reduction of labour 
costs continued in September of the same year, but they soon broke down. The 
unions accused the employers’ side that it was overly focused on redundancies 
and labour costs reduction, ignoring the framework of the Accord agreed earlier 
in June.122 In the face of deadlock of negotiations the Minister of Labour, Tiziano 
Treu, intervened again to mediate the conflict, and a solution was reached.123 For 
one more time, the government intervention saved the institution from collapsing 
and the employers agreed to extend the 1996/97 agreement for 1998, because 
trade unions needed more time to agree on a common platform for bargaining. 
Negotiations among the unions were lengthy, but they managed to agree on a 
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common position for the next bargaining round.124 Their platform was responsive 
to employers’ requests for labour cost containment and increasing flexibility. The 
trade unions were ‘becoming more pragmatic because they could see that 
competition in the banking sector was intensifying’.125 But their platform entailed 
a very clear quid pro quo. 
 
Unions were willing to accept extension of opening hours and reduction in labour 
costs, in exchange for reduced weekly working time and cushioning redundancies 
through the ‘Redundancy Fund’ (Fondo Esuberi) envisaged in the Accord of June 
1997. Crucially the financing of these Funds would burden mainly employers 
(2/3) and to a lesser extent employees (1/3), while the state budget would not be 
burdened at all.126 At the same time, unions were willing to reduce the importance 
of seniority-based pay for new recruits, but not for older employees. Labour costs 
containment was envisaged to be gradual and smooth: including a pay freeze for 
two years and an overhaul of the job classification system, significantly reducing 
the overstaffed ‘management’ grade to a maximum of 2.5 per cent of total 
workforce. Finally, the unions embraced the proposals in the Treu legislation of 
June 1995 on labour market flexibility.127  
 
Despite the concessions made from unions, employers joined the bargaining table 
at the start of 1999 dismissing unions’ platform as ‘inappropriate and unsuitable 
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for pursuing the commonly agreed goals on reducing costs and increasing 
flexibility’.128 Additionally, the employers association (ABI) decided to 
unilaterally suspend seniority premia and bonuses. Their rationale was that 
premia represented little in terms of overall pay, but would provide great 
flexibility for firms. However, negotiations over a new wage contract broke 
down. Trade unions were ferocious accusing the employers for ‘flexing their 
muscles’ and a preordained decision to leave the bargaining table.129 In the face 
of this, they followed their two-pronged strategy: engaging in concerted strike 
action and calling the Minister of Labour of the centre-left D’ Alema government 
to intervene.130 
 
Indeed, by the end of the March, a tripartite meeting took place with government 
representatives, employers, and the major sectoral unions. The government was 
represented at the highest level, not only by the new Minister of Labour, Antonio 
Bassolino, but also by the Secretary to the Prime Minister, Franco Bassanini.131 
On the side of the employers the meeting attended the new president of ABI, 
Maurizio Sella, and the general director, Giuseppe Zadra, and of course, top 
representatives from all three confederal trade unions and the autonomous unions 
Fabi, Falcri and Sinfub. The meetings took place at the Prime Ministerial Office 
(Palazzo Chigi) and the government mediated the talks between the employers 
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and the unions to resolve the deadlock over labour cost reductions.132 The 
agreement entailed a compromise between unions’ demands for security and 
firms’ needs for flexibility. Crucially, the labour-state coalition held out well, 
with the government siding with the unions on the hot topic of the ‘Redundancy 
Fund’ for the planned redundancies133, while the issue of seniority premia 
reduction was deferred to the next bargaining round, only reducing the frequency 
of payment from biennial to triennial134.  
 
The ‘Redundancy Fund’ financed through contributions from banks (0.375 per 
cent of the total wage bill) and employees (0.125 per cent of the total wage bill) 
finally became operational on 17 November 2000. Employers accepted it not only 
because of the political pressure from the government, but because it was a vital 
tool in the process of restructuring their workforces and re-organising their 
operations.135 The fund was a corporatist institution, administered by a board 
made up of four trade union representatives, four employer representatives, and 
two government representatives, one from the Ministry of Labour and another 
from the Ministry of Finance. Why was the government interested in supporting 
trade unions in their demand? The government supported wage bargaining and 
encouraged ‘billateralismo’, the development of semi-public social support 
institutions (such as the Fondo Esuberi), because they had zero-cost for the 
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state.136 Thus, the state withdrew from the state responsibility for welfare, and to 
compensate this, it supported the reform of the institution of wage bargaining, 
with an extension of social partners’ prerogatives.137 
 
5.6.2. Italian Banking in the 2000s: At the Forefront of the ‘New 
Model’ in the Italian Wage Bargaining System 
 
Throughout the 2000s negotiations over wage agreements have been difficult in 
Italian banking with frequent strikes and bitter conflict and disagreements even 
between the unions, but eventually, the reformed wage bargaining institution 
worked rather well. Sectoral wage agreements were concluded in the following 
bargaining rounds of 2002, 2005 and 2007. In March 2002 a new agreement was 
concluded in the banking sector between ABI and banking sector trade unions.138 
Maurizio Sella, president of ABI, maintained that the agreement ‘safeguarded the 
purchasing power of employees, while remaining affordable for employers and 
dealing with restructuring of the banking sector’.139 This does not mean that 
labour relations were absolutely peaceful; instead, conflicts and tensions 
appeared, but they did not threaten the survival of the institution. For instance, the 
negotiations for the 2004/5 wage agreement broke down and the trade unions 
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decided strike action, but the main reasons for the tensions were disagreements 
over the level of pay increases and not the institution of wage bargaining per se. 
 
The latest wage agreement that was concluded was in 2007 and had three year 
duration, being at the forefront of the ‘new model’ of wage bargaining pursued in 
Italy (nuovo modello contrattuale). Even if the national union CGIL is very 
critical of the ‘new model’140, all sectoral federations of CGIL (except for the 
metalworkers) signed agreements which adopt elements of the new model. In a 
nutshell, the ‘new model’ introduces three main changes in the procedural aspects 
of the wage bargaining system: (i) it changes the duration from 4+2 (4 years for 
normative issues and 2 years for economic issues) into 3+3 (3 years for both) (ii) 
it allows the possibility of derogation of industry-wide agreements (iii) it restricts 
the regulation of strikes at the firm level, requiring the use of ballots and (iv) it 
changes the inflation index which is followed to guide increases in wages into 
one which excludes energy prices (petroleum, etc). However, as several 
informants mentioned: ‘CGIL was in delicate position and didn’t want to ‘lose 
face’ in wage bargaining. Thus, almost all sectoral federations of CGIL (except 
for the very militant metalworkers union, which is ‘the left of the left’) eventually 
signed a renewal of agreements following the spirit of the ‘new model’, because 
the most controversial elements were not part of the agreement’.141 FISAC was 
one of the first CGIL affiliates to sign an agreement in the direction of the new 
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model, because the most contested elements were not part of the deal142. The 
signing of agreements which shift the relative importance from industry-wide to 
firm level bargaining solidifies the trajectory of change towards reform and 
‘organised decentralisation’. 
 
Finally, the ability of unions to speak with a ‘single voice’ in the banking sector 
was also strengthened. The autonomous unions FABI and Sinfub pursued the 
closer cooperation with FIBA-CISL. On 22 February 2006 FIBA/CISL, Sinfub 
and FABI signed a pact of ‘unity of action’ and the three sides formed an alliance 
aimed for coordinated action during the negotiations.143 They were committed to 
fully respect the traditions and histories of each other, affirmed their autonomy 
from political parties, and assigned their principal focus on the representation the 
interests of banking employees while respecting the public interest.144 
 
The state remained committed to supporting wage bargaining irrespective of 
political party in government. Not even the Berlusconi government proposed its 
decentralisation according to the Anglo-Saxon model (Herrmann, 2005:304). The 
Berlusconi government may not have followed the concertation method (social 
pacts) in economic policy making as much as previous centre-left governments, 
and made decisions unilaterally with ‘decrees’.  However, it did not dare allow 
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the full decentralisation of the wage bargaining system, which remained within 
the remit of unions’ and employers’ Accords.145 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
The chapter has examined a case study outlining the transformation processes that 
took place in the Italian banking sector during the 1990s. It examined the process 
of liberalisation of the sector that led to an intensification of competition. 
Additionally, it sketched the introduction of greater employment flexibility in 
previously state-owned and bureaucratic organisations. The changing external 
conditions in combination with the introduction of flexible practices inside firms 
manifested the strong pressures towards destabilisation of the institution of wage 
bargaining. However, instead of a breakdown, as in the Greek case, one observes 
a reform of the institution. The chapter explained this trajectory of institutional 
change outlining the relevance of the hypotheses developed in the second chapter. 
 
It was argued that employer associability was crucial in reforming the institutions 
to meet the new needs of firms. Employer associability existed in Italian banking 
before the liberalisation of the sector; however, it was fragmented between 
associations representing smaller savings banks and larger commercial banks. 
The liberalisation triggered a merger process in the associations, whereby all 
interests were represented by one association. Thus, the trade association of 
Italian banks (Associazione Bancaria Italiana) acquired both the legal 
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competence to represent firms on labour issues and amended its statute to take 
into account the interests of both large banks and smaller banks. As a result, ABI 
managed to strike a compromise between setting wages at the lowest common 
denominator for the sector, and deferring much flexibility-related issues to the 
firm level. The motivation behind this choice rested on an appreciation of long-
run interests of their members in their need to restructure the sector, increase the 
efficiency of banks and maintaining social peace. 
 
Finally, the case-study suggested that apart from employer associability, a labour-
state coalition was also critical for the survival of the institution. The unions were 
able to speak with a ‘single voice’ despite organisational fragmentation, and this 
allowed them to steer the interest of the state since unions’ links went both ways 
(either centre-left or centre-right). The unions repeatedly invited the government 
to intervene on their side, and thus, the labour-state coalition was forged. The 
government managed to put pressure on employers to overcome deadlocks and 
reach compromises. In sum, the labour-state coalition blocked the path towards 
Anglo-Saxon breakdown of wage bargaining, while employer associability and 
the labour-state coalition facilitated the reform of the institution. 
 
The government’s motivation in supporting the wage bargaining system rested on 
electoral incentives, but also on a government agenda for labour market flexibility 
and corporate restructuring via the institution of wage bargaining. The 
government was keen on the expansion of welfare provisions on the basis of 
industry-wide ‘social shock absorbers’ which were not costly for the state budget. 
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Thus, the withdrawal of the state from the responsibility to managing 
unemployment and redundancies strengthened the importance of the institution. 
 Chapter 6 The Successful Centralisation of Wage 
Bargaining in the Italian Telecommunications Sector 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the process of change in the wage bargaining 
system of Italian banking, which resulted in the survival of the institution, despite 
the destabilising pressures. It was shown that employer associability and a 
labour–state coalition were crucial factors which mediated the effects of 
liberalisation and flexibility. Unlike Greek banking, the institution did not break 
down, but was restructured to meet new needs. Still, the earlier theories would 
predict that in sectors where the starting point is firm level bargaining, the 
pressures from intensified competition and flexibility would militate against any 
effort to centralise bargaining at the sector level. Firms would favour a 
decentralised bargaining structure in order suit their needs for flexibility, avoiding 
the ‘straightjacket’ of sectoral agreements. Thus, the case of the Italian 
telecommunications industry is a ‘hard case’ for earlier conjectures and the 
chapter will focus on this case, tracing back the process of successful 
centralisation at the sector level.  
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Before the liberalisation of the sector, there was only one firm providing services. 
Within the state-owned monopoly of SIP (later renamed into Telecom Italia), 
wage bargaining took place at the company level. The monopoly position in 
conjunction with the state ownership offered fertile ground for wage bargaining 
to flourish. However, the intensification of competition and increased needs for 
flexibility were expected to deter employers from centralising bargaining. What 
can possibly account for this institutional change? 
 
This question will be answered with the backdrop of the theoretical framework 
outlined in the second chapter. The strong mediating factors enabling this 
outcome were the presence of ‘employer associability’ and a ‘labour-state 
coalition’ in support of wage bargaining. Initially, the peak employers 
association, Confindustria, literally filled the gap of the missing sectoral 
employer association and bargained the first ever industry-agreement with the 
three confederal unions. Subsequently, Confindustria took initiatives to organise 
telecom firms around a sectoral association, which took account of the interests of 
both small and large firms in the sector. Thus, employer associability solidified. 
The motivation of firms was to ensure ‘fair competition’ in the sector with a floor 
in wages and working conditions. The trade unions were able to speak with a 
single voice, despite multiple union federations, and were interested in avoiding a 
race to bottom in wages. Finally, the government intervened to support wage 
bargaining and extend it to resisting and reluctant firms across the sector. The 
government’s motivation was based on electoral concerns and on its agenda on 
labour market reform towards flexibility, which was promoted in the sectoral 
agreement. 
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will first provide a brief overview of 
developments in the industry until the 1980s, when the sector was fully owned by 
the state. Then I will examine the sweeping structural changes that were observed 
during the 1990s, namely the European Union liberalisation, the privatisation of 
the incumbent Telecom Italia, and the introduction of flexible employment 
practices. The purpose is to pin down that pressures which are inimical to 
centralisation of wage bargaining were present and strong. Next, I will shift my 
focus on changes observed in the representation of business and labour interests. 
On the one hand, trade unions were able to speak with a single voice despite 
organisational fragmentation, and on the other hand, employers adjusted their 
representation in light of the privatisation in the industry. Finally, the account of 
events during the late 1990s and early 2000s that led to centralisation will pay 
close attention to the interactions between the employers, unions, and the state. 
Overall, the case study will trace back the process of centralisation, suggesting 
the relevance of the coalitional approach for explaining the dynamics of wage 
bargaining change. 
 
6.2. Italian Telecoms until the 1980s: Monopoly and State Ownership 
 
The telecommunications industry in Italy has historically been segmented, due to 
the different concession agreements that were granted to private telephone 
operators in the early 20
th
 century. In the 1960s the concession agreements 
expired, and the telecoms branch (IRI-STET) of the state-owned IRI holding 
company (Istituto di Reconstruzione Industriale) purchased shares of the regional 
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operators. Thus it created a public monopoly under the name of SIP (Società 
Italiana per l’ Esercizio Telefonico)146. However, the nationalised company 
retained a divided organisational structure and the national territory was divided 
into the five zones in which the previous five companies operated. This structure 
contributed to the persistence of inefficiencies: bureaucratic relationships within 
and across management levels; duplicated tasks and responsibilities; and wasteful 
human resource practices (Negrelli, 1996:296-297). These organisational 
inefficiencies were amplified by the fact there were still different companies in 
charge of different parts of the communications infrastructure leading to an 
excessive institutional fragmentation (Schneider, 2001:68). While SIP was mainly 
responsible for provision of telecoms services to households and business, 
Telespazio was responsible for satellite communications, SIRM for maritime 
communications, Iritel for public telephone services, Italcable handled 
international calls, and ASST dealt with long-distance (intercity) calls. Unlike the 
Greek case, the nationalisation in Italy ‘did not lead to unification of the system’s 
sub-sets into a single administration’ (Negrier, 1997:46). 
 
Two initiatives stand out as responses to the challenge of persisting inefficiencies 
in the early 1980s. The first related to intra-firm reorganisation, and the second 
was oriented to the restructuring of the whole industry. Intra-firm reorganisation 
in SIP involved inter alia: abolition of old geographical divisions that 
corresponded to different entrepreneurial and technical cultures; changes in work 
organisation away from bureaucratic and repetitive jobs towards enlarged job 
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tasks; annualised working hours; and incentive pay systems for sales staff 
(Negrelli, 1996: 297-299). Despite conflict and disagreements, the trade unions 
and SIP management managed to reach compromises and signed related 
company-level agreements in 1982 and 1984 to modernise the company. 
 
In addition to that, the Spadolini government tried to consider a restructuring of 
the whole sector in the early 1980s. It established an expert commission directed 
by Franco Morganti to study the situation in the telecommunications sector and 
develop recommendations for action (Schneider, 2001:69). The ‘Morganti 
Committee’ submitted its proposals with much delay due to political instability 
and successive government changes. The recommendations of the Committee 
included the complete liberalisation of the terminal market as well as new 
telematic services, but – unlike developments in Britain at the time – the experts 
defended the conservation of the public monopoly in the fixed telephony network. 
The Committee aimed at ending the fragmentation in the industry, and proposed 
the consolidation of the various telecoms organisations (SIP, Telespazio, 
Italcable, SIRM, Iritel described above) and integrating them into a single public 
monopoly (monopolio intelligente) (Schneider, 2001:69). Still, a series of 
upheavals in Italian politics did not allow the implementation of any of the 
proposals. 
 
The reform inertia persisted until 1987, when the government established a five 
year plan (Piano Europa) in order to boost competitiveness in the sector and 
reduce the technological gap with other European nations (Graziosi, 1988:308; 
Thatcher, 2007a:193). In addition to technological developments abroad, the 
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advent of the Single European Market in 1992 was a recurrent theme used to 
justify the urgent need for institutional reform (Graziosi, 1988:302; Thatcher, 
2007a:193). The Piano Europa was consistent with earlier proposals of the 
Morganti Committee, suggesting the integration of the traditionally fragmented 
system into a ‘super-SIP’ (or ‘super-STET’). This solution was advocated 
particularly by Romano Prodi, who was the head of IRI at the time. As Thatcher 
(2007a:194-95) argues, consolidation was thought to be important for two 
reasons: (i) it would allow the privatisation of the company in the near future and 
(ii) it would establish a powerful Italian telecoms group, able to compete with 
other ‘national champions’ such as British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and 
France Telecom. The transition to a consolidated ‘super-SIP’ is explained by a 
broad coalition between relevant actors: Minister Mammi made the creation of a 
super-SIP a priority; senior managers at IRI-STET (notably Romano Prodi and 
Giuliano Graziosi) and SIP (Paolo Benzoni) pressed continuously for change; 
while Confindustria and large business users supported reorganisation and 
privatisation which would reduce the costs for business (Thatcher, 2007a:194). In 
1992 a new law reorganised SIP through the creation of ‘STET-Telecom Italia’ 
and a merger between the previous disparate companies followed (Baroncelli, 
1998). At last, the single ‘Telecom Italia’ was born in 1994. 
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6.3. Italian Telecoms in the 1990s: State Withdrawal and the Market 
Unbound 
6.3.1. EU Liberalisation, Privatisation and Intensification of 
Competition 
 
As hinted in the previous section, European economic integration was partly 
responsible for the ‘Piano Europa’, but the European impact would be felt more 
strongly during the 1990s. Following the transposition of the Directives and the 
‘opening up’ of the mobile and later fixed-telephony markets, new players 
appeared in Italy alongside the incumbent Telecom Italia. Starting with mobile 
telephony, the Olivetti manufacturing group acquired the first licence and 
established the Omnitel subsidiary in 1995, which began competing with the 
incumbent’s subsidiary in mobile telephony (Telecom Italia Mobile/TIM). The 
Italian electricity company (ENEL) established WIND in the late 1990s, while 
Blu and the Chinese ‘3’ entered the market soon after. By the early 2000s 
competitive pressures in the mobile phone segment appeared strong, as illustrated 
by the rapidly changing market shares below (Table 2). UK is used as a reference 
point of a very competitive market. Telecom Italia Mobile had the lead in the 
market share in 2000s, but strong competition led to a sharp decline from 56 per 
cent in 2000 to 37 per cent in 2009. At the same time, the foreign entrants such as 
the British Vodafone and Chinese ‘3’ increased their shares significantly. 
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Table 6.1. Market Shares (based on subscribers) in Mobile Telephony across 
Italy and the UK, 2000 – 2009. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Leading operator 56 48 46 47 46 40 41 40 39 37 
Main competitor 36 35 34 36 35 32 32 33 32 33 IT 
Third+Other competitors 8 17 20 17 19 27 27 27 29 30 
Leading operator 30 28 27 26 26 25 26 24 25 21 
Main competitor 26 25 25 25 25 24 23 23 22 20 UK 
Third+Other competitors 44 47 48 49 49 51 51 53 53 59 
Source: European Commission (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009).  
 
Similar changes are observed in the fixed-telephony segment of the market, albeit 
with a few years lag. The first company to compete with Telecom Italia in the 
fixed network was Albacom, which was established in 1995 and was later 
acquired by BT Italia. In 1997 the Olivetti Group established a subsidiary in fixed 
telephony called Infostrada, which was later acquired by WIND. Finally, Teletu 
was established in 1999 and was acquired by Vodafone in 2010. Competition in 
the market was steered by AGCOM (Autorità per le garanzie nelle 
comunicazioni), which was the sector’s independent regulator authority 
established by Law 249 of July 31, 1997. AGCOM followed a rather restrictive 
tariff policy for Telecom Italia, allowing new entrants to compete for services 
using the ‘last mile’ of the fixed network infrastructure and preventing Telecom 
Italia from abusing its dominant position (Sacripanti, 1999). Table 3 presents the 
rapid decline in the market share of the Telecom Italia from 100 per cent 
(monopoly) to 65 per cent in the late 2000s. 
 
Table 6.2. Incumbent Telecom Operator's Market Share (based on retail 
revenue) in Fixed Telephony across Italy and UK, 1997 - 2008. 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IT (Telecom Italia) 100 100 99 93 75 70 68 n/a 65 64 62 65 
UK (BT) 87 82 73 68 55 59 64 n/a 51 56 58 55 
Source: European Commission (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). 
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The above table sketches the picture of intensified competition within the Italian 
fixed-telephony market. Although Telecom Italia’s market share remained large 
until the end of 2000s, occupying more than half of the market, competitive 
pressures appeared strong throughout the decade. A comparison with the 
respective UK market is illustrative: the incumbent operator (BT) lost on average 
2.66 per cent annually for the period examined. In the Italian market, the 
incumbent lost on average 2.91 per cent annually for the exact same period. 
While the difference in total market shares is explained by the fact that Italian 
telecommunications were opened up later than the UK market, the rate of change 
is even higher in Italy. As a result, the monopoly position of Telecom Italia was 
eroded at a high speed and market competition intensified. 
 
Although the liberalisation was largely guided by the European Commission’s 
agenda, privatisation of the incumbent was on the agenda of both centre-right and 
centre-left Italian governments. The consensus on privatisation was based on the 
common goal of raising funds so as to reduce the national debt and eventually 
join the Economic and Monetary Union (Thatcher, 2007a:195). The consolidation 
process described above (from SIP to Telecom Italia) was led by the centrist 
Amato government during the early 1990s. Then the centre-left governments took 
over and privatisation was completed under Romano Prodi, who -in the 
meantime- was elected as Prime Minister. For the privatisation of Telecom Italia, 
the solution that was favoured included: a ‘stable core’ of large shareholders 
having an 18 per cent stake, while another 35 per cent was sold via initial public 
offering (IPO) to the stock exchange (Florio, 2007:3). In sum, 35 years after the 
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nationalisation of the 1960s, the state ownership of Telecom Italia ended on 20 
October 1997. 
 
Interestingly, Telecom Italia became the object of three successive hostile 
takeovers after privatisation. The first hostile takeover was an initiative led by the 
Olivetti Group. While the Telecom Italia CEO at the time, Fransesco Bernabé, 
tried to erect defences against the hostile takeover, these did not work, partly 
because they were not whole-heartedly embraced by the government. The most 
important one was the search for a ‘white knight’ (i.e. finding a friendly-bidder 
who would offer a higher bid than the hostile bidder). The main candidate for that 
position was Deutsche Telekom, which was allegedly a ‘problematic’ white 
knight. Since the German state owned a 72 per cent of Deutsche Telekom, this 
meant that it would end up control 40 per cent of the merged company. That 
would have led to a foreign renationalization of Italy’s biggest listed company, 
and ‘it was too much for the Italian government to stomach’.
147
 Massimo 
D’Alema, who had become Prime Minister in the meantime, entered into 
negotiations with the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. However, the 
negotiations failed, since Germany was not willing to privatise Deutsche Telekom 
in the near future, and Massimo D’Alema eventually favoured the Olivetti 
solution (Kruse, 2005). It was thought that it would be better if Telecom Italia fell 
onto Italian hands, rather than the German state, and thus, the hostile takeover 
was completed by the end of May 1999.  
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Still, the Olivetti control of Telecom Italia was not bound to last. The second 
hostile takeover was largely a consequence of the first one, because Olivetti 
effectively bought a company that was five times larger than itself, financing the 
acquisition via debt. But servicing the debt was not easy and the performance of 
Telecom Italia’s stocks was unimpressive in the next two years. An alliance 
between Pirelli and Benetton seized the opportunity and offered a very lucrative 
bid for the holding company that controlled Telecom Italia. On 28 July 2001 
Pirelli and Benetton acquired the holding company and gained the control of 
Telecom Italia (Florio, 2007). But this was no the end of it, either. In 2007, a 
consortium led by Italian banks and the Spanish Telefonica, acquired the holding 
company through which Pirelli and Benetton retained control of Telecom Italia. 
The Prime Minister Romano Prodi accepted the deal under the condition that 
Spanish Telefonica will only be a minority shareholder, and the majority of 
control will remain in Italian hands.
148
 
 
6.3.2. Restructuring the Telecoms: Technological Change, 
Downsizing, and ‘Negotiated’ Flexibility 
 
The processes of liberalisation and privatisation that were described in the 
previous section undoubtedly hold a prominent place in the recent history of 
Italian telecoms. They coincided with fast moving technological advances which 
brought about dramatic changes in firms’ internal work organisation. Inevitably, 
Italian telecoms were bound to follow the international trends. Functional 
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flexibility and the need for new and versatile skills among employees were 
necessitated more directly in responses to changes in technology (Frey and 
Vivarelli, 1991). Already in the SIP era,  the trade unions frequently revised job 
descriptions so that they correspond to new technologies, and the job 
classification system was made flatter leading to job enrichment and multi-
tasking employees (Negrelli, 1996). 
 
After the merger between the five telecommunications companies (SIP, Italcable, 
Telespazio, Iritel, and SIRM) into a single Telecom Italia the negotiations began 
for the conclusion of the new company agreement in 1994. The main aim of the 
wage agreement was to harmonise pay and working conditions in the previously 
disparate companies; a necessary pre-condition to facilitate its restructuring and 
eventual privatisation. The merger process allowed large cost savings via 
‘improvements in the organisation of work and services’ and was expected to 
generate even greater savings in the future.
149
 However, the business restructuring 
and reorganisation involved inevitable redundancies. For employers, moving into 
a single company agreement for Telecom Italia was important in order to 
safeguard industrial peace during the forthcoming negotiations for the 
privatisation of the company. 
 
Already in the mid-1990s, the firm level unions in Telecom Italia anticipated the 
sweeping structural changes in the sector. As a result, the 1995/6 company 
agreement was foreseen to lay ‘the foundations for a new national contract for the 
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telecommunications industry, which might be extended to other operators once 
the market opened up’.
150
 Unlike their Greek counterparts, Italian trade unionists 
accepted pragmatically the inevitability of privatisation (Negrier, 1997:51; 
Thatcher, 2007a:195). Instead, they were more interested in managing the social 
repercussions, and negotiating the terms of restructuring across the whole 
industry. The major hurdles following the consolidation of Telecom Italia, was to 
downsize the company and therefore, make its privatisation smoother. 
Negotiations were lengthy between Intersind (the state-employer association for 
IRI companies including Telecom Italia) and the three Telecom Italia unions: 
FILPT-CGIL (Federazione Italiana Lavoratori Poste e Telecomunicazioni), 
SILT-CISL (Sindacato Italiano Lavoratori Telefonici Stato), and UILTE-UIL 
(Unione Italiana Lavoratori Telefonici), but were finally successful. 
 
In their 1995 agreement, downsizing would be achieved through voluntary 
redundancies, while flexibility was introduced via four avenues: teleworking, 
geographical mobility, part-time working, and franchising.
151
 Teleworking 
(remotizzazione) was especially facilitated by technological advances and would 
help alleviate the problem of having some overstaffed divisions, while other 
divisions were understaffed. This measure was complemented by geographical 
mobility, providing bonuses for workers assigned to other workplaces according 
to company needs. Part-time working was an option given to employees who 
were neither eligible for voluntary exit, nor eligible for geographical mobility. 
Still, there were limits to part-time working set to 12 per cent of the workforce by 
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business unit. Finally, one very innovative measure was literally transforming ex-
employees into entrepreneurs: former employees would be offered the 
opportunity to open a franchised shop selling Telecom Italia products and 
services. The company would offer financial incentives in a lump-sum as well as 
training and advice on how to get a commercial license. 
 
The structural changes that the sector was undergoing surfaced again during 
negotiations in 1996 in the form of increased needs for flexibility. On the 
employers’ side the rationale was that ‘competition in the telecom market means 
that existing “privileges” are no longer affordable’.
152
 Therefore, the company 
wanted to squeeze labour costs by reducing the wages for new recruits, and 
increasing working time from 38 to 40 hours per week (annualised). Eventually, a 
deal was reached between the state employers’ federation Intersind and the 
telecoms unions providing for: (i) revision of the grading system; (ii) introduction 
of working time flexibilities; and (iii) the introduction of three forms of 
teleworking for different staff grades.
153
 The grading system was revised so that 
the number of grades is reduced from ten to eight, signifying a move towards 
‘flatter’ management hierarchies. There was an introduction of flexible working 
time depending on company needs and customer demand. Part time working was 
also encouraged, while overtime compensation was also regulated and extended 
to part-time workers. Finally, the agreement established three forms of 
teleworking: (i) home teleworking (aimed at low-skilled employees, such as 
telephone operators); (ii) working-out tele-workers (more skilled employees such 
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as accountants and computer managers, providing services which might 
eventually mature into a full outsourcing) and (iii) remote teleworking, 
(individuals working from specially equipped tele-work centres, involving 
operators in more remote areas).
154
 
 
Naturally, the ‘search for flexibility’ did not end with the privatisation of 
Telecom Italia in 1997. After the hostile takeover of Telecom Italia by Olivetti, 
the company incurred a huge debt and the new management tried to cut down on 
labour costs (Florio, 2007:4). This cost-cutting strategy is mostly telling in the 
firm level agreement that was concluded on 28 March 2000 and involved massive 
cuts including: redundancy via compulsory retirement; phased retirement via 
increased unemployment benefit for those close to retirement; retraining and 
redeployment; reduced working time and pay cuts for other employees to avoid 
redundancies (called ‘solidarity contracts’, see below); and switch from full time 
to part-time employment.
155
 Additionally, the company planned to squeeze labour 
costs even further via recruiting some 6,200 workers on apprenticeship/work-
entry contracts and contracts designed to provide young people with work 
experience, especially from high unemployment areas in Southern Italy. The pay 
in such contracts was of course lower than the regular ones and the adoption of 
those working practices was fully in line with the government agenda on labour 
market reform towards greater flexibility. 
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However, introduction of work and pay flexibilities were not only taking place 
inside the privatised Telecom Italia, but were also pursued within the new market 
entrants. The main competitor of Telecom Italia in the fixed telephony network, 
Infostrada, was also introducing several types of flexibilities. On 21 September 
1998, an agreement was signed between the management of Infostrada and the 
metalworking trade unions (Fiom-Cgil, Fim-Cisl and Uilm-Uil)156 on a plan to 
recruit about 1,300 workers for the company's call centres. Crucially, the two 
sides agreed on a high degree of ‘negotiated flexibility’, including: (i) about half 
of the workers would be hired on fixed-term part-time contracts, while the rest 
would be hired on apprenticeship/work-entry contracts (ii) the company would 
subsequently convert up to two thirds of fixed-term part-time contracts into 
permanent part-time contracts (depending on actual business volumes) (iii) pilot 
introduction of incentives and performance related-pay systems, before 
generalised implementation (iv) a minimum service would be guaranteed during 
strikes, while Sunday work would be allowed and finally (v) a joint committee 
would be set up to study the operation of the 24/7 shift system, with is findings 
put down for joint assessment.
 157
 
 
The agreement was received with satisfaction from the unions’ side, despite the 
increased levels of flexibility it entailed. The representative from the CGIL union 
in the negotiations, Gian Piero Castano, justified the choice to accept increased 
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flexibility on the grounds of the potential for future employment creation stating 
that:  
‘This choice - which has already been introduced at Omnitel, is made necessary by 
the two factors of lnfostrada being a relatively new company and the 
telecommunications sector being still a developing one. The unions are confident 
that the consolidation of Infostrada's business will be matched by a corresponding 
consolidation of employment, as has happened in the Omnitel case.’
158
  
This assessment was also shared by the other main union in the sector, CISL, 
whose representative, Giorgio Paolo, applauded the employment creation 
potential in the sector, admitting that increased flexibility is very important 
especially in customer care segment.159 
 
In sum, the new market entrants in Italian telecommunications introduced a great 
degree of flexibility in working practices so as to survive the competitive 
environment and meet customer demand responding to fast moving technological 
change. However, the increased levels of employment flexibility were equally 
observed in the privatised Telecom Italia. Unlike their Greek counterparts who 
resisted the introduction of flexibility, the Italian unions in the sector accepted 
pragmatically the need for greater flexibility in working practices. In both the 
Italian incumbent and the new entrants, the types and extent of flexibility were 
the outcome of negotiations, specified within the context of firm level 
agreements; hence, flexibility was negotiated. Their motivation for negotiated 
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flexibility was in line with the wider government agenda on labour market reform 
to boost employment creation in a rapidly developing sector. The next section 
examines the issues of labour and business representation in more detail. 
 
6.4. The Representation of Labour and Business 
6.4.1. Labour: ‘Single Voice’ despite Organisational Fragmentation 
 
The previous section hinted that representatives from the confederal trade unions 
were active not only within Telecom Italia (where they had a long history of 
representation), but also within the new companies that entered the sector. This 
point is worth emphasising, because prima facie there are several characteristics 
that may jeopardise Italian unions’ capacity to speak with a ‘single voice’ and 
represent the interests of labour in the newly liberalised sector. The representation 
of labour interests could be problematic in three ways. First, there was a danger of 
a split and divisions between employees in the incumbent operator and new 
firms’ employees, as in the Greek case.  Second, there was a context-specific 
danger that the three confederations would be competitive with each other. 
Finally, there was a danger of militant grass-roots unionisation against the three 
confederal unions, something that also happened in the Greek telecoms case (see 
next chapter). 
 
More specifically, the first danger for united labour representation was between 
the privatised incumbent (which had the greatest share of employment) and the 
new firms in the sector (which involved far fewer employees). Employees in the 
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privatised Telecom Italia already enjoyed a higher level of pay and conditions via 
their wage agreements, which were far better than the rates prevalent in the new 
firms. Thus, the Italian unions could focus their efforts on representing only the 
interests of Telecom Italia employees. This would mean that workers in newly 
established firms could be left without representation, leading to a cleavage 
between employees in the incumbent (insiders) and employees in new firms 
(outsiders).  
 
A second source of danger for labour representation stems from the Italian 
industrial relations system, and the nature of competitive relations between union 
confederations. The three confederal unions (CGIL, CISL, and UIL) have 
different membership power, and the new telecoms companies would offer a new 
pool of potential members. As a result, the danger would be that confederal 
unions could be dragged into a spiral of internal conflicts, competing for new 
members with each other. Finally, there was always the chance that employees in 
the new firms could organise bottom-up via militant grass-roots unionisation. 
This was not unlikely, because such organisations (the so-called COBAS) were a 
frequent phenomenon in Italian manufacturing and parts of the public sector. In 
this instance, employees would be unwilling to be affiliated with any of the three 
confederal unions. This is also observed in the Greek telecommunications sector. 
 
In spite of the dangers that liberalisation posed to labour representation in the 
sector, Italian unions managed to skilfully avoid all those hurdles. The danger of 
ending up with a cleavage between incumbent and new firms was avoided, 
because unions followed an inclusive strategy. Telecom Italia unions (FILPT, 
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SILT, and UILTE) were transformed into sectoral-level associations embracing 
the workers in the new firms. The first union that was transformed was CGIL’s 
affiliate union FILPT. In 1997 it was renamed into SLC merging the previous 
separate post/telecom union and the information/broadcasting union. CISL’s 
affiliate union SILT was also transformed into FISTEL covering also employees 
in all firms in telecoms, IT and broadcasting, Finally UIL’s affiliate UILTE was 
transformed into UILCOM. Thus, the process of filling the gap in new workers’ 
representation took place ‘top-down’.  
 
This process was not problem-free. The main problem was that the first 
companies such as Omnitel [now Vodafone] workers were represented by 
metalworkers unions and in Wind by electricity (ENEL) unions. But in the new 
firms in which there was no representative previously, trade unionists visited the 
workplaces and asked the employees to become members of their union.160 
Hence, the problem of representation in those firms was resolved at the 
confederal level, with telecoms unionists taking over representation from their 
colleagues in manufacturing, and organised workers in the newly established 
firms. 
 
In addition to that, the dangers of having internal fights and compete for members 
was also avoided because the unions shared a common strategic objective for the 
sector: centralising bargaining via a single sectoral contract. This vision was 
shared long before the liberalisation was completed. As mentioned in the previous 
section, unionists from all three confederations in Telecom Italia were resolved to 
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use the incumbent’s wage agreement as the foundation for a national contract in 
the sector and extend it to new operators.161 To that end, the three sectoral 
federations (Filpt, Silt and Uilta) followed the familiar two pronged strategy 
already since 1996: on the one hand, putting pressures to telecoms firms via 
national strikes, and on the other, urging the government to ensure ‘fair 
competition’ in the sector via a national wage agreement in telecoms.162 
 
The final danger for labour unity was the prospect of militant grass-roots 
organisation such as the COBAS (Comitati di Base). Already in the 1980s, the 
three confederations had experience of militant COBAS in several sectors. This 
led them to devise a new institutional solution: the RSUs (Rappresentanza 
Sindacale Unitaria). This provision was foreseen in the monumental July 1993 
Accord between the government, the unions and Confindustria163, but was also 
further specified in the bi-partite inter-confederal Accord of 20 December 1993. 
Confindustria, together with the three main union confederations agreed that 
representation at workplaces over 15 employees would take place through RSUs, 
of which two thirds of their members would come from direct elections and one 
third would be appointed by the confederations. Still, the RSU would be 
considered independent and not affiliated with any of the three main unions. 
Thereby, independent grass roots unionists would be represented without formal 
affiliation, appeasing their militant tendencies. Indeed, RSUs were established in 
all main companies such as WIND and Vodafone and as the later section shows, 
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they were influential in negotiating the extension and inclusion of call-centres’ 
workers under the umbrella of the sectoral agreement.  In sum, despite 
organisational fragmentation, Italian unions were able to ‘speak with a single 
voice’ and pursue their strategy of centralisation. 
 
Table 6.3. Main Trade Union Organisations in the Italian Telecoms Sector. 
Organisation Function/Affiliation Membership/Structure 
Sindacato Lavoratori 
Comunicazione  SLC/ 
CGIL Est. as FILPT-
CGIL 
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Affiliated to ex-communist 
CGIL 
Members: 15,000 (2006). 
Federazione sindacale 
della  informazione dello 
spettacolo e delle 
telecomunicazioni 
FISTEL/CISL 
Est. as SILT-CISL  
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement;  Affiliated to Christian 
democratic/Catholic CISL 
Members: n/a. 
Unione Italiana 
Lavoratori 
Comunicazione 
UILCOM 
Est. as UILTE-UIL  
Signatory to national sectoral wage 
agreement; Affiliated to social 
democratic UIL 
Members: 17,302 (2006). 
Unione Generale del 
Lavoro Comunicazioni 
UGL Comunicazioni 
Approves the agreement ex-post; 
Affiliated with neo-fascist UGL 
Members: 2,000 (2006) 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
6.4.2. Business: The ‘Privatisation’ of the Employer Associability 
 
The extensive state ownership in the Italian economy meant that there was a large 
pool of publicly owned enterprises alongside the privately-owned firms. While 
Confindustria was traditionally the employer representative of private sector, 
Intersind was the employer representative of the public sector enterprises. 
Intersind was set up in 1958 so that it represents state-owned (IRI) firms in labour 
relations. The members of Intersind came from a diverse range of economic 
sectors such as: metalworking, construction, food processing, communications, 
broadcasting, and transport. Following a political agreement in May 1994 
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between Romano Prodi (president of the IRI Group), Luigi Abete (president of 
Confindustria), and Agostino Paci (president of Intersind), it was decided that 
Intersind would be incorporated into Confindustria.164 
 
The agreement stipulated that: (i) Intersind would remain in existence with its 
current membership for two years; however, giving up its role at the ‘inter-
confederal level’ (ii) over those two years, many of Intersind’s companies will 
prepare to join the relevant sectoral federations of Confindustria (e.g. 
Federmecanica for metalworking, Federalimentare for food processing, etc.) (iii) 
at the end of that process, Intersind would change its name and become the 
federation representing ‘network services’ (i.e. telecommunications, transport, 
road communication, and broadcasting).
165
 
 
This incorporation was seen as a necessary step in the large scale privatisation 
process which was taking place in Italy, which was ‘the largest privatisation 
programme in the world during the 1990s, raising about €90 billion between 1992 
and 1999’ (Deeg, 2005:531). On the one hand, this action reaffirmed 
government’s resolve to proceed with privatisation, while on the other hand it 
would expand Confindustria’s membership and representativeness into services 
sectors which were until then dominated by state ownership. Indeed, after the 
announcement of the merger, Confindustria president Luigi Abete stated that: 
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‘it is an important step in the associations’ representativeness widening process and 
the overcoming of a historical division between public and private employers, and 
the proof that privatisation process is taking place effectively.’
166
 
 
Notwithstanding its high importance, the mere fact of incorporation of Intersind 
into Confindustria could not lead deterministically into centralisation of 
bargaining in all the network-services sectors. At the first stage, Federcomin 
(Federazione delle Imprese delle Comunicazioni e dell’ Informatica) was 
established in 1998 after the dissolution of Intersind, and absorbed some of the 
personnel and functions in Intersind. While new telecoms firms in the sector 
became members of Federcomin, the association lacked the legal competence to 
negotiate wage agreements with trade unions. 
 
As will be described in the next section Confindustria sought to protect the 
collective interests of both small and large firms in the telecommunications sector 
ensuring ‘fair competition’ and it negotiated the first sectoral agreement. 
Subsequently, it created the first employer association Assotelecommunicazioni 
or ASSTEL on 29 November 2002 with legal competence to represent members in 
labour relations issues. The association was not dominated by the ex monopoly 
Telecom Italia, and the president was usually coming from one of the new 
entrants (e.g. Vodafone) balancing views of smaller operators and the incumbent 
in frequent meetings.167 Eventually, Federcomin was merged with FITA 
(Federazione Italiana del Terziario Avanzato per I Servizi Innovativi e 
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Professionalli) on 7 November 2006 and formed an association of ‘network 
services’ as Confindustria Servizi Innovativi e Tecnologici.168 The telecoms 
employer association, ASSTEL, became one of the affiliates of this federation. 
 
Table 6.4. Main Business Associations in the Italian Telecoms Sector. 
Organisation Function Membership/Affiliation 
Associazione delle 
Imprese Esercenti Servizi 
di Telecomunicazioni 
ASSTEL 
 
Represents the interests of all 
telecommunications  companies; 
Employers Association since 2002; 
Signatory to national wage agreement;  
Members: 28 companies (2006); 
affiliated member of  Confindustria 
Servizi Innovativi e Tecnologici 
Confindustria Servizi 
Innovativi e Tecnologici 
Est. 2006  
Represents the interests of main 
telecommunications, radio-television, 
and Information / Communication 
Technology companies 
Outcome of a merger between FITA 
and Federcomin; affiliate member of 
Confindustria 
Intersind 
Est. 1958 
 
Represented all state-owned (IRI) 
public enterprises with sectoral 
divisions 
Dissolved in 1994-6 and absorbed by 
Confindustria and evolved into 
Federcomin 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
6.5. Italian Telecoms in the early 2000s: The Centralisation of Wage 
Bargaining 
6.5.1. The Path Towards the Successful Centralisation of Wage 
Bargaining 
 
The institutional change from firm level bargaining to sectoral-level bargaining in 
Italian telecoms was neither easy nor straightforward. In the context of increased 
penetration of flexible working practices at the company level, the sector was 
characterised by extreme diversity in working conditions across firms. As 
mentioned above, the entry of Omnitel in the mobile telephone sector back in 
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1995 was very disturbing for unions’ plans to have a single national contract. Not 
only did Omnitel apply the metalworking sector wage agreement, but it also 
recruited highly qualified professionals from Telecom Italia and paid them 
individually higher salaries.
169
 In other words, the new entrant was seriously 
disturbing a level-playing in competition following a strategy of ‘poaching’ 
highly skilled personnel, and thus ‘free-riding’ on acquired experience and 
training. This situation led the unions to call national strikes several times during 
the mid 1990s in order to voice their demand for a single wage agreement across 
the sector.
170
 
 
By the end of the 1990s the situation was as follows. Telecom Italia had a rather 
generous wage agreement covering employees across the group such as TIM 
(mobile telephony) and Tin.it (internet service provider). On the other hand, 
Omnitel (mobile telephony) and Infostrada (fixed telephony) applied the less 
generous metalworking sector agreement, but it could afford to pay a premium 
for poached personnel. Wind (fixed telephony) applied a special agreement 
negotiated with the union confederations similar to the electricity sector 
agreement of ENEL (of which it was a subsidiary). Finally, other smaller 
companies were not bound by any agreement. As a corollary, the three peak 
confederations’ (CGIL, CISL, and UIL) shared the fear that the combination of 
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multiple bargaining arrangements and high competitive pressures would lead to a 
‘race-to-bottom’ for working conditions.
171
 
 
Initially, the strategy of the unions was to put pressure for the extension of the 
Telecom Italia agreement across the sector. However, its terms and conditions 
were considered as very onerous by the new companies, and refused to apply it to 
their workers.  Instead, smaller firms voiced their preference for decentralised 
firm level bargaining.
172
 In that period the firms did not want a single contract, 
and there were divisions between them: Telecom Italia wanted a contract because 
it was a necessary tool for safeguarding peace during the restructuring process; 
the larger players such as Vodafone, Wind and Omnitel wanted a contract, but not 
the high level of Telecom Italia; and finally, the smaller telecom operators did not 
want any contract at all.
 173
 
 
Faced with those divisions between firms, the unions’ strategy was to put 
pressure to Telecom Italia and Confindustria to negotiate an agreement for the 
sector since there was no employer association with a legal competence to 
represent firms in this sector. To this end, they pursued meetings with the CEO of 
Telecom Italia, to pull the strings in Confindustria and other firms. Indeed, after 
meeting with the trade unions in July 1999 the new CEO of Telecom Italia, 
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Roberto Colaninno, agreed to provide the sector with a single contract. Colaninno 
characterised this choice as ‘essential and decisive’ adding that: 
‘I am ready to personally sit at the bargaining table. I fully agree with the unions; it 
remains to overcome plenty of resistance from various interested companies‘174. 
 
Unlike their Greek counterparts, the Italian unions were resolved to push for the 
centralisation and put the broader interests of employees from the whole sector 
above the narrow interests of employees in the incumbent operator. Notably, they 
refused to negotiate a new contract for Telecom Italia employees, unless wage 
bargaining is first centralised covering all employees in the sector.175 Their 
strategy was to pursue the argument of ensuring ‘fair competition’ (concorrenza 
leale) in the sector for which Confindustria was committed in an Accord of 1998 
with the government and the peak confederal unions. As a labour informant 
noted: 
‘The June 2000 national contract was an effect of an earlier Accord between 
government and the peak business and labour associations. It was the era of 
privatisation of public services; the idea was thrown in an Accord in 1998176 
towards fair competition in telecommunications, water, gas and electricity, 
transportation. The telecoms market was liberalised and the competition was intense 
because of the new entrants. The new firms increasingly took market shares 
‘crashing’ Telecom Italia. Therefore, the aim of the accord between Confindustria, 
government, and us was to ensure fair competition and focus competition on 
services quality and prices, rather than on wages.’177 
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Responding to this situation, Confindustria recognised that the simultaneous 
application of different wage agreements in the sector was creating conditions of 
unfair competition among firms.178 Therefore, it joined the bargaining table in 
order to create a level-playing field for its members by agreeing with the unions 
on the first national contract.
179
 The final agreement, which was signed on 28 
June 2000, provided for minimum conditions across the sector, which coincided 
with the lowest rates applied in telecoms companies and a component of 
‘negotiated flexibility’.
180
 As showed in the previous sections, unions were 
pragmatic in accepting flexibility in employment practices, since their priority 
was to increase employment levels and bargaining coverage for the whole sector. 
The agreed minimum wages accommodated the new and smaller companies in 
the sector, which could benefit from social peace.
181
 Additionally, the 
introduction of performance related pay was delegated to the firm level 
bargaining to suit individual needs of firms. In exchange, the agreement 
confirmed the two-level bargaining system, whereas its coverage was wide 
including not only companies providing telephone services, but also internet 
service providers and small specialised firms. The other side of the compromise 
involved an increase in numerical and working time flexibility, in exchange for 
training and reduction of total working time. 
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In terms of working time flexibility, the agreement specified the establishment of 
‘individual time bank accounts’ and employees would be able to accumulate 
overtime and subsequently take those hours as leave.
182
 Weekly working time 
was set at 38.5 hours on average over a six-month reference period. The increase 
in flexibility was dubbed as ‘just-in-time working’ (flessibilita tempestiva). 
Management could request from labour representatives - at a very short notice (48 
hours) – to alter working time schedules (up to 48 hours per week and 12 hour per 
day) so as to meet increased customer demand in busy periods.
183
 In terms of 
numerical flexibility (fixed term contracts and temporary agency work) this was 
permitted at levels exceeding those provided in previous firm level agreements. 
However, the increase came with strings attached. Fixed-term contracts and 
agency workers could constitute no more than 30 per cent of the overall 
workforce (15+15), in the South of Italy (Mezzogiorno) and no more than 26 per 
cent of the workforce (13+13) in companies located in the Central and Northern 
parts of Italy. A further increase might be permissible, but it was delegated to the 
firm level bargaining to suit individual companies needs. The atypical contracts 
were allowed to deal with skills shortages and labour shortages during periods of 
holidays, training leaves, busy periods of production or peaks of activity due to 
new orders or to the launch of a new product. In other words, working time 
flexibility was instrumentally used to meet fluctuations in customer demand. 
Finally, the agreement provided for the operation of job-sharing and teleworking 
and included the establishment of two joint national committees entrusted with 
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the introduction of functional flexibility. The first committee would analyse 
training needs in the sector, develop training programmes, and generally manage 
vocational training, while the second would examine the job classification system 
update occupational profiles in response to rapidly changing technologies. 
 
The national sectoral agreement in 2000 created a momentum and triggered 
changes in labour and business representations. Peak associations took initiatives 
to solidify the institution of sectoral wage bargaining. The unions were already in 
the process of taking over representation from their metalworking colleagues, 
becoming the sole representatives in the sector. After SLC and FISTEL, 
UILCOM was the third union to be transformed into a sectoral ‘network services’ 
union representing all firms in telecoms, information technology and 
broadcasting. On the business side, Confindustria took the initiative to organise 
telecoms companies around a new association ASSTEL. The smaller firms in the 
sector which were resistant to centralisation of wage bargaining were faced with a 
united front from the three labour confederations. Thus, the worse-case scenario 
for the resisting firms was the prospect of continuous industrial unrest, whereby 
their employees would ask for comparable wages with those in Telecom Italia’184 
At the same time, the multiplicity of bargaining arrangements was creating 
conditions of unfair competition, since some firms were not bound by any 
agreement, thus obtaining a cost advantage.  
 
Confindustria was able to offer to individual firms a very lucrative compromise 
getting for them the ‘best of both worlds’: ensure peace and minimum common 
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standards at the sector level and increasing employment flexibility at the 
company level. Notably, ASSTEL was an association that was not dominated by 
Telecom Italia, but took the interests of smaller operators and other firms into 
account. Hence, employer associability was established in the sector and the 
negotiation of wage agreement was taken over by their sectoral associations 
(ASSTEL for employers, and SLC, FISTEL, and UILCOM for trade unions) 
which signed a new sectoral agreement in 2002. 
 
The unions kept up their strategy of avoiding a ‘race to bottom’ in working 
conditions, however, accepting the introduction of ‘negotiated flexibility’. By 
2005 the remaining conflict concerned the employment conditions of call-centre 
employees and the unions wanted to include measures to increase their job 
security.
185
 The unions’ primary demand was the extension of the wage 
agreement coverage to include call-centre companies and regulate subcontracting 
and outsourcing in a growing and very competitive sector. Indeed, on 3 December 
2005 trade unions and ASSTEL signed a new sectoral agreement, thus, 
solidifying the centralisation of wage bargaining. Generally its provisions 
included an increase in negotiated flexibility in exchange for extension of 
coverage: (i) the agreement’s coverage was extended to include all relevant firms 
to which major telecoms players were outsourcing: call-centre firms, web-
services and digital/multimedia services companies; (ii) job classification system 
would be updated to define new job profiles in information technology and 
networks; (iii) fixed term and agency contracts would be permitted according to 
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previously agreed levels; (iv) work-entry contracts and professional 
apprenticeships would be allowed within limits; (v) the reference period for 
working time could be extended to one year after negotiation at the company 
level, while overtime was made more flexible by removing quarterly restrictions 
and replacing them with an annual limit; (vi) compliance with laws on social 
security and health and safety was a prerequisite to combat undeclared and 
irregular work in subcontracting firms; (vii) RSUs in telecoms firms were granted 
increased information and consultation rights, especially with regard to equal 
opportunities and workplace health and safety.
186
 
 
6.5.2. Protecting the Outsiders: Outsourcing and the Almaviva Call 
Centre Group 
 
Despite the sectoral agreement of 2005, free riding tendencies persisted from 
firms operating in the periphery of telecoms, mainly outsourced call centres. The 
paramount importance of the sectoral wage bargaining agreement was to 
homogenize working conditions and ensure fair competition across the sector. At 
the same time it allowed sufficient increase in flexibility in response to changes in 
technology or fluctuation in demand. The level of pay and conditions stood at the 
lowest common denominator for telecoms companies. This was very important to 
accommodate the interests of both the incumbent operator and smaller operators. 
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The signing of the 2005 agreement moved the game into a different segment of 
the newly developing market: call centres. As far as call centres were an ‘in-
house’ part of the telecoms companies divisions, the wage agreement would 
ensure a ‘level-playing’ field across the sector. However, call-centre services 
became increasingly important for customer care and sales, and new specialised 
companies emerged in the sector. The main telecoms operators were 
‘outsourcing’ the relevant business functions to those firms, which in turn 
operated outside the limits set by the sectoral wage agreement. 
 
The most notorious case of such a specialised firm was the Almaviva Group. 
Almaviva was a holding company, leader in information technology and 
customer relations management (CRM) services, which was running the largest 
group of call centres in Italy (including Atesia, Cos, Alicos and InAction).
187
 In 
an effort to cut labour costs, the Almaviva Group was using extensively 
‘freelance work contracts’. This type of work contract was used for both ‘inbound 
operators’ receiving calls to provide information or technical assistance, but also 
‘outbound operators’ who were working on sales promotion and telemarketing 
activities. The freelance contracts were a case of ‘spurious’ or ‘bogus’ self-
employment. Although employees were employed in freelance contracts, those 
were successively renewed, as if they were permanent. Additionally, the 
employees performed a pre-specified set of tasks with a regular employer and in 
standard locations, which are the characteristics of a standard ‘dependent 
employment relationship’. Almaviva had an incentive to resort to an extensive 
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use of this type of contracts, because it avoided several costs that would have to 
pay for a normal open-ended employment contract (e.g. sickness and accident 
benefits; maternity leave; paid holidays; yearly bonus, etc.). Crucially, about 70 
per cent of the call-centre workers were women, so maternity leave would 
potentially represent a serious cost for the company. 
 
The trade unions were very attentive on that matter, because it created the 
potential for firms to avert the regulations imposed by the national agreement 
across the sector and circumvent them via outsourcing business functions to 
Almaviva Group. Indeed, by 2005 not only Telecom Italia, but also TIM and 
WIND had outsourced their call-centres to Almaviva. This was a clear instance of 
‘free-riding’ tendency: while the telecoms firms took advantage of the benefits of 
social peace from the national contract, they avoided the regulations stemming 
from the contract. 
 
The strategy of the unions was to put pressure to call-centre firms by forging a 
coalition with the state. Indeed, the sectoral unions used their political influence 
and eventually drafted together with the Minister of Labour a Government 
Circular (No. 17/2006) that restricted the use of freelance workers in call 
centres.188 More specifically, the Circular made illegal the successive renewal of 
freelance contracts for workers supplying online customer care and assistance 
(‘inbound operators’), because in this type of job there was ‘ample scope to 
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determine beforehand the content, intensity and form of the work undertaken’.189 
Importantly, the unions had begun drafting the Circular with the Minister’s 
predecessor Roberto Maroni, of the outgoing centre-Right Berlusconi 
government.190 However, the change in government to the centre-Left under 
Romano Prodi did not disrupt the process of regularisation. In June 2006 the 
Circular was finalised under the supervision of the newly appointed Minister of 
Labour, Cesare Damiano.
191
 According to the Circular the call-centre companies 
were allowed to use freelance contracts only for call centre operators hired for 
very short-term promotional and marketing campaigns. Apart from the Circular, 
the unions were armed with the state’s coercive power and used Labour 
Inspectorate’s investigations strategically to put pressure on Almaviva.192 
Almaviva initially resisted the implementation of the Circular noting that ‘the 
rulings of the Labour Inspectorate and the Circular are contradictory’ and 
threatened that the cost of regularising all of its contracts may require it to resort 
to dismissals.193  
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However, the resisting firm was not able to withstand the pressure from the 
labour-state coalition. Eventually, the unions reached a deal with the Almaviva 
Group in December 2006, agreeing to convert existing ‘freelance contracts’ into 
open-ended employment contracts for 6,500 employees.
 194
 The result was that 97 
per cent of employees in the company would be recruited on a basis of an open-
ended employment contract. Even more importantly, the company agreement 
provided that Almaviva would join ASSTEL and thereby, all workers would be 
covered by the telecommunications’ wage agreement provisions.  
 
Why had the Minister taken the side of the unions on this issue? The explanation 
of the government’s motivation rests on both electoral concerns and priorities in 
the government agenda. The unions were strategic in using their political clout 
with both centre-left Prodi governments and the centre-right Berlusconi 
governments to achieve their objectives. However, there was no permanent 
relationship with any party; they could invite either party to support them, 
because their links went both ways. As a labour informant noted: 
‘The new culture among unions is to be strictly non-partisan and independent from 
ideologies. Of course we have some leaders who support one party, but there is no 
organic relationship. Government support for specific issues can be created on a 
case-by-case basis. Nobody tells the other what to do. But the political parties in 
general (right, left, centre) are not in a position to avoid totally what the trade 
unions ask them, because we are in any case representing a lot of people.’195 
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In parallel, the government agenda’s priorities were congruent with unions’ 
demands. The increase in atypical contracts was an instance of an abuse of the 
provisions of the labour Law No. 30/2003 (known as Legge Biagi) which allowed 
greater flexibility in the labour market. While the unions had agreed with those 
labour market reforms, the extensive use of ‘freelance work’ contracts increased 
precariousness in the labour market and was against unions’ strategy for 
‘negotiated flexibility’. The Almaviva group was a notorious case that abused the 
system even when performing outsourced tasks for government services (such as 
ISTAT). The government, therefore, had an interest in showing a ‘firm hand’ for 
the proper implementation of the law, especially since the Minister of Labour, 
Cesare Damiano, was in the past a leading trade unionist at CGIL and was in 
favour of ‘good flexibility’.196 After the conclusion of the agreement the Minister 
stated that it was ‘a success for both the trade unions and the company’ and 
encouraged both sides to ‘look forward and to ensure homogeneous employment 
conditions and labour cost stability in all call centre companies, guaranteeing thus 
equal rights for the workers and fair competition among the companies’.
197
 
 
In sum, the unions accepted increased use of flexible working practices for 
existing employees -even in the privatised incumbent Telecom Italia- but also 
sought to regulate and restrict the abuse of flexibility for more precarious 
workers. In other words, the unions were willing to relax protection for ‘insiders’ 
but also increase job security for typical ‘outsiders’. They took a much more 
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balanced approach that their Greek counterparts, who ignored the situation of 
‘outsiders’, and only defended job security for ‘insiders’ (see next chapter). Thus, 
the unions’ inclusive strategy, using their political clout to ease the cleavages 
between insiders and outsiders paid off and the newly established institution of 
sectoral wage bargaining solidified. 
 
6.5.3. Negotiating the Restructuring of the Sector: Vodafone and 
Telecom Italia 
 
Italian unions did not only forge a labour-state coalition with respect to increasing 
the coverage of the wage bargaining agreement to call-centre employees. The 
unions’ inclusive strategy is also evidenced in the cases of business restructuring. 
Unlike their Greek counterparts, the Italian unions were not focused on 
negotiating the restructuring only in the large incumbent operator. Instead, unions 
used their political links with the government so as to put pressure to private 
sector firms, so that the institution of sectoral wage bargaining is not jeopardised 
and restructuring is part of negotiated solutions. The cases below document how 
the unions pursued this inclusive strategy catering the interests of employees 
across the sector. 
 
By the end of the 2000s Telecom Italia remained the largest telecommunications 
group in Italy; however, it had already gone through three successive hostile 
takeovers. Despite earlier efforts to restructure, Telecom Italia was still burdened 
with more than €35 billion debt, and the management announced that 
redundancies would be necessary. Trade unions sought to influence the pattern of 
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restructuring, averting outright redundancies. Instead, they signed an agreement 
in 2008, stipulating that 5,000 workers would be registered onto ‘mobility lists’. 
‘Mobility procedures’ (mobilità) was one of the innovative ‘social shock 
absorbers’ introduced since 1991 mainly for blue-collar manufacturing workers, 
and their aim was to facilitate re-entry into work of redundant employees.
198
 
Workers ‘in mobility’ received supplementary benefit and were enrolled on a 
regional ‘mobility list’ (lista di mobilità), while firms that hired personnel from 
the mobility list were entitled to tax concessions. 
 
The restructuring process did not end there, as cost-savings have not been 
achieved and in January 2009, the Telecom Italia Group presented its Strategic 
Plan for the period 2009–2011 to the trade unions, whereby the plan specified the 
need for further 4,000 redundancies.
199
 The trade unions opposed this action and 
requested the intervention by the Minister of Labour of the centre-right 
Berlusconi government, Maurizio Sacconi. The Minister responded, agreeing to 
act as a mediator, and on 21 July 2009, a meeting took place at the Ministry, 
between Telecom Italia management, the Telecom Italia RSU, and sectoral 
associations SLC, FISTEL and UILCOM. After intensive and long negotiations, 
the parties reached an agreement whereby the anticipated redundancies were to be 
replaced by 1,054 employment ‘solidarity contracts’. This meant that weekly 
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working hours would be reduced for full-time personnel turning their contracts 
into part-time jobs, so that their jobs are saved via job-sharing. 
 
However, the market pressures for further downsizing of Telecom Italia were not 
averted. In April 2010, Telecom Italia’s revised Strategic Plan for 2011-12 
announced a total of 6,822 redundancies to be implemented by December 2012. 
In response to this announcement the strategy that trade unions followed was two-
pronged: first they engaged into industrial action organizing a national strike in 
July; and second they invited the Minister of Labour, Maurizio Sacconi and the 
Deputy Minister of Telecommunications to intervene into negotiations mediating 
the resolution of the conflict. Indeed, the Ministers met with representatives from 
Telecom Italia management and the sectoral unions at the Ministry of Economic 
Development on 14 July 2010.
200
 Following this meeting, Telecom Italia 
suspended the dismissal notices that it had sent to 3,700 employees, and after a 
series of meetings, the parties reached an agreement on 4 August 2010. 
 
The main aspects of the agreement included: mobility procedures for 3,900 
employees, ‘solidarity contracts’ for 1,100 employees, and suspension of all plans 
to outsource business functions such as IT activities, human resources, and 
customer operations, keeping them ‘in-house’. On the one hand, those entitled to 
be registered in ‘mobility lists’ would be employees who are up to 36 months 
before retirement. On the other hand, employees entitled to solidarity contracts 
would be younger employees, and while their working time and pay was reduced, 
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they were expected to attend vocational training programmes so that they are 
retrained. Following this arrangement, the CEO of Telecom Italia, Franco 
Bernabè, declared that ‘the agreement is perfectly in line with efficiency 
objectives foreseen in the Strategic Plan and that, at the same time, it guarantees 
workers’ protection from job losses’
201
. 
 
But as mentioned above, the unions did not only cater the interests of the 
employees in the incumbent operator. A few years earlier, the trade unions 
pursued a similar strategy in Vodafone Italia Group. In September 2007 the 
Group announced that about 900 employees dispersed across various company 
locations would be affected by a business branch transfer to the specialised 
transaction processing services company Comdata.
202
 The trade unions 
recognised immediately the risks for circumventing the rules set out in the 
national wage agreement. The ‘transfer of employees’ was another form of 
outsourcing and Comdata was not a member of ASSTEL, therefore, would not be 
obliged to abide by its rules and regulations. The strategy of the unions was 
consistent: hinging on the state’s coercive power. They invited the Minister of 
Economic Development to informally mediate the negotiations with the two 
firms. Indeed, the Minister responded to this call and the agreement between 
Vodafone, Comdata, and the sectoral trade unions was concluded at the premises 
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of the Ministry.
203
 According to the agreement’s provisions, Comdata was 
required to apply to the transferred workers the nationwide wage agreement for 
the telecommunications sector, which was binding for Vodafone, while the firm 
level agreement would stipulate performance-related pay and other matters. Even 
more, the same provisions would also apply to any future recruits in the 
transferred branch, so that a double contractual regime is avoided. In the case of 
bankruptcy of the Comdata group, Vodafone was obliged to either find a third 
party to which all of the workers would be transferred or re-hire them in 
Vodafone Group.204 
 
To sum up, restructuring in the sector was the outcome of negotiations, although 
the state stepped in to support the process.  The centralisation of wage bargaining 
in the sector solidified, and unions forged a coalition with the state to increase 
coverage covering equally employees in the privatised incumbent and in the new 
firms.  In all wage agreements, flexibility was introduced in an orderly fashion, 
relaxing the protection of core employees (insiders) and increasing the protection 
of peripheral employees (outsiders). The most recent wage agreement in 
telecommunications was signed in 2009. The agreement followed from the earlier 
ones allowing for ‘negotiated flexibility’ and setting common standards across the 
sector. It is important to note that the agreement was in line with the ‘new model’ 
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(nuovo modello contrattuale) as outlined in the previous chapter on Italian 
banking. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
Liberalisation and privatisation transformed the Italian telecommunications 
sector. The public monopoly that was created in the early 1960s was dissolved 
under the requirements of European regulation. New players entered the telecoms 
market, both foreign and domestic. Competitive pressures intensified, and the 
dominant position of the incumbent was eroded. Telecom Italia was privatised in 
1997 and -in conjunction with technological advances- this led to unprecedented 
changes in work organisation towards extensive use of flexible working practices. 
The pervasive introduction of flexibility is observed across the sector and smaller 
firms voiced their preferences towards solely firm level bargaining to better suit 
their business plans and needs. But these developments did not bring about 
convergence to Anglo-Saxon decentralised bargaining structure.  Wage 
bargaining was centralised at the sectoral level and was extended to cover call-
centre firms. The main aim of the chapter was to explain this trajectory of 
institutional change. 
 
The argument that the chapter put forward was that the institutional change is 
explained by employer associability and labour-state coalitions. Confindustria 
stood out as a strong employers association both willing and able to negotiate 
sectoral agreements and strike effective compromises for its members. The 
motivation lay in ensuring a level playing field across the sector avoiding unfair 
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competition between its members. The compromises catered the long run 
interests of both large and small telecoms firms, providing a generous 
introduction of flexibility and allowing for cost standardisation at the lowest 
common denominator. However, an explanation based solely on the role of 
employer associability would be terribly incomplete.  
 
The case study suggested that the state intervened in critical junctures after 
invitation by the unions and a ‘labour-state coalition’ was forged. Notably, the 
unions were able to ‘speak with a single voice’ and steer the interest of the state, 
irrespective of the political party in government. The Minister of Labour 
mediated conflicts and facilitated compromises so that wage bargaining coverage 
is extended. The motivation behind state intervention was partly due to electoral 
concerns; the unions’ vote was too important to ignore. But there were also state-
functional considerations such as ensuring the implementation of the government 
agenda on labour market flexibility. Liberalisation, intensification of competition 
and increased flexibility were necessary but not sufficient conditions to lead to a 
decentralised bargaining structure. In a nutshell, ‘employer associability’ and a 
‘labour-state coalition’ mediated the EU liberalisation and introduced ‘negotiated 
flexibility’ ensuring a level playing field across the sector. If any of those two 
conditions was missing, the process of centralisation would be most likely 
unsuccessful. 
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Chapter 7 The Failure to Centralise Wage Bargaining in the 
Greek Telecommunications Sector 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the process of centralisation in Italian 
telecommunications sector. The monopoly of Telecom Italia was dissolved and 
new entrants appeared in the market, the competition intensified and flexibility 
was introduced in the internal work organisation of firms. However, despite the 
strong appearance of factors which are held to destabilise centralised bargaining 
arrangements, the sector experienced – against all odds – a centralisation of 
bargaining at the sector level. It was shown that the two factors that enabled this 
path of institutional change were ‘employer associability’ and a ‘labour-state 
coalition’. On the one hand, Confindustria filled the gap of the missing sectoral 
association, first by negotiating on behalf of firms in the sector, and then by 
creating a distinct employer association. Additionally, the unions were able to 
speak with a single voice, and steered the interest of the government in support 
for the extension of wage bargaining coverage to resisting or reluctant call-centre 
firms. The unions also accepted a great deal of ‘negotiated flexibility’ in the 
internal work organisation of firms. This particular path of institutional change 
contrasts sharply with the path of Greek telecommunications. 
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The Greek telecommunications sector is an instance of an industry in which 
decentralised bargaining became the norm after liberalisation. In contrast to the 
Italian case outlined in the previous chapter, the case exhibited the trajectory of 
convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model of decentralised bargaining. Before the 
liberalisation of the sector, there was only one firm providing services. Within the 
state-owned monopoly of OTE, wage bargaining took place at the company level. 
The opening up of the telecoms market started with the entrance of mobile 
telephony operators in 1993, while fixed telephony was fully liberalised in 2001. 
After the full liberalisation there was an effort to centralise bargaining, just like 
the Italian case, however, it was marked by a failure. The aim of this chapter is to 
account for this failure of centralisation. 
 
The first factor explaining the differential trajectory of change in wage bargaining 
is the absence of employer associability. As will be shown in the chapter, 
representation of business interests was segmented along multiples lines: the 
incumbent operator and the larger operators were represented in one association 
(SEPE), while the smaller alternative operators were organised in another 
association (SATPE). Even more, those associations were merely trade 
associations, lacking the legal competence to represent their members on the 
labour relations realm. 
 
Additionally, the previous chapters suggested that apart from employer 
associability, a labour-state coalition may tilt the balance in wage bargaining 
institutional arrangements. If unions are able to speak with a ‘single voice’, they 
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may strike a coalition with the state and use state’s coercive power to put pressure 
to individual firms so that they curb their resistance. As this chapter shows the 
conditions that could facilitate such a labour-state coalition in support of a 
sectoral agreement were also missing. On the one hand, unions were unable to 
speak with a single voice and steer the interest of the government. The 
representation of labour was fragmented between the union representing 
employees in the incumbent operator (OME-OTE), and new trade unions which 
were created bottom-up in some of the new firms, while employees in other firms 
were not represented at all. The divisions were not only organisational, but also 
ideological: the strong union of OME-OTE was dominated by the socialist faction 
affiliated with the PASOK party, while smaller unions were either autonomous or 
were associated with smaller leftist parties. The OME-OTE union was essentially 
not interested in centralising bargaining across the sector. Instead, it was focused 
on preserving the narrow interests of its core members delaying liberalisation and 
getting compensation for the restructuring. Therefore, when the demand for a 
centralised agreement came from a smaller trade union in the sector, the latter 
was unable to steer the government’s interest. Still, the government did forge a 
narrower ‘labour-state coalition’ with only OME-OTE to advance its government 
agenda for the full privatisation of OTE. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will first provide a brief overview of 
the developments in the industry until the 1980s. Then I will examine the 
sweeping structural changes that are observed during the 1990s, namely the EU 
liberalisation of the market, the process of privatisation of OTE, and the 
intensification of competition. Next I pin down the pervasive introduction of 
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flexible employment practices and the development of a dualism in the sectoral 
labour market between core OTE employees and the rest of employees in the 
sector. Following from this, the chapter will shift the focus on changes observed 
in the representation of labour and business, detailing the sprung of ‘narrow 
interest’ associations on both the labour and the business side. This provides a 
glimpse of the factors that were missing. The account of events during the mid 
2000s will pay close attention to the failed attempt at centralisation. The unions 
appeared divided, while the chapter shows how the OTE union followed a 
protectionist, introvert, and exclusivist strategy with regard to the restructuring of 
the sector. Unions were unable to speak with a ‘single voice’ and OME-OTE 
excluded precarious employees from representation. Instead, it used its 
particularistic ties with political parties to gain generous compensation from the 
state. 
 
7.2. Greek Telecoms until the 1980s: Monopoly and State Ownership 
 
Until 1949, telephony services in Greece were provided by AETE (Greek 
Telephone Company), which was a Siemens subsidiary. The international 
telegraphy was shared between a subsidiary of the British Cable & Wireless 
(Eastern Telegraph) and the post-office (Tachidromia Tilegrafia Telefona-
TTT).205 After the end of World War II, the national communications 
infrastructure was largely destroyed, and the cost of repairs was borne out by US 
Marshall Plan funds. As a result, the Greek government decided to nationalise the 
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above companies, merging them into a single one: the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), keeping separate the post office. With 
Law 1049/1949 the state granted OTE with the monopoly in telecommunications 
services that involved ‘the exclusive right to administer and exploit all 
telecommunication media on wire and radio transmission, local trunk, national 
and international communications’ (Constantelou, 1993:435). 
 
In the following decades, the performance of the incumbent telecommunications 
operator was ambivalent. On the one side, it started from a very low telephone 
density, but managed to attain very high rates by the end of the 1950s: 2.88 
telephone connections per 100 inhabitants, which was the 10
th
 highest rate in 
Europe.206 Additionally, OTE was among the first European operators to 
automate the intercity telephone calls in the 1960s, and was the 6
th
 in Europe to 
launch an antenna of satellite communications in 1970. The above achievements 
were due to a rapid expansion of its network and substantial infrastructure 
investments. 
 
On the other side, customer demand was never fully met and customer service 
quality deteriorated as demand for new telephone connections increased over 
time.207 Indicatively, by the end of the 1980s the waiting time for a new telephone 
line installation was about 5.5 years (Michalis, 1994:447). The inefficient 
performance of OTE was exacerbated by the prevalence of clientelistic practices. 
It was not an unusual phenomenon to recruit personnel on the basis of political 
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affiliation criteria, catering for electoral interests of successive centre-right and 
socialist governments (Constantelou, 1993:437; Michalis, 1994:443). This led to 
overstaffing in OTE reaching a peak of employment at about 30,000 employees 
in 1986 (Doukas, 2009). Even more, the management of the organisation suffered 
from excessive government interference. For instance, equipment procurement 
had to be approved by special government committees in the Ministry of 
Telecommunications, while the tariff policy was co-determined with the Ministry 
of Economy, which sought to keep costs for consumers low (Constantelou, 
1993:437). 
 
It is important to mention that during the 1980s the telecommunications sector 
(along with others such as electricity and transport) was a target of the socialist 
government’s ‘socialisation policy’. Socialisation was one of the main 
programmatic aims of the PASOK party under Andreas Papandreou, when he 
came into power in 1981. The scheme’s rationale entailed ‘introducing elements 
of social control, decentralisation, and democratic planning’ (Lyberaki and 
Tsakalotos, 2002:103) in public sector enterprises which produced some sort of 
public good. Thus, ‘social control’ of those enterprises was expected to be 
achieved via employee participation in management, and eventually promote 
economic development. The scheme was introduced with Law 1365/1983, but -as 
with many other laws- its actual implementation was delayed. The plan was to 
change the organisational structure of public sectors enterprises, introducing a 
new body called Representative Assembly of Social Control. The latter consisted 
of representatives from a variety of stakeholders such as the state, local 
government, consumer organisations, and the trade unions, and was charged with 
  
222 
charting the medium-term and long-term planning in companies of public 
interest. As Lyberaki and Tsakalotos (2002) note the ASKE sought to promote 
greater transparency and efficiency, but fell victim of clientelistic practices and 
was never fully implemented. By the end of the 2000s ASKE and the right of 
unions to be represented in the board of directors were abolished (Zambarloukou, 
2010:244).208 
 
Similarly to Italian telecommunications, the changes in the sector were influenced 
from developments at the European Union level in the late 1980s. The 
Commission’s plans to gradually open up European telecommunications 
prompted the specification of a five-year development plan (1989-1993) for OTE. 
The overall aim of the plan was to modernise the existing infrastructure and 
radically improve provision of services along specific targets: (i) higher telephone 
density per 100 inhabitants; (ii) reduction in waiting list for outstanding 
applications and zeroing the waiting list for business applications (iii) reduction 
of waiting time for residential applications to a few months and 1 month for 
businesses (iv) increase the digitisation of existing infrastructure (Constantelou, 
1993:436). To assist the aim of modernisation, the European Commission, with 
the agreement of the Greek government, requested from the UK based 
management consultancy, Coopers, Lybrand & Deloitte, to conduct a study on the 
reform of the telecommunications market (Michalis, 1994). This EU impetus for 
liberalisation was destined to radically transform the Greek telecommunications 
industry. 
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7.3. Greek Telecoms in the 1990s: State Withdrawal and the Market 
Unbound 
7.3.1. EU Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Intensification of 
Competition 
 
The liberalisation of telecommunications in Greece started with the separation of 
telecoms operation and regulation. In 1992, the centre-right government under 
Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis passed Law 2075/1992 to establish the 
first independent regulator, the National Telecommunications Commission 
(EET). Its actual operation was delayed until the summer of 1995, and even then 
it was still focused only on the mobile telephony segment of the market. Law 
2668/1998 of the socialist government under Prime Minister Kostas Simitis 
reorganised the postal services sector, and as a result, the authority was renamed 
into National Telecommunications and Post Commission (henceforth: EETT) and 
entrusted with the supervision and regulation of both sectors. The regulatory 
framework was subsequently revised and streamlined with European Union 
Directives, first with Law 2867/2000, which enhanced the supervisory, auditing 
and regulatory powers of EETT; and later with Law 3431/2006 which further 
specified the institutional framework of electronic communications and networks 
(Internet). 
 
The early 1990s also mark the fist attempt to privatise the national telecoms 
company (OTE). The procedure that was favoured by the right-wing Mitsotakis 
government was a mix of asset sale and share issue privatisation. It was planned 
that the 35 per cent of ownership of OTE would be sold to a strategic investor via 
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auction; 10 per cent would be sold to the public via issuing shares; and another 4 
per cent was earmarked for OTE employees. The Minister of Economy at the 
time, Stefanos Manos, sent out an information sheet with a call for tenders. 
Several global players expressed interest, such as: Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (NTT), Telefonica, and France Telecom.209 Despite the interest, the 
plan to privatise OTE backfired on the government. It met fierce resistance not 
only from the socialist opposition under Andreas Papandreou and the socialist 
dominated trade union of OTE (Dimas, 2010:19-24), but also from prominent 
members of the New Democracy party, such as the late Miltiadis Evert, who later 
succeeded Mitsotakis as a leader of the party. The slim parliamentary majority of 
the Mitsotakis government was lost and the government collapsed in 1993.210 
 
Following the October 1993 elections, the new socialist government under Prime 
Minister Andreas Papandreou, abandoned the plans for finding a strategic 
investor for OTE. However, the PASOK government did not fully forsake the 
plans for privatisation.  The reason was identical to the Italian case. Fiscal 
consolidation for the entry to the Economic and Monetary Union was considered 
as completely unattainable without -at least partial- privatisations (Dimas, 
2010:26; Pagoulatos, 2005:360; Pagoulatos and Zahariadis, 2011:3). OTE was 
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one of the gems in the crown of public sector companies, and certainly, on the top 
of the privatisation list. 
 
Yet, the socialists followed a much different approach for the privatisation of 
OTE than the earlier centre-right government. Instead of asset-sale privatisation 
(transferring a block of shares to a strategic investor) the government pursued a 
more ‘gradualist’ approach of shares issuing. Indeed, the initial public offering of 
OTE stocks (8 per cent value) took place in 1996 under the socialist Prime 
Minister Kostas Simitis, who succeeded the late Andreas Papandreou. It is 
important to note that the privatisation was already underway under PM 
Papandreou, however, vacillations over the legal framework which specified the 
procedure, delayed the first offering. This gradualist approach was followed by 
the socialist government until 2004, when the state owned 33 per cent of the 
organisation. The ‘gradualist’ approach in privatisation ended with the acquisition 
of majority ownership by Deutsche Telekom in 2008 under New Democracy. The 
next table documents this gradual reduction in the government’s ownership of 
OTE. 
 
Table 7.1. Government Ownership (%) of OTE, 1993 - 2009. 
Year Governtment’s Stake Note 
1993 100%  
1994 100% 
The government enacts Law 2257/1994 setting 
the minimum government stake at 75 per cent. 
1995 100%  
1996 94% Public Offering of OTE shares. 
1997 81% Public Offering of OTE shares. 
1998 65% 
The government enacts Law 2642/1998 setting 
minimum government stake at 55 per cent.  
Public Offering of OTE shares. 
1999 51% 
The government enacts Law 2731/1998 setting 
minimum government stake at 51 per cent.  
Public Offering of OTE shares. 
2000 51% 
The government enacts Law 2843/2000 setting 
minimum government stake at 33.3 per cent. 
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2001 51%  
2002 33.4% Public Offering of OTE shares. 
2003 33.4%  
2004 33.4%  
2005 39% 
The Government’s stake increases temporarily 
to 48.6 per cent, because it exercises an option 
to convert a bond into shares. This is followed 
by public Offering of OTE shares. 
2006 39% 
The government enacts Law 3522/2006 which 
abolished the requirement for a minimum 
government stake. 
2007 28.3% 
The government sells another 10 per cent to 
institutional investors. 
2008 25% 
Deutsche Telekom acquires 20 per cent of OTE 
from Marfin Investment Group, 3 per cent from 
the government, and 2 per cent from the Athens 
Stock Exchange. 
2009 20% 
Deutsche Telekom acquires another 5 per cent 
of OTE from the government and becomes the 
larger shareholder. 
Source: OME-OTE (nd) ‘The chronology of OTE privatisation’ Unpublished 
Manuscript.  
 
Despite the failure of the Mitsotakis government to privatise OTE, it still 
managed to achieve one part of its government agenda for telecommunications 
industry: open up the mobile telephony segment. On 5 August 1992 there was an 
auctioning of 2 GSM licences. OTE was excluded from the procurement process 
with the rationale that the market was not ‘large enough’ to allow for a third 
player, while it was claimed that two private companies would ensure 
competition and efficiency.211 
 
As a result, competition in the Greek mobile telephony started with a duopoly 
between a consortium led by Vodafone (Panafon) and a consortium led by 
Telecom Italia (Telestet), later acquired by WIND. After the change of 
government to the socialist party in 1993, the incumbent operator OTE was 
allowed to enter the mobile telephony, and in April 1998 it launched its own 
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subsidiary, Cosmote using the much more expensive DCS 1800 system. Although 
Vodafone started as the leader in the mobile market, Cosmote soon surpassed 
both competitors, and by June 2001, it had the highest share of subscribers. This 
was accomplished with a very aggressive product market strategy that entailed 
‘price wars’ and product diversification via launching new services. The radically 
changing market shares between the leader and the followers in the market are 
presented in the following table with UK as a comparison. UK is chosen as a 
yardstick of a very competitive market, since it was liberalised earlier than any 
other in Europe. 
 
Table 7.2. Market Shares (based on subscribers) in Mobile Telephony across 
Greece and the UK, 2000 – 2009. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Leading operator 38 37 43 38 41 n/a 40 37 43 48 
Main competitor 28 26 32 35 31 n/a 31 35 27 26 EL 
Third+Other competitors 34 37 25 27 27 n/a 29 28 30 26 
Leading operator 30 28 27 26 26 25 26 24 25 21 
Main competitor 26 25 25 25 25 24 23 23 22 20 UK 
Third+Other competitors 44 47 48 49 49 51 51 53 53 59 
Source: European Commission (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). 
 
Intensification of competition took also place in the fixed-telephony segment of 
the market, albeit with a notable delay. While most of the European Union 
member states were obliged to open up their markets by 1
st
 January 1998, the 
Greek government managed to negotiate with the European Commission a three-
year extension, so that full liberalisation would take place in 2001.212 In those 
three years, OTE was expected to modernise and prepare for an environment with 
high competitive pressures, while the necessary institutional framework would be 
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set. In the years that followed 2001, the independent regulator authority assumed 
a more active role, making sure that OTE does not take advantage of its dominant 
position. Thus, new entrants were allowed to compete with OTE (and with each 
other) offering services using the ‘last mile’ of the network of OTE. As we shall 
see in a later section, these policies stirred a continuous conflict between OTE 
and the independent regulator, in which the OME-OTE union was involved (see 
below).213 
 
One of the major players which entered the fixed telephony market in the early 
2000s was the Greek public electricity company (DEH) via a consortium with 
Italian WIND and formed the ‘Tellas’ company. Additionally, two major internet 
service providers (‘Forthnet’ and ‘Hellas On Line’) took advantage of their 
network infrastructure to offer fixed telephony services. The new entrants 
included also several new start-up companies (e.g. Lannet, Telepassport, 
Teledome, Altec Telecoms, and Vivodi).  However, few of them manage to 
survive the intensity of competition, and by the late 2000s many were either 
acquired by larger players or were closed down.214  
 
The regulatory impact of EETT afforded the new players to erode OTE’s 
monopoly position. As part of its policy to inject competition in the market, 
EETT took a number of measures, for example, introducing number portability to 
allow easy switching between providers. Additionally, the regulatory frame 
became stricter, when EETT made a significant reduction in OTE’s wholesale 
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charges and prohibited OTE from charging consumers (retail price) below a 
certain threshold. From EETT’s standpoint, the policy sought to prevent OTE 
from applying price squeeze upon its competitors (Pagoulatos and Zahariadis, 
2011:18) and OTE suffered a steady decline in market share. The following table 
documents this fall in market shares and compares Greece with UK, again, as a 
benchmark of a very competitive market. 
 
Table 7.3. Incumbent Telecom Operator’s Market Share (by retail revenue) in 
Fixed Telephony across Greece and the UK, 1997 - 2008. 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EL (OTE) 100 100 100 100 99 98 86 n/a 74 72 75 71 
UK (BT) 87 82 73 68 55 59 64 n/a 51 56 58 55 
Source: European Commission (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). 
 
The general strategy that was followed by OTE during the socialist governments’ 
rule (1993-2004) was akin to that of building a ‘national champion’. OTE’s role 
in the Balkan telecommunications market was similar to that of National Bank of 
Greece in the Balkan banking sector and both firms led the corporate expansion 
to the emerging markets of Southeastern Europe. Indeed, OTE (either directly, or 
indirectly via Cosmote) expanded in the neighbouring markets via setting up 
subsidiaries or acquiring stakes in existing firms. This expansion was either in 
mobile or fixed telephony segments.215 While this expansive strategy enhanced 
the position of OTE as a major player in the region, however, it did run out of 
steam. As Pagoulatos and Zahariadis (2011:5) argue: 
‘...underinvestment threatened OTE’s ability to catch up with the next big 
technological waves, such as broadband telephony. Thus, the “national champion” 
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regionalisation strategy gave way to internationalisation through entry of and 
transfer of management to a major foreign strategic partner.’ 
 
When the government changed to the centre-right in 2004 under Prime Minister 
Kostas Karamanlis, the state had a minority ownership, which was standing at 33 
per cent. The new government tried to find a major telecoms player to acquire 
OTE, however, it was unsuccessful. Therefore, it followed the ‘gradualist’ 
approach of share-issue privatisation, selling another 10.7 per cent of issues to 
institutional investors. The next year, it hired an international consultant 
consortium to look for a strategic investor again; however, this search did not 
yield any results.216 While OTE’s presence in the Balkans was impressive, there 
were three elements that made the acquisition of OTE unattractive: (i) OTE was 
overstaffed; (ii) the employees enjoyed a job-for-life tenure by law; and (iii) the 
rights of minority shareholders were not strong enough. The government sought 
to act on all three terrains to proceed with its privatisation agenda. During August 
2007, just one month before the elections, the government amended Law 2190 on 
corporate governance, strengthening the minority shareholder rights and abolition 
of the limit of 33 per cent for the government stake in OTE. 
 
This change had unintended consequences, obviously not foreseen by the 
government. The combination of this institutional reform with a high exposure of 
OTE shares in the stock market, made OTE vulnerable to a hostile takeover. This 
opportunity was seized by Marfin Investment Group (MIG), a holdings company 
with investments in several sectors. MIG started silently buying out OTE shares 
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from the stock market, reaching gradually a 19.9 per cent of OTE. The revelation 
of this slow acquisition led to a public outcry for the government, which was 
blamed for ‘being caught while sleeping’.  
 
Marfin Investment Group requested a seat in the board of directors and expressed 
the interest in taking over management of the firm from the government. 
Moreover, it publicly assured employees and the government that its intention 
was to make a long-term investment and develop OTE as a national champion, 
rather than liquidate it or sell off parts.217 However, the government did not 
favour such an acquisition. To avoid this hostile takeover, the Minister of 
Economy, George Alogoskoufis, passed quickly a bill through which set a 20 per 
cent limit for the participation of individual investors in companies of ‘strategic 
importance’ such as OTE218. It was clear that this bill was against European 
competition rules, and would be challenged by the European Commission. In 
practice, this bought some time for the government to find a ‘white knight’ and 
achieve a friendly takeover. 
 
Interestingly, the government preferences diverged diametrically from the 
Italian’s government. The Italian government sought to avoid a Deutsche 
Telekom (DT) acquisition, on the grounds that Telecom Italia should not be 
renationalised and owned by the German state. Instead, the Greek government 
wanted the very same German firm to be the buyer of OTE, considering Marfin 
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Investment Group’s interest as highly opportunistic.219 After consultations 
between government, Deutsche Telekom, and MIG, a deal was arranged so that 
DT buys MIG’s shares at a mutually convenient price and another 5 per cent from 
the government. DT agreed under the condition that it would eventually purchase 
an additional 5 per cent from the government, which would give a total of 30 per 
cent ownership. This made DT ‘the largest shareholder with rights to appoint the 
Chief Executive and to have a majority of seats on the company’s board’.220 In 
2009 the takeover of OTE by Deutsche Telekom was finalised. 
 
7.3.2. Restructuring the Telecoms: Technological Change, 
Employment Flexibility and Downsizing 
 
In parallel with the processes of liberalisation and privatisation that were 
described in the previous sections, the telecommunications sector underwent a 
period of fast moving technological change. OTE kept up modernising its 
infrastructure with the aid from European Community Support Frameworks. In 
the early 1990s the project of digitisation of its network took off, while it began 
developing its infrastructure for Internet provision and mobile telephony. This 
prepared –rather slowly- the ground for the upcoming privatisation and 
liberalisation just like in Italy. In 1995 OTE was transformed into an SA company 
and developed subsidiaries in separate market segments (e.g. internet, mobiles, 
leasing, real estate, and currency exchange). The digitisation of the telephone 
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network offered to customers more diversified product services, while the waiting 
time for new phone connections was minimised to less than a month. Finally, 
OTE introduced ISDN Internet technology in 1996 and ADSL broadband in 
2003.221 
 
On the mobile segment of the market, product innovation was led by the private 
companies. For instance, WIND was first to offer 3G mobile network in 2003 and 
the others followed suit the year after.222 Mobile telephony in Greece proved to be 
much more popular than anticipated, and demand was very high. By 2008 the 
mobile phone penetration rate stood at 146 per cent of the population, only 
second in Europe after 151 per cent in Italy (ICAP, 2008:1). Companies from 
both mobile and fixed telephony segments followed international trends towards 
the ‘combined business model’. As a result, fixed telephony company Tellas was 
acquired by mobile telephony company WIND in 2008, and fixed telephony 
company ‘Hellas On Line’ made a strategic alliance with mobile telephony 
Vodafone in 2009. This wave of mergers boosted the development of new 
products combining fixed telephony and broadband (‘double-play’) or even more 
recently cable TV (‘triple-play’). 
 
The constant and rapid technological change in products was bound to affect 
work organisation inside firms. Indeed, the extent of use of flexible working 
practices by new operators is staggering: fixed-term, three-hour or four-hour 
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contracts; temporary agency staff; project based self-employment (blokaki); 
outsourcing; flexi-time; and long-hours with (sometimes illegally unpaid) 
overtime.223 In addition to that, on-call working, tele-working and performance-
based pay were also in the ascendancy. 
 
In contrast to this mosaic of flexible working practices utilised by its competitors, 
OTE had an important built-in ‘rigidity’ in the employment relationship. Owing 
to its erstwhile status as a public sector enterprise, employees in the company 
were guaranteed a ‘job-for-life tenure’, akin to civil servants. While privatisation 
advanced incrementally in the 1990s, this job protection remained for core 
employees. As a result, the company’s recruitment on open-ended employment 
relationships was almost frozen. Instead, all new hires in OTE and other OTE 
group companies took place via an increase in fixed-term and part-time contracts. 
Other sources of flexibility entailed an increased use of subcontracting and 
agency staff, especially for employees in subsidiaries (for example, in the printing 
and call-centre subsidiaries Infote and OTEplus).  
 
Until the mid-2000s OME-OTE unionists were successful in defending job-for-
life tenure for core employees in OTE, but at the same time, a peripheral 
workforce was developing in the subsidiary enterprises. The picture in the 
sectoral labour market reflected multiple labour market segmentation Within the 
OTE Group, which was the larger employer; one could distinguish between core 
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employees with job-for-life tenure and peripheral employees in OTE subsidiaries 
with private law employment contracts. Second, in the telecoms industry 
generally, the segmentation was between employees who were covered by wage 
bargaining agreements, and employees in firms whose wage was set individually 
and were outside bargaining coverage. Those firms were operating ‘at the margin’ 
between OTE’s wholesale and retail prices, and therefore were trying to keep 
their costs as low as possible via extensive use of flexibly working employees. 
The picture of strong labour market dualism foreshadowed the problems in the 
representation of labour interests. 
 
7.4. The Representation of Labour and Business 
7.4.1. Labour: Divided Unions and Organisational Fragmentation 
 
OME-OTE was a trade union federation, which was established in 1982 and had 
as affiliate members ‘occupational’ unions operating in OTE divisions.224 
Although OME-OTE appears as a unitary trade union representing OTE 
employees, there are several internal divisions that play out inside the 
organisation: (i) between employees with different skills and qualifications 
(secondary vs. higher education)225; (ii) between white collar sales staff and blue 
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collar technicians and engineers; and (iii) between union federations affiliated 
with different political parties. Except for the Cosmote union, none of the other 
affiliate unions had the right to negotiate or sign wage agreements.  Instead, the 
preparation of each bargaining round was as follows: OME-OTE federation 
called the representatives of the primary occupational unions to submit the 
demands for the employees they represent. This usually involved wage-related 
and non-wage (institutional) issues, and from this process the federation derived 
its overall bargaining platform to be used during negotiations.226 
 
Union factionalism along ideological lines was present in OME-OTE in line with 
the general structure of trade unionism in Greece. However, it is important to note 
that OME-OTE has been a stronghold of the PASKE faction associated with the 
socialist party. The faction associated with the centre-right New Democracy party 
comes second in power. The two factions combined have a strong grasp over the 
OME-OTE union, since they possess 10 out of 13 seats in the Executive 
Committee and 17 out of 22 seats in the Administrative Board. Reflecting this 
balance of power, the president of OME-OTE is customarily from the socialist 
PASKE, while the general secretary from centre-right DAKE. 
 
While OME-OTE is a federation and could –in principle- accept other unions as 
members, in practice it remained very much introvert, focused on representing 
OTE Group employees. As we shall see below, this ‘exclusivist’ strategy was an 
                                                                                                                                     
with secondary education was against such a change, requiring those employees to be paid 
according to the job description for which they were recruited. 
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 ‘Representativeness of the social partners: Telecommunications sector – Greece’ European 
Industrial Relations Observatory (May 2007), available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0606017s/gr0606019q.htm  [last retrieved: 25 
September 2011]. 
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important factor accounting for the failure of unions to speak with a single voice. 
Although the OME-OTE federation amended its statute so that it is able to accept 
other organisations as members, however, its eligibility requirements remained so 
strict, which in practice excluded the new smaller unions in the sector.227 The 
only new affiliate member that it accepted after the liberalisation of the sector 
was the union established in its Cosmote subsidiary. The Cosmote union was 
established in 2000, after an initiative from employees to exercise their rights to 
associate. In 2002 the union managed to agree General Staff Regulations with 
Cosmote management. As with other firms in the sector, flexibility was 
pervasive, since it relied heavily on outsourcing and subcontractors. Employees 
were working for Cosmote, but their employment relationship lied with some 
other company. The Cosmote union managed to minimize the extent of 
outsourcing for its own employees.
228
 Additionally, it signed its first firm-level 
agreement in 2004 and then another two agreements in 2006 and 2008. In the 
process, the union benefited from its affiliation with OME-OTE, the federal union 
of the parent company. 
 
Employees in new telecoms firms lacked the opportunity to benefit from OME-
OTE representation, because OME-OTE required from a union to have at least 
500 members in order to become an affiliate. In fact no other union in the sector 
satisfies this requirement, and the gap of workers’ representation in the new firms 
was filled ‘bottom-up’ with grass-roots radical unionisation. In 2005 a group of 
employees managed to set up a firm level union in WIND (PASE-TIM/WIND - 
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Pan-Hellenic Union of TIM/WIND Employees), and subsequently unions were 
established in mobile telephony Vodafone (PASE-Vodafone - Pan-Hellenic Union 
of Vodafone Employees) as well as in fixed telephony company Forthnet. Firm 
level agreements were eventually agreed in Wind and Vodafone, usually under 
the reluctant acceptance from the firms’ management, which generally followed 
an anti-union stance.229 In their effort to establish firm level unions, grass-roots 
organisers conducted field visits to workplaces across Greece.230 The organisers 
in WIND were aided more from the Athens Labour centre (Ergatiko Kentro 
Athinas) the Federation of Private Employees (OIYE) and SMT rather than OME-
OTE.231 However, these unions did not develop internal political factions, 
because they thought that this would deter potential members, and preferred to be 
autonomous and focus on workplace issues.232  
 
Finally, there are two other smaller unions that are more sectoral in perspective, 
rather company-based: the SMT (Union of Waged Technicians) and the Athens-
based SETIP (Union of Workers in Telecommunications and Informatics). SMT 
was an occupational union whose members were employed on spurious self-
employment contracts (blokaki) in the informatics and telecoms sector or were 
unemployed technicians and engineers.233 SETIP was disconnected from other 
unions, since it was controlled by the communist party (KKE).  
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This organisational fragmentation might lead one to the conclusion that any effort 
for coordinated action on the part of unions was a priori destined to fail. 
However, as the Italian case suggests, organisational fragmentation per se is not a 
hindrance for coordinated action. Instead, if traditional unions had followed an 
inclusive strategy, they might have been able to temper the radicalisation of 
employees in new firms, and unite them under a single banner. The table below 
summarises the representation of employees in the sector and the next section 
turns to the side of business representation. 
 
Table 7.4. Main Trade Union Organisations in the Greek Telecoms Sector. 
Organisation Function/Affiliation Membership/Structure 
Federation of Employees 
of OTE (OME-OTE) 
Est. 1982 
Represents all employees in OTE with 
permanent employment relationship; 
Negotiates firm level agreements; 
Affiliated with peak-level tertiary 
union GSEE 
Members: 6 primary (occupational) 
Unions;  
 
Union factions: PASKE; DAKE; AS; 
ESK; ASE; AKOM. 
Trade Union of Waged 
Technicians (SMT) 
Est. 1999 
Represents spurious self-employed and 
unemployed in technical companies, 
telecommunications and informatics; 
Signs occupational agreement for 
employees in technical firms. 
Union factions: PAME, Left Schema, 
Aftonomi Paremvasi, Enosi 
Ergazomenon 
Pan-Hellenic Trade 
Union of TIM (WIND) 
Employees (PASE-TIM) 
Est.2005 
Represents employees in TIM(WIND) 
company; Signs firm level agreement; 
Affiliated with Federation of Private 
Sector Employees (OIYE) 
No political factionalism. 
Pan-Hellenic Trade 
Union of Vodafone  
Employees (PASE-
Vodafone) 
Est.2008 
 
Represents employees in Vodafone 
company; Signs firm level agreement. 
Not affiliated with secondary-level 
union. 
- 
Trade Union of Forthnet 
Employees (SEF) 
Est. 2009 
Represents employees in Forthnet 
company; Does not sign firm level 
agreement. 
- 
Trade Union of 
Employees in OTE Call 
Centres (SETK-OTE) 
Est. 2009 
Represents fixed-term contract and 
part-time employees in OTE Call 
Centres, Not affiliated with OME-
OTE. 
- 
Trade Union of Workers 
in Telecoms and 
Informatics (SETIP) 
Represents employees in 
telecommunications and informatics 
companies in Attica. Affiliate-member 
of PAME. 
- 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
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7.4.2. Business: ‘Narrow interests’ Trade Associations and the Lack of 
Employer Associability 
 
The first business association in the broader telecoms sector was SEPE 
(Federation of Hellenic Information Technology & Communications 
Enterprises). SEPE was established in 1995, but the main aims of the association 
were not concentrated in representing business interests in the labour relations 
realm. Instead, the aim was to focus on the technological and regulatory aspects 
of the market. In addition to that, the firms that constituted the founding members 
were almost exclusively coming from the information technology sector, which 
was thriving in the mid-1990s. Mobile telecommunications companies 
(Vodafone, WIND) were making their first steps at the time. By the early 2000s, 
OTE and the large fixed and mobile telephony companies became members of 
this association. Despite the enlargement of membership to include 
telecommunications companies, the logic of interest representation that was 
enshrined in the association’s statute remained narrow, focused on lobbying for 
regulatory and technological issues. The next section will document in more 
detail the only case when the association faced a rather weak challenge to engage 
with labour relations issues.  
 
The full opening up of fixed-telephony market and the entry of new players 
triggered the creation of new interest groups. The second instance in the sector is 
SATPE (Greek Licensed Telecommunication Providers Association), which was 
established in 2003. This association was the initiative of the smaller telecoms 
operators, which were given licences to offer fixed-telephony services over 
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OTE’s last mile of the network. The association’s main function was to represent 
the interests of its members in the implementation of European Union regulation 
with regard to liberalisation and acted mainly as a lobbying group vis-à-vis the 
national regulator.234 
 
Although SATPE started with very dynamic and promising companies, the Greek 
market proved to be very competitive for some of those firms. Several of this 
association’s founding members were forced to go out of business (e.g. Lannet 
and Teledome) by the end of the 2000s.235 The business strategy of the new firms 
was very much focused on low cost products and services, rather than product 
diversification. Although new subscribers’ base was expanding rapidly, the ‘cash-
flow’ problems pushed many firms out of the market.236 In the late 2000s other 
smaller providers merged (e.g. Vivodi with OnTelecoms) or made strategic 
alliances with larger firms (e.g. ‘Hellas On Line’ with Vodafone) so that they 
survive competition.237 These developments cumulatively contributed to the 
weakening of the clout of the aforementioned association. 
 
Finally, EEKT (Association of Mobile Telephony Companies) was established in 
2008. This association had only three members (Cosmote, Vodafone, and 
WIND), all of which operated in the mobile telephony market. The rationale 
behind its creation was to influence regulatory issues, and not surprisingly, the 
life of the association was foreseen to last until September 2011. This short-
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timeframe was not random; 2011-12 was the period when the earlier mobile 
frequencies licenses were expected to expire; and the independent regulator 
(EETT) intended to conduct an open tender procedure for the award of spectrum 
usage rights. This explains the very narrow range of interest, on which the 
association was based: lobbying the independent regulator procurement process. 
 
Table 7.5. Main Business Associations in the Greek Telecoms Sector. 
Organisation Function/Affiliation Membership/Structure 
Federation of Hellenic 
Information 
Technology & 
Communications 
Enterprises (SEPE) 
Est.1995 
Represents information and 
communications technology 
enterprises; Affiliate member of 
European Industry Association for 
Information Systems, 
Communication Technologies & 
Consumer Electronics 
(DIGITALEUROPE). 
18 alternative telecoms providers 
Greek Licensed 
Telecommunication 
Providers Association 
(SATPE) 
Est. 2003 
Represents Greek electronic 
communications providers; Main 
function is to promote the 
regulatory framework in 
telecommunications in fair 
competition. Affiliate member of 
European Telecoms Association 
(ECTA) 
350 informatics and telecoms 
firms 
Association of Mobile 
Phone Companies 
(EEKT) 
Est. 2008 
Represents Greek mobile phone 
companies 
3 firms (Cosmote, Vodafone and 
Wind) 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
The above discussion suggests that an employer association with legal 
competence to negotiate agreements was entirely missing in the Greek telecoms 
case. Even more it shows that business representation was segmented along many 
lines: SEPE represented info-tech companies and big telecoms providers; SATPE 
represented smaller telecoms providers; and EEKT represented only mobile 
telephony companies. Thus, the prospect of having an association able to mediate 
effectively the interests of both small and large firms was unlikely. All 
associations were oriented towards representing ‘narrow interests’ regarding 
  
243 
regulation, acting as mere trade associations. Overall, the lack of employer 
associability foreshadowed the slim chances of success for the attempt to 
centralise bargaining in the sector. 
 
7.5. Greek Telecoms in the late 2000s: Inertia and Decentralised 
Bargaining 
7.5.1. The Path Towards the Failure to Centralise Wage Bargaining 
 
So far the chapter reviewed the processes of liberalisation and privatisation in the 
market that brought about the intensification of competition. Additionally, it 
gauged the extent of flexibility introduced in employment relationships resulting 
into a labour marked dualism. While the Greek telecommunications sector 
experienced the very same challenges with the Italian telecoms sector, 
developments in wage bargaining diverged. In contrast to the Italian case, the 
effort to centralise bargaining was marked by a total failure, and firm level 
decentralised bargaining continued to be the norm. In the previous section it was 
highlighted how unions were unable to speak with a single voice and the larger 
OTE union erected barriers to a unitary representation of labour interests. 
Additionally, it was shown that employer associability was missing, and business 
associations were oriented towards representing narrow interests, divided 
between larger and smaller firms. This section will show how and why these 
divisions played out in the attempt to centralise bargaining across the sector. 
 
  
244 
OME-OTE was clearly the stronger trade union capable of leading any attempt at 
bargaining centralisation. However, bargaining centralisation was very low in the 
agenda of OME-OTE, which was very much focused on the negotiation of its 
internal restructuring. On 2 February 2006, the Executive Council of OME-OTE 
met and decided the bargaining platform for the start of negotiations for a new 
company agreement, including no less than 56 items.238 The items were of 
various types: generic demands (e.g. reform of the Greek tax system, fewer 
indirect taxes), demands pertaining to the operation of the independent regulator 
EETT (e.g. relaxation of tariff restrictions to OTE); company-union issues (union 
representatives to get back the right to be represented at the board of directors of 
OTE); resistance to further privatisation; request for funding from OTE for 
training programmes for trade unionists; and other non-wage issues such as 
benefits and holidays. Crucially, it was the first time that their platform included 
the demand to centralise bargaining with an industry-wide agreement covering all 
firms in the sector. However, the item was very low in the priorities of the unions. 
OME-OTE was not resolved to push for the centralisation of bargaining and this 
is evidenced in two ways. 
 
First and most importantly, this bargaining platform was sent to the customary 
recipients for the conclusion of the firm level agreement (OTE, several 
Ministries, Labour Inspectorate, etc). No other telecom firm in the sector or any 
business association (e.g. SEV) was notified of such a demand. This means that 
there was nobody on the other side to bargain for the firms in the sector and the 
unions did not have any strategy to pursue this demand. This contrasts sharply 
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with the strategy followed by Italian telecoms unions, which put pressure to 
Telecom Italia and invited Confindustria for the centralisation of bargaining 
(chapter 6). 
 
The second reason that justifies the lack of resolve from the part of OME-OTE 
was that the specific demand was made without any prior consultation with 
employees in the rest of the sector. The firm level union in WIND was already 
established at the time, but was not consulted. More generally, OME-OTE did not 
consult any other union in the sector and the communication channels were 
broken. This demand was included in the bargaining platform to appease the 
smaller leftist political factions within OME-OTE and only a minority within 
OME-OTE supported the centralisation of bargaining.239 Indeed, the dominant 
socialist and centre-right factions in the Executive Council did not take any 
further action towards its realisation. It was an instance of ‘window dressing’ and 
just another item in the 56-item long agenda. 
 
In contrast, the only attempt to centralise bargaining in the sector came from the 
small occupational union of engineers’ (SMT) in 2008.240 In contrast to OME-
OTE, SMT was resolved to push for bargaining centralisation. This time there 
were prior consultations with representatives from firm level unions in the sector 
(Wind, Forthnet, and Vodafone) and individual employees (Altec Telecoms, etc). 
Additionally, SMT carried out a brief study to support the demand for a sectoral 
agreement, and then sent the invitation to SEPE, which was one of the two 
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business associations in the sector.
241
 SEPE responded with a rejection of this 
demand. When the request for a sectoral contract went to the Organisation for 
Mediation and Arbitration and SEPE was invited to the negotiations, SEPE 
argued that it lacked of legal competence to negotiate labour relations issues on 
behalf of its members and the mediation process ended there.242 
 
But apart from the lack of legal competence, a number of other factors hindered 
this effort. First of all, the union made one tactical error and several strategic 
ones. The tactical error lied on the fact that on its request for sectoral agreement, 
it asked for wage levels that surpassed by far those in firm level agreements 
provided in WIND. The trade unionists in SMT were not interested in setting 
lowest common standards in the sector.243 This contrasts sharply with the Italian 
unionists’ strategy that prioritised ‘avoiding a race to bottom’. In other words, 
SMT unionists were maximalist in their demands, and this meant that the chances 
for success were even slimmer. But perhaps more important were the strategic 
miscalculations that the union made. 
 
The unions’ side appeared unable to speak with a single voice. SMT lacked the 
requisite size to put pressure to employers via a national strike as the Italians. 
Instead, they only organised a small demonstration outside the SEPE 
association’s offices.244 Finally, SMT lacked the support of OME-OTE. The latter 
was the largest union in the sector and had established links with both political 
                                                 
241
 Technikoi Dromoi (November 2008); Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 12 
(2 May 2011) and with sectoral labour representative 13 (2 May 2011). 
242
 Author’s interview with sectoral business representative 5 (31 August 2011). 
243
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 13 (2 May 2011). 
244
 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 13 (2 May 2011). 
  
247 
parties. In contrast, SMT was a negligible player which had no links to with either 
centre-right or centre-left political parties. SMT’s members followed a leftist-
leaning political orientation and were representing mainly employees with 
spurious self-employment (blokaki).245 SMT’s relations with the peak 
confederation GSEE were not good either, since they considered GSEE as ‘sold 
out’ (poulimenoi) and part of ‘employer-controlled unionism’ (ergodotikos 
syndikalismos).246 This deprived SMT from the political links that would have 
facilitated the use of state’s coercive powers. Indeed, the request for centralisation 
of wage bargaining in telecoms was announced to the Ministry of Labour, but the 
Minister showed no interest. 
 
Why didn’t OME-OTE assist SMT in its effort for centralisation, despite the fact 
that it had expressed a request for a sectoral agreement two years earlier? In short, 
the answer is that the interests of OME-OTE were not aligned with those of SMT. 
OME-OTE followed a protectionist, introvert, and exclusivist strategy as a 
response to the EU liberalisation and government agenda for privatisation. This 
repertoire of action is evidenced in three areas. First, OME-OTE strategy was 
protectionist, since it repeatedly lobbied the independent regulator authority, so 
that liberalisation is delayed  (see also Pagoulatos and Zahariadis, 2011). The 
interests of OME-OTE were more aligned with the interests of the OTE Group, 
rather than with other employees in the sector. Second, and partly as a 
consequence of the previous choice, OME-OTE unionists were also very 
introvert, focussing on the negotiation of favourable conditions in the company’s 
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restructuring, even if that led to clashes with other unions or even the peak 
confederation GSEE. Given the huge discrepancy between working conditions in 
the ex-public sector enterprises and working conditions in the new market 
entrants, OME-OTE had closer ties and common interests with other public sector 
unions (in postal sector, electricity, railways, etc), rather than with the new unions 
in the sector. Finally, OME-OTE’s strategy was exclusivist, since it left 
employees in the rest of the sector outside representation, erecting bureaucratic 
barriers to outsiders. In sum, there was only a small minority within OME-OTE 
which supported whole-heartedly the demand for centralisation, whilst the vast 
majority wanted to retain the status-quo. These points are further developed in the 
following sections. 
 
7.5.2. Protecting Insiders and Excluding Outsiders: OME-OTE vs. the 
Independent Regulator and Call-centre Employees 
 
Since the early 2000s the independent regulator EETT assumed a stricter policy 
to ensure competition in the sector. OME-OTE unionists had clearly aligned their 
interests with OTE group’s fate. The implicit rationale was that if the group was 
growing, the employees would also be able to prosper. Instead, if the group was 
losing market shares from new entrants, then the employees would lose as well. 
As a result, trade unionists were more worried about the falling market shares and 
fully supported a strategy of OTE as a ‘national champion’. 
 
Indeed, this protectionist strategy is evident in several position papers and actions 
from OME-OTE since the early 2000s. In 2003 OME-OTE characterised the 
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independent regulator (EETT) as ‘Enemy No1’ for OTE; and called for a wide 
alliance between management and employees to make use of the ‘dominant 
position’ in the market so that the market shares are defended and lost market 
shares are recouped.247 While it did mention concerns over ‘fair competition’ its 
interpretation was radically different from the Italian case. For Italian telecoms 
unionists ‘fair competition’ would be ensured if they centralised bargaining 
creating a level-playing field in wage costs. For OTE unionists fair competition 
meant that new firms should invest in developing their own network 
infrastructure, and cease ‘exploiting’ OTE’s infrastructure, profiting on the 
difference between wholesale and retail price. Admittedly, the smaller telecom 
operators in Greece were following a low-cost and short-termist business strategy 
without investing in broader communications infrastructure (e.g. optical fibre 
networks), and none of the business associations attempted to provide collective 
goods in infrastructure achieving economies of scale for its members.248 
 
OME-OTE’s 29
th
 congress’ resolution in 2004 was following similar lines. It 
condemned the policy of EETT against OTE and resisted further privatisation and 
liberalisation, while there was no mention for a need to centralise bargaining. As 
a matter of fact, in 2004 OME-OTE made two condemning announcements 
against EETT policies and invited the government to intervene in the independent 
regulator’s operation, so that it stems the decline in OTE’s market share.249 This 
repertoire continued also in OTE’s 30
th
 congress resolution in 2005, which 
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ratified the very controversial wage agreement on voluntary exit programme 
(detailed in the next sub-section). Even more, there was still no interest in wage 
bargaining centralisation in the sector. OME-OTE was even involved in the 
conflict between OTE Group and the trade association of alternative providers 
(SATPE)250, but this did not involve any mention for centralised bargaining. The 
conflict pertained to one of the small providers (Telepassport), which was 
member of SATPE and -like other small providers- owed large amounts to OTE, 
due to cash-flow problems. Finally, unlike its Italian counterparts, OME-OTE 
never organised a strike to support its 2006 demand for centralisation. Instead, it 
kept its attention on the policies of the independent regulator policies and even 
organised a protest demonstration outside EETT’s offices.251 
 
Overall, this ‘protectionist’ stance from the part of OME-OTE is not completely 
surprising. Employees and unionists had developed over time a sense of 
‘ownership’ of OTE. This was nurtured by the socialisation policies of the 1980s 
(mentioned at the beginning of the chapter) which promoted a perverse culture of 
‘shared ownership’ and ‘participation in management’ in public sector 
enterprises. Thus, competitors of OTE were also perceived as ‘enemies’ of the 
trade union. This culture of ‘ownership’ prompted the OTE union to devote 
resources to resist liberalisation, rather than centralise bargaining. Additionally, 
the strategy of resistance to liberalisation and privatisation was encouraged by 
either party while in opposition. For instance, in 2008 when the PASOK party 
was still in opposition, the leader George Papandreou promised to OME-OTE 
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unionists the reversal of the acquisition of OTE by Deutsche Telekom, as soon as 
PASOK was elected in government.252 In a nutshell, the union had no real interest 
in pushing for centralisation and this request assumed an almost decorative role in 
its platform. 
 
Notably, this ‘exclusivist strategy’ followed by OME-OTE did not only touch 
employees in new competitor firms. It also entailed employees within the OTE 
Group, more specifically in OTE’s call-centres. The call-centre employees 
established a union on their own the Trade union of employees in OTE-Call 
centres. Subsequently, they sought to become affiliated with OME-OTE 
federation. But OME-OTE statute prescribed that a trade union can be affiliated 
with OME-OTE if it had at least 500 members.253 Additionally, the OME-OTE 
union wanted to include only members with a permanent employment 
relationship among its ranks. In contrast, the call-centre employees had 3-hour 
and 4-hour part-time contracts, with very precarious and unstable employment 
relationships.254 In the face of this, the call-centre unionists went to the OME-
OTE congress in 2009 and requested the floor to express their wish to become 
members of OME-OTE. The organisers were holding them up, denying them the 
floor repeatedly. The call-centre representatives interrupted a speaker to take the 
floor, bickering followed with the centre-right (DAKE) unionists, and at the end 
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the call centre unionists were literally ousted from the congress.
255
 How can one 
explain this exclusion, despite the acceptance of Cosmote union as an affiliate? 
 
The answer lies in ideological divisions creating ‘us-and-them’ attitudes. In 
Cosmote the socialist (PASKE) and centre-right (DAKE) factions were dominant, 
just like the OME-OTE union. Since those unionists had a compatible political 
persuasion, they were considered as ‘one of us’ and were eventually accepted as 
affiliates. Moreover, Cosmote trade union was able to overcome the barriers 
which were erected by OME-OTE, namely the request for employees with 
permanent employment and unions with at least 500 members. In sharp contrast, 
the unionists in the call-centre were more radical and leaning towards smaller 
leftist parties such as ‘SYN’. The acceptance of a new union as an affiliate of 
OME-OTE might upset the balance of power in political factions within OME-
OTE. The effect would be aggravated if OME-OTE was compelled to accept 
members from new firms (Wind, Vodafone, and Forthnet). Such a move would 
jeopardise the balance of power, but may even result in socialist and centre-right 
unionists losing control of OME-OTE. In a nutshell, none of the firm level unions 
was considered to be ‘one-of-us’ and this calculation led OME-OTE to adopt an 
exclusivist strategy. Many trade unionists within OME-OTE ranks were attached 
on ‘holding an office’ and had secured a range of perks and privileges stemming 
from their officio. If the sector was centralised, then the number of positions 
would be radically reduced and many old trade unionists would be left without 
‘office’.256 
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7.5.3. Negotiating the Internal Restructuring: The State Pays for OTE 
Downsizing257 
 
Throughout the privatisation process in the 1990s generous severance packages 
bought labour’s acquiescence (Pagoulatos and Zahariadis, 2011). This culminated 
to the 2005 agreement, in which OME-OTE got an extremely generous voluntary 
exit scheme, in exchange for the abolition of the job-for-life tenure for future 
recruits. The deal between the unionists, OTE management, and the Minister of 
Economy was heavily criticised by the opposition parties and by the peak 
confederation GSEE. This episode created a rift between OME-OTE and other 
unions and made the prospect for coordinated action in support for centralisation 
even more unlikely. 
 
The use of ‘voluntary exit’ schemes for those close to retirement age was not a 
new practice. Indeed, this was the primary means that was negotiated already in a 
firm level agreement in 1996, so that it lightens up the overstaffed OTE. The 
Chief Executive of OTE at the time, Petros Lambrou, and the president of OME-
OTE union, had signed a company-level agreement according to which an annual 
voluntary exit scheme was set up. This agreement also specified that for every ten 
exits, only one hiring would take place. Since then about 600-800 employees who 
were close to retirement left annually, receiving a minor compensation. This 
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process accomplished the reduction of the total number of employees from 
29,000 in 1996 to 16,000 in 2005. However, the cost of that scheme was 
miniscule compared to the 2005 described below. 
 
Following the change in government in April 2004, Panagis Vourloumis was 
appointed as the new CEO of OTE. Panagis Vourloumis was an experienced 
manager with a reputation for rationalising ‘ailing’ public enterprises. During 
autumn and winter 2004 the negotiations between OTE management and the 
unions were centred on the terms and conditions of the voluntary exit. Soon it 
became apparent, that the agenda of the management entailed other items beyond 
the regular exit scheme. When the management requested the abolition of the job-
for-life tenure system in OTE, the trade unionists were taken by surprise. 
Following from this development, OME-OTE negotiating tactics were changed. 
The unionists asked for a solid plan for the business restructuring, and requested 
legal assurances for the voluntary exit terms. However, both the socialist party in 
opposition (PASOK) and the peak trade union confederation (GSEE) were 
adamant: ‘do not dare accept the deal’.258 OME-OTE reacted with strike action on 
14 of February 2005 demanding better terms for the voluntary exit scheme, and, 
rejected the plan to abolish job tenure. A few days later the CEO Vourloumis 
improved the terms of voluntary exit and put the deal on the bargaining table. The 
deal was comprised of three parts; the first was on annual voluntary exit and was 
signed immediately; the second was on the extraordinary voluntary exit scheme 
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with very generous compensation, while the third was concerned with the 
abolition of job-for-life tenure for future hires.  
 
Events quickly followed one another. In early March there was a tripartite 
meeting between Minister of Economy, George Alogoskoufis, the CEO of OTE, 
Panagis Vourloumis, and OME-OTE president and general secretary. In this 
meeting, the unionists were given a very explicit dilemma by both the Minister 
and the CEO of OTE: ‘either you agree with a radical reversal of industrial 
relations in OTE or the programme of voluntary exit is neither enacted by law nor 
financed’.259 The meeting failed to produce any concrete results and OME-OTE 
decided another strike for 17 March 2005. The concerted action of government 
and management was increasing pressure. A few days later the Minister appeared 
resolved to proceed with the plan, announcing his intention to impose the 
voluntary exit by law, if the OTE union did not agree. Additionally, the pressures 
from about 5,000 employees who would benefit from the scheme ‘were very 
strong, almost unbearable’. 260 
 
The time of the OME-OTE congress was approaching. On Tuesday 24 of May, 
OME-OTE participated in an extended meeting with GSEE representatives in the 
peak confederation’s headquarters. The official line from GSEE was crystal-clear 
‘do not accept an overturn in the status quo’ and their recommendation to OME-
OTE was to ‘bring the agreement before the OME-OTE congress’, which would 
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take place on 28 May.261 The very next day the trade unionists were talking with 
the socialist party’s head of labour issues section (i.e. shadow Minister of 
Labour), Evangelos Venizelos, who would represent the socialist party in the 
OME-OTE congress. In their meeting the unionists did not mention anything on 
their intention to sign an agreement. Two hours later, the president and general 
secretary of OME-OTE were called urgently to Mr Vourloumis’ office. The wage 
agreement was literally signed at night, exchanging the abolition of job tenure in 
future hires for an extremely generous voluntary exit programme covering some 
5,000 employees. The ‘voluntary exit’ plan was a result of secret negotiations; 
and the Executive Council was not informed of the content of negotiations.262 
 
On the one side, the government was celebrating the consensual abolition of job-
for-life tenure, and the trade unionists were speaking of a victory ‘avoiding the 
worse’. On the other side, the socialist opposition was taken by surprise, while 
GSEE president Christos Polizogopoulos was outrageous with this outcome. The 
voluntary exit deal was estimated to cost the breath-taking sum of €1.6 billion and 
would be financed by the state budget and company funds. 263  Apart from 
dropping job tenure, its main effect would be to reduce the number of employees 
from 16,000 to 11,000. The beneficiaries were up to eight years before retirement 
with the majority of them being between 48 and 57 years’ old.264 
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In the congress there were about 300 delegates who represented the employees in 
the company. The majority of the delegates was either part of the group of 
beneficiaries, or just didn’t care as long as their own job-tenure was 
safeguarded.265 As a result only a minority objected the plan, and the agreement 
was approved by a 77 per cent majority in the OME-OTE Congress. Still, the 
agreement did provoke severe frictions within the socialist faction of PASKE, 
within the socialist party PASOK, and of course between GSEE peak 
confederation and OME-OTE federation.266 The president of OME-OTE (and 
member of PASKE faction) who negotiated and signed the agreement, was 
sacked.267  
 
This deal increased the mistrust between OME-OTE and unions and employees in 
the sector. The use of tax-payers money for an extremely generous compensation 
for early retirement of only 5,000 employees aggravated the suspicion towards 
OME-OTE unionists. The (ex) public/private divide between employees was 
continuing, even after the full privatisation of OTE. On the whole, the unionists in 
OTE (and other public enterprises) were considered –at best- as faint-hearted, 
managing to get unionism ‘the easy way’ with the aid of political parties’ 
clientelistic practices and exchanging privileges in return for votes.268 At worse, 
the OTE unionists were considered as ‘sold out’ (poulimenoi), using unionism as 
a medium for political career (ergatopateres) and uninterested in representing the 
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real workers interests.269  In sharp contrast, the firm level unions in the new 
private telecommunications companies developed in a much more hostile 
environment, than the easy unionism of the public sector. Their affiliations were 
either with more leftist parties or preserved their political autonomy. They sought 
to represent workers’ interests, rather than play the game of clientelism with 
governing political parties. The labour market dualism with the deep cleavages in 
working conditions was mirrored in the fragmentation of labour representation. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
Liberalisation and privatisation altered the landscape of Greek 
telecommunications. The public monopoly that was created in the post-war 
period was dissolved under the requirements of European Union regulation. New 
players entered the telecommunications market, competitive pressures intensified, 
and the dominant position of the incumbent operator was eroded. OTE was 
gradually privatised via share-issuing. Simultaneously, the new firms made 
extensive use of flexible working practices, as did the subsidiaries of OTE. In the 
aftermath of liberalisation the attempt to centralise bargaining was marked by a 
failure. The aim of this chapter was to explain this path. 
 
The argument that the chapter put forward was that the outcome is explained by 
the lack of employer associability and unions’ inability to speak with a single 
voice. The latter made the prospect for a labour-state coalition in support for 
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wage bargaining very unlikely. On the business side, there was a proliferation of 
narrow interests associations. They lacked the crucial legal competence to 
represent their members in labour relations and were solely focused on 
representing them on regulatory issues. The divisions among them were stark: 
one association for large telecom providers, a second association for small 
alternative telecom operators, and a third association just for mobile telephony 
companies. 
 
On the labour side, the unions in the sector appeared divided along several lines. 
Unions in the incumbent operator (OTE) were very much focused on negotiating 
their internal restructuring. Although they had links with governing political 
parties, they used those links to gain compensation from the state for the 
restructuring in OTE. In contrast, the unions in the new firms were organised 
without any support from the OTE union. Moreover, the centralisation demand 
was led by a small occupational union, which was leftist in political orientation, 
and lacked the precious links with centre-right or socialist parties. The 
government was uninterested in taking into account the demand for centralisation 
that came from that union, with no clear electoral gain. Instead, it sought to make 
exchange with the union in the incumbent OTE, so that its agenda for 
privatisation proceeds. 
 
Overall, the possibility of exchanging centralisation of bargaining for ‘negotiated 
flexibility’ as in the Italian case was and remains unlikely. OME-OTE response to 
the market liberalisation was first to contain it via lobbying the independent 
regulator, and second to negotiate an extremely generous compensation from the 
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state. The protectionist, introvert and exclusivist strategy exacerbated the 
divisions between unions in the sector, and hindered the unions’ ability to speak 
with a ‘single voice’. Unless unions are able to overcome internal divisions, the 
decentralised bargaining structure will likely persist in the future. 
 
 Chapter 8 Employer Associability and Labour-State 
Coalitions: Mediating EU Liberalisation and Negotiating 
Flexibility 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this thesis has been to examine the impact of the pressures 
from markets liberalisation and employment flexibility on wage bargaining 
institutions. The central research question has been: how do we explain divergent 
trajectories of change in wage bargaining, despite common pressures? More 
specifically, the thesis set out to shed light on the mediating role of collective 
actors, which may moderate destabilising pressures to wage bargaining 
institutions. Which collective actors mediate the impact of liberalisation and 
flexibility on wage bargaining? How does the process of their interaction unfold, 
leading to coalitions that shape divergent paths of institutional change? Why do 
actors choose one path over another, what are their ultimate motives? These 
questions were answered in the context of theoretical frameworks in comparative 
political economy and comparative employment systems. 
 
The earlier literature had envisaged a generalised pull towards a breakdown of 
wage bargaining institutions, due to the destabilising pressures from liberalisation 
and flexibility. On the one hand, the liberalisation of markets in Europe stemmed 
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from the European Union’s regulatory impact on member states’ product markets. 
The European Commission’s liberalisation agenda was extended to ‘network 
services’ and resulted in an intensification of competition with foreign firms 
entering the previously closed and protected sectors. On the other hand, the 
introduction of flexible working practices was part of the greater 
internationalisation and diffusion of ‘best practices’ in management, but also 
accelerated with the privatisation of state-owned bureaucratic firms. In particular, 
three forms of flexibility were identified as more prevalent in network services: 
working time flexibility (e.g. annualised hours, flexitime), pay flexibility (e.g. 
performance-based pay systems) and numerical flexibility (e.g. outsourcing, fixed 
term contracts). 
 
The thesis examined wage bargaining institutions in two key sectors which 
provide a backbone to the wider economy: banking and telecommunications. In 
European banking the process of liberalisation started in the early 1980s and was 
completed by the late 1990s. In European telecommunications, the liberalisation 
started in the late 1980s and was completed by the early 2000s. The effects of 
liberalisation and flexibility on wage bargaining have been compared in banking 
and telecoms across two European Union member-states, Italy and Greece, which 
belong to the Mediterranean model of capitalism. Yet, the common pressures that 
appeared in all four cases, did not translate into similar outcomes and the paths of 
institutional change diverged. The case studies traced back the process of change 
and this allowed the study of collective actors’ strategies, coalitions and interests. 
 
  
263 
This concluding chapter seeks to bring the findings of the empirical analysis 
together relating them to broader themes. The second section briefly reviews the 
main argument of the thesis based on a coalitional approach to wage bargaining. 
The third section summarises the central empirical findings applying the 
argument to explain the divergent paths in each case. The fourth section gauges 
the broader relevance of the argument and how it could be tested in other cases, 
but also acknowledges some of the limitations of the argument. The fifth section 
considers the implications of the argument and the empirical findings for wider 
debates in the comparative political economy and the comparative employment 
systems literatures. Finally, the sixth section contemplates on the role of wage 
bargaining institutions and the future trajectories of change in the Mediterranean 
model of capitalism light of the current Eurozone crisis. 
 
8.2. Review of the Argument 
 
The conceptual framework of the thesis is placed at the intersection of two 
literatures that deal with institutional change and wage bargaining, namely 
comparative political economy and comparative employment systems. The 
varieties of capitalism strand provided the background theory on which 
institutional change was studied. More specifically, the thesis sought to examine 
the dynamics of change within the under-researched category of the 
Mediterranean model of capitalism, with a motivation to flesh out empirically the 
role of the state in the industrial relations sphere. 
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However, the purpose was not to contribute to the inflation of static typologies of 
capitalism. Instead, the aim was to develop middle-range theoretical propositions 
which are able to explain divergent trajectories of change in wage bargaining 
institutions. In other words, the focus was not on the national level, i.e. the 
capitalist model as a whole, but on the sub-national level, examining wage 
bargaining institutions in the wider category of liberalised and privatised sectors. 
The interest in these sectors came from their immense transformation during the 
last two decades. In those sectors ‘the boundaries between public-private sphere 
have been redrawn’ (Pagoulatos, 2005), since the state has withdrawn from direct 
ownership and regulation.  
 
The main research question of this thesis was: how do we explain divergent 
trajectories of change in wage bargaining, despite common pressures from 
liberalisation and flexibility? As mentioned earlier, sectoral wage agreements are 
a form of employment regulation, which set rules that govern pay and working 
conditions in a sector. It is of particular interest in those sectors, because they 
were characterised by state-ownership and limited competition, which offered 
fertile ground for wage bargaining to flourish. Given their privatisation and 
liberalisation, it was interesting to see how this altered the evolution of wage 
bargaining and explain the observed differences in the trajectories of change. 
 
Thus, the core conceptual framework was informed by scholarly works focussing 
specifically on wage bargaining institutions from both comparative political 
economy and comparative employment systems literatures. Earlier contributions 
to those literatures predicted that the forces of markets liberalisation, on the one 
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hand, and the internationalisation of flexible working practices, on the other, 
would destabilise centralised bargaining arrangements, converging to the LME 
model of decentralised bargaining. 
 
The liberalisation hypothesis emphasised the external pressures towards wage 
bargaining institutions. According to this hypothesis, wage bargaining could 
flourish in relatively protected and oligopolistic product markets, in which 
competitive pressures were weak. In such a business environment, the wage 
agreements were meaningful because they took wages ‘out of competition’, thus 
stabilising costs across the sector. However, the opening up of markets and the 
entry of new players were expected to intensify competition and ‘weaken the 
logic for taking wages out of competition’ (Marginson et al., 2003). The 
flexibility hypothesis entailed a more diverse list of factors. Either because of 
changes in production technologies or changes in product demand, firms 
intensified their ‘search for flexibility’. The internationalisation of flexible 
working practices involved introduction of working time flexibility, variable pay 
systems, and numerical flexibility. Wage bargaining agreements were perceived 
as too rigid to accommodate the firms’ new and diversified needs. Therefore, it 
was expected that business would ‘dismantle’ sectoral wage bargaining, so that 
individual firms suit work organisation to their own needs. 
 
Despite the merits of the above hypotheses, they were criticised on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, they suffer from excessive 
functionalism, assuming that institutions will collapse when the needs of firms 
change. As a corollary, they downplayed the role of collective actors, and their 
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coalitions, in moderating the pressures or transforming the nature and direction of 
institutional change. In a nutshell, these theoretical conjectures expected a 
generalised breakdown of wage bargaining in an almost deterministic manner. 
 
Apart from a theoretical critique on earlier conjectures, the third chapter showed 
that empirical reality proved to be inconsistent with their predictions. Despite the 
completion of the single market programme in Europe, the intensification of 
competition, and the widespread introduction of flexible working practices, there 
was no generalised pull towards breakdown of centralised wage bargaining. 
Instead, divergent trajectories of change were observed. Thereby, it was shown 
that the empirical puzzle of the thesis has strong empirical underpinnings and a 
wider relevance – beyond the countries and sectors examined. 
 
The thesis developed a coalitional approach to wage bargaining change in order 
to address the empirical puzzle and refine earlier theoretical propositions. Indeed, 
earlier theories downplayed the role of employers associations or the state, and 
were overly focused on individual firms’ needs. In other words, they over-
emphasised the effects of structural changes on long-standing institutions, 
ignoring the mediating role of collective agents. In line with current coalitional 
approaches in political economy, the argument relied on the three main collective 
actors’ interactions (business, labour, state) to throw light on the dynamics of 
change. It was argued that wage bargaining institutions may be reformed to meet 
new needs if there is ‘employer associability’ with larger and smaller firms 
pursuing their shared interests. Additionally, it was argued that wage bargaining 
may survive, because it is an institution that does not only rest on a ‘cross-class 
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coalition’, but also on a ‘labour-state coalition’, especially in the more statist 
industrial relations systems of Mediterranean capitalism. 
 
On the one hand, employer associability was defined as the delegated legal 
competence of a collective interest association to represent both large and small 
firms in a sector on labour relations. Therefore, employer associability is missing 
in two occasions: (i) when an association does not have the legal competence to 
represent firms on labour relations (i.e. is just a trade association representing a 
narrower set of interests) or (ii) when representation is skewed towards one group 
of firms in the sector (e.g. large firms vs. small firms). Following from this, the 
first hypothesis was that if employer associability exists, then tensions in wage 
bargaining are likely to be moderated. An employer association may protect the 
long-run interests of firms, enforcing decisions on reluctant or resisting firms. 
The most likely trajectory of institutional change is the reform of the institution of 
wage bargaining. ‘Organised decentralisation’ is such an example, in which there 
is a shift in relative importance between sectoral and firm level of bargaining. The 
motivation of an association lies in getting the ‘best of both worlds’ for its 
members: to achieve cost standardisation at the lowest common denominator, and 
thereby, ensuring fair competition at the sectoral level; and to suit its members’ 
needs for work organisation and pay flexibility at the firm level. Inversely, if an 
association lacks the legal competence or the representation of interests is skewed 
towards one group of firms, then the destabilising pressures are let loose. 
 
On the other hand, the labour-state coalition was defined as an implicit 
congruence of preferences between organised labour and the government with 
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respect to wage bargaining. Therefore, a labour-state coalition will likely not 
occur in two occasions: (i) when organised labour is unable to ‘speak with a 
single-voice’ and therefore unable  to steer government’s interest to support a 
wage agreement for the whole sector, or (ii) when government’s electoral motives 
are weak and the government agenda clashes with the unions’ demands. 
Following from this, the second hypothesis stated that if a labour-state coalition 
exists, then the pressures towards the breakdown of centralised wage bargaining 
are likely to be moderated. If organised labour is able to speak with a ‘single 
voice’ then it may hinge on the state’s coercive (and persuasive) power to put 
pressure on employers. The most likely trajectory of change is the survival of 
centralised wage bargaining. The motivation of labour unions is to protect their 
members from ‘a race to bottom’ in wages and working conditions, while the 
motivation behind the government’s actions is to benefit from the unions’ votes 
and to get ‘room for manoeuvre’ for the rest of the government agenda. Wage 
bargaining is an institution that is not costly for the state budget, and therefore, 
easier for the government to side with the unions’ demands. Inversely, if labour is 
not able to speak with a single voice, it may focus on advancing narrow interests 
rather than pursuing centralised bargaining coverage of the sector. 
 
8.3. Central Empirical Findings 
 
The argument was applied to explain two matched pairs: on the one hand, Greek 
and Italian banking, and on the other, Italian and Greek telecoms. All four cases 
experienced the common pressures from liberalisation and flexibility, while the 
pairs were matched on the basis of similar starting points and divergent paths. In 
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the Greek and Italian banking sectors the starting point was sectoral wage 
bargaining. However, the institution was reformed in Italy (‘organised 
decentralisation’), whereas in Greece the institution broke down. In the Italian 
and Greek telecommunications sectors the starting point was firm level 
bargaining owing to the sectors’ earlier monopoly market structure (i.e. one firm 
was the equivalent of the whole sector). After the liberalisation of 
telecommunications, the institutional paths across Italy and Greece diverged; 
there was successful centralisation of bargaining in Italian telecoms, whereas the 
attempt at centralisation was marked by a failure in Greece. 
 
The Greek banking sector in the 1980s had the characteristics of an oligopoly in 
which the majority of banks were owned by the state. The internal organisational 
structure of banks was bureaucratic and flexibility was missing. Since the late 
1980s the European Union regulatory framework prompted the opening up of the 
market and the intensification of competition. Simultaneously, the privatisation 
process brought about modernisation of banks’ internal work organisation and 
introduction of various forms of flexibility. By the mid 2000s, the preferences of 
individual banks changed towards abandoning sectoral wage agreements. 
Historically, there was no employer associability and the larger banks were 
representing the whole sector during negotiations. However, as market shares 
changed over the last decade, and the larger banks were privatised, the desire to 
loosen the straightjacket of wage agreements intensified. Until the mid 2000s, 
government intervention appeased the tensions, mediating negotiations and 
reconciling the disagreements between banks. Thus, state intervention ‘filled the 
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gap’ in employer associability and wage bargaining rested on a labour-state 
coalition.  
 
However, in 2006 the large banks appeared resolved to abandon sectoral wage 
bargaining and expressed this desire by the simultaneous mailing of identical 
letters to OTOE by the six leading banks. The abandonment of wage bargaining 
was initially avoided, because trade unions were able to speak with a single voice, 
despite internal ideological divisions. The sectoral union responded with a two-
pronged strategy: industrial action and putting pressure on the government to 
intervene. The state’s intervention saved the institution from collapsing, since the 
government sided with the unions because of electoral concerns and priorities in 
advancing the government agenda. When the labour-state coalition was broken, 
the institution collapsed. The bankers refused to negotiate a new sectoral 
agreement in the late 2000s, and the government did not intervene on the side of 
unions. The electoral motives were weaker than in the previous negotiation 
rounds and the government agenda had shifted priorities. This resulted in the 
breakdown of sectoral wage bargaining in Greek banking. 
 
The Italian banking sector in the 1980s had the characteristics of a sector in 
which the majority of banks were state-owned and organised into regional 
oligopolies. Bank employees enjoyed job security and developed a civil service 
culture. Since the late 1980s the European Union regulatory impact on the sector 
facilitated the opening up of the market and competitive pressures increased. At 
the same time, the privatisation process brought about the restructuring of banks 
and the introduction of various forms of work flexibility. Although the banks 
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were organised into employers associations, their representation was fragmented; 
one association represented the interests of the large commercial banks, and a 
second one represented the interests of smaller savings banks. The liberalisation 
of the market prompted the restructuring of the sector and the move to a universal 
banking model.  It became increasingly difficult to reconcile the interests of both 
smaller and larger banks between the two different associations.  
 
Until the mid-1990s government intervention appeased the tensions during 
negotiations and saved the institution from collapsing. Again, the wage 
bargaining institution rested on a labour-state coalition. When the firms voiced 
their desire to abandon sectoral wage bargaining, they were faced with a strong 
labour-state coalition. The government responded that it would not support 
decentralisation, if the trade unions did not agree. The unions categorically 
rejected such a development, and the path towards ‘LME-like’ decentralisation 
was practically blocked. Individual firms resolved their representation problems 
and delegated the legal competence to negotiate labour relations to a single 
association (ABI). Their motivation was to push their agenda for restructuring 
and downsizing. Indeed, the strengthening of employer associability facilitated 
the reform of the institution of wage bargaining. From 1999 onwards, sectoral 
wage agreements set the sectors’ minimum standards, while companies used firm 
level bargaining as the locus of flexibility. Trade unions were able to speak with a 
single voice, despite fragmentation across different organisations. The ‘market 
pressure’ via strike activity and the ‘political pressure’ via government 
intervention were used consistently as a strategy to save the institution from 
collapsing.  
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Employers finally accepted the creation of redundancy funds (fondo esuberi), 
which were primarily funded by the banks, and secondarily by the employees. 
This eased the repercussions from downsizing and was part of the exchange for 
greater flexibility in the sector. Crucially, the unions drafted the plan for 
restructuring together with the Minister of Labour. The government was willing 
to support the trade unions’ demands for electoral reasons, since wage bargaining 
was not a costly institution for state budget. Instead, wage agreements were used 
as a means to implement the government agenda on labour market reforms 
towards greater flexibility. Overall, the reform of wage bargaining in the Italian 
banking sector was at the forefront of the overhaul of the wage bargaining system 
in Italy by the late 2000s. Despite occasional tensions, the reformed institution of 
wage bargaining solidified during the 2000s and succeeded in increasing the 
efficiency and competitiveness of Italian banks, adjusting to the more competitive 
environment. 
 
The Italian telecommunications sector is certainly a hard case for earlier 
theoretical conjectures. Centralisation of bargaining was least expected under the 
scope conditions of intensified competition and pervasive introduction of 
flexibility. Following the opening up and liberalisation of the market, new firms 
entered into the sector, mainly foreign subsidiaries or joint ventures. The 
competitive pressures appeared high and the new firms made an extensive use of 
flexible employment practices (numerical flexibility and outsourcing, working 
time, and pay flexibility). In spite of these pressures - which were expected to 
keep bargaining decentralised – the trade unions managed to successfully 
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centralise wage bargaining in the sector. Hence, the Italian telecommunications 
case enhances the wider applicability of the argument.  
 
The three union confederations transformed the firm level unions of Telecom 
Italia into sectoral federations, so as to accept members from the new telecoms 
operators. Even before the opening up of the market in 1998, they shared a 
strategic goal to centralise bargaining in the sector and devoted their resources to 
this aim, by organising strikes and inviting the government to intervene and aid 
their effort. In the absence of representative business associations in the sector, 
the peak trade union organisations and peak employer association (Confindustria) 
signed the first agreement for the sector in 2000. Confindustria literally filled the 
gap of the missing sectoral employer association and the trade unions were able 
to speak with a single voice, despite organisational divisions. The employers’ 
motivation for accepting the centralised agreement lay in ensuring ‘fair 
competition’ in the sector by setting a level-playing field in wages and working 
conditions. It is important to note, however, that the trade unions were willing to 
accept a wide-ranging introduction of flexibility in their sectoral wage agreements 
(‘negotiated flexibility’), thus, implementing the labour market reforms of the 
government.  
 
Subsequently, both sides resolved their representation problems and included 
members from new firms. Confindustria absorbed the public employer 
association Intersind, which had the legal competence to negotiate labour 
relations for Telecom Italia. Afterwards, it created a new association, ASSTEL, in 
which both large and small telecoms operators became members. Similarly, the 
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unions appeased militant tensions in the new firms via unitary workplace 
representation (RSU), and organised employees across the sector.  
 
The first telecoms agreement between the new sectoral associations was signed in 
2002. Still, an increased dualism persisted in the labour market, with outsourced 
call-centre employees remaining outside the coverage. The unions forged a 
labour-state coalition to extend the coverage to include ‘outsiders’ in the labour 
market. The government put pressure on resisting and reluctant firms in the 
sector, so that the precarious outsiders fell into the remit of the sectoral wage 
agreement and call-centre firms became members of ASSTEL. 
 
The Greek telecommunications sector contrasts sharply with the Italian case, 
since it exemplifies a failed attempt at centralisation. Like the Italian telecoms, 
the sector was opened up due to the regulatory impact of the European Union. 
The competitive pressures increased with the entry of new firms offering mobile 
and fixed telephony services. Flexibility was introduced bottom-up with many 
smaller firms resorting extensively to outsourcing and precarious employment 
contracts. Even in the ex-monopoly of OTE, subcontractors were extensively 
used in the satellite subsidiaries of the OTE Group. Although the firms in the 
sector were organised in interest associations, their representation was severely 
fragmented and narrow. The larger telecoms firms and OTE were organised in 
SEPE, while the smaller alternative operators were members of SATPE. In both 
associations their members did not delegate any legal competence to negotiate 
labour relations issues, and the associations acted as narrow interest groups, 
lobbying for regulatory and technological issues.  
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At the same time the firm level union of OTE (OME-OTE) was uninterested in 
pushing for centralisation of bargaining across the sector. Instead, it devoted its 
resources in the organisation of strikes and protests for the delay of liberalisation 
and in getting compensation from the state for the restructuring process. A deep 
dualism emerged with substantially different working conditions between core 
OTE employees enjoying job-for-life tenure, and employees in private telephone 
operators who worked in more flexible and precarious contracts. In the new 
telephone operators, firm level unions were organised bottom-up, without help or 
support from the OME-OTE federation.  
 
The attempt to centralise wage bargaining came from a rather small occupational 
union (SMT) organising engineers with spurious self-employment (blokaki) in the 
telecommunications and informatics sector. The union was very suspicious of 
OME-OTE and labour was unable to speak with a single voice and put pressure 
on employers via strikes. Additionally, divisions were exacerbated because of 
ideological cleavages. SMT was a radical leftist union and had no links with the 
governing political parties as OME-OTE did. Thereby, it was unable to steer the 
interest of the state in support for its demand. Still, the state was keen on 
advancing its privatisation agenda. Therefore, a narrow labour-state coalition was 
forged between OME-OTE and the government, not to support centralisation of 
wage bargaining, but to assist the privatisation process of OME-OTE by 
removing the ‘job-for-life tenure’ and generously compensating employees in the 
firm. The generous compensation of OME-OTE employees aggravated the 
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mutual suspicion and divisions between unions in the sector, and made the 
prospect of centralisation even more unlikely. 
 
In conclusion, the conceptual and empirical contribution is summarised in the 
next Table (Table 8.1.). Using quantitative terminology the thesis suggested that 
two ‘intervening variables’ (employer associability and labour-state coalitions) 
mediate the relationship between the ‘dependent variable’ (wage bargaining 
agreements) and the ‘independent variables’ (liberalisation and flexibility). In  the 
Greek banking sector the breakdown of wage bargaining was resisted as long as a 
‘labour-state coalition’ was supporting the institution. When the coalition broke 
up, the pull towards abandonment of centralised bargaining was let loose. In the 
Italian banking sector the employer associability and the labour-state coalition 
moderated the destabilising pressures, and facilitated a reform of the institution to 
meet new needs. In the Italian telecommunications sector, there was a successful 
centralisation of wage bargaining due to employer associability and a labour-state 
coalition. The newly born centralised bargaining system took a form that met the 
needs of firms in the new competitive environment. Finally, in the Greek 
telecommunications sector the liberalisation and flexibility led to a decentralised 
bargaining structure, as was expected by earlier literature. But it was shown that 
the failed attempt at centralisation was explained by the nature of business 
associations (which represented narrow interests) and by the fact that labour was 
divided, which hindered the prospect of forging a coalition with the state. 
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Table 8.1. Summary of Case Studies. 
Trajectory of change 
Breakdown of 
Sectoral Wage 
Bargaining 
Reform of 
Sectoral 
Wage 
Bargaining 
Successful 
Centralisation 
of Wage 
Bargaining 
Failed 
Centralisation 
of Wage 
Bargaining  
Cases Greek Banking 
Italian 
Banking 
Italian Telecoms Greek Telecoms 
Liberalisation 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Flexibility 
Employer 
Associability 
No Yes Yes (post 2000) No 
In
te
rv
en
in
g 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Labour-State 
Coalition 
No (post 2007) Yes Yes No 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
Sectoral 
Wage 
Agreement 
No (post 2007) Yes Yes (post 2000) No 
Source: Author’s Own Elaboration. 
 
8.4. Testing the Argument in Other Cases 
 
How might the arguments developed in this thesis be tested to examine whether 
they are more widely applicable? Although the ‘universe of cases’ was cautiously 
constrained to liberalised and privatised sectors in Mediterranean capitalism 
countries, there seem to be three possible extensions. The first and most obvious 
way is to test them in further instances within the ‘universe of cases’. For 
example one could test the argument in telecommunications and banking sectors 
in countries such as France, Spain or Portugal. These cases are especially 
promising, since the European Union regulatory impact of liberalisation is 
present, and therefore, the pressures towards destabilisation of wage bargaining 
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are strong. Indeed, recent studies on developments in wage bargaining in French 
telecommunications suggest that wage bargaining centralisation was aided by the 
state (Doellgast, Nohara et al., 2009) making the mechanism of a ‘labour-state 
coalition’ highly plausible. Another possible extension involves railways, airlines, 
and electricity sectors in Mediterranean capitalism countries. However, the 
problem with those sectors is that the European Union regulation developed much 
more slowly and the pressures from the intensification of competition are 
expected to be weaker. 
 
The second way is to expand the universe of cases beyond services sectors, within 
the Mediterranean model of capitalism. For instance, chemicals, food-processing, 
and textiles, are sectoral cases in which the argument could be tested. While these 
sectors did not experience the strong impact of European Union liberalisation as 
‘network services’, the increased competitive pressures may have stemmed from 
general European competition law or from the intensification of competition 
globally. Additionally, some of these sectors may not have been public 
monopolies, which were privatised. Still, the internationalisation of flexible 
working practices is expected to provide additional pressures with the changes on 
the internal work organisation of firms. The coalitional approach to wage 
bargaining would predict that despite pressures for the destabilisation of wage 
bargaining institutions, employer associability may help reform wage bargaining 
and the institution will survive if it rests on a labour-state coalition. Indeed, the 
sectoral case of Italian metalworking seems to corroborate this expectation. Wage 
bargaining agreements have been difficult in an industry that experienced 
unprecedented competitive pressures from low-cost countries; however, the state 
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stepped in several times and saved the institution from collapsing, while wage 
bargaining was used as an instrument for business restructuring.
270
 
 
The final way to test the wider applicability of the argument is to check whether it 
holds in sectors outside the Mediterranean model of capitalism. However, this 
may also unveil some of the argument’s limitations. In LMEs and CMEs the 
industrial relations systems have been less ‘statist’, and therefore, there may be 
little scope for a labour-state coalition to support the institution from collapsing. 
For instance, examining the decentralisation of wage bargaining during the 1980s 
in the United Kingdom -in retrospect- may show that a labour-state coalition was 
not within the range of options. Unlike the Mediterranean countries, the links 
between the British TUC (Trades Union Congress) and political parties went only 
one-way; TUC had an organic relationship only with the Labour Party. Therefore, 
the electoral interests of the ruling Conservative Party were very weak, from the 
outset. More generally, there was a preference for a ‘collective laissez faire 
system among both trade unions and by employers’ (Rubery, 2010:516) which 
kept the state out of the realm of industrial relations. In CMEs like Germany, the 
stylised picture is that employer associability is strong. However, this picture is 
conventionally inferred from the manufacturing sector. For instance, when we 
look at the liberalised German telecommunications sector, employer associability 
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is non-existent and trade unions appear divided (Doellgast, Nohara et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the convergence to a decentralised bargaining structure may be partly 
attributed to those factors. 
 
In a nutshell, the argument presented in the thesis sheds light to the divergent 
trajectories of wage bargaining change advancing an interest-based explanation of 
different coalitions between collective actors. However, the argument does not 
pretend to be able to explain the whole variation between divergent outcomes 
across the cases. Instead, embedded cultural attitudes, norms and practices are 
likely to play their part in the dynamics of wage bargaining change.  
 
Despite a similar past until the 1980s, the trade union organisations in Italy and 
Greece display a differing level of ‘maturity’ (cf. Kritsantonis, 1998). Greek 
unionists were more prone towards ‘all-or-nothing’ bargaining tactics, unwilling 
to pursue compromises. Indeed, evidence from the interviews suggested that this 
cultural difference may explain part of the variation in outcomes. As was 
mentioned throughout the empirical chapters, Greek unionists were more attached 
on a strategy of playing out the government’s electoral motives to easily achieve 
concessions in wage bargaining. Having been ‘socialised’ in this version of ‘easy’ 
unionism, they never really internalised the logic of compromise.The large state 
ownership across the economy was of course critical, since the state occupied the 
seat of the employer. The maximalistic aspirations of unions were nurtured by 
political parties in opposition via a residual of a ‘transmissions belt mechanism’ 
(Mavrogordatos, 1988). Indeed, evidence suggested that when either the centre-
left PASOK or the centre-right New Democracy were in opposition, they 
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systematically nurtured the maximalistic aspirations of the Greek unions.
271
 This 
behaviour heightened the expectations of union leaders and members. When 
elected, the party in government negated its earlier commitments, thus outraging 
trade union leaders, and making the prospect for compromises even less likely. 
As the economy moved away from public ownership to private ownership, the 
trade unionists did not adjust to the new realities, hoping to negotiate wage 
bargains in the ‘old-fashion’. 
 
By contrast, Italian unionists had internalised the logic of ‘political exchange’ 
(Pizzorno, 1978) in negotiating and finally reaching compromises with employers 
and/or the state. Since the 1990s, the Italian unionists were much more pragmatic 
when carving out their strategies and more willing to accept the government 
agendas for reform (for instance, on liberalisation, privatisation, and labour 
market flexibility). Instead of trying to resist them, they attempted to actively 
shape the direction of change. As far as liberalisation is concerned they sought to 
protect their members from a ‘race to bottom’ in wages; or ease out the social 
costs of adjustment to business restructuring with bi-partite welfare funds. With 
regard to labour market flexibility they did not reject it en bloc, but put limits on 
the extent and nature of flexibility. In other words, Italian trade unions 
internalised the logic of quid pro quo. Additionally, there is a different evolution 
in the relationship between trade unions and political parties since the early 1990s 
(after Tangentopoli). Unlike their Greek counterparts, the Italian trade unions 
distanced themselves from traditional political parties and there was no clear 
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alignment between the new political parties and the confederal unions. Even 
more, the unions’ membership became more diversified, and union leaders 
enjoyed renewed legitimacy from the wider society, because they were not 
involved in the scandals. As a result their institutional role was upgraded. In 
essence, when Italian unions were able to ‘speak with a single voice’ they 
constituted a quasi-political party, which neither Left nor Right governments 
could ignore. 
 
8.5. Implications for Broader Academic Debates 
 
Overall, applying the coalitional perspective on wage bargaining has yielded 
fruitful insights for the dynamics of change in this institution. A contribution is 
evident not only empirically by looking into new cases and bringing in novel 
data, but also conceptually by elaborating on the mechanisms of change and the 
motivation of the actors. The next sub-sections discuss the implications from the 
argument and empirical findings for broader debates in comparative political 
economy and comparative employment systems literatures. 
 
8.5.1. Comparative Political Economy: Liberalisation and the 
Dynamics of Change in the Mediterranean Model of Capitalism 
 
The argument put forward here is also relevant to wider debates in comparative 
political economy and the dynamics of change within models of capitalism. 
Conventionally, Italy and Greece are classified as belonging to the Mediterranean 
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capitalism or ‘Mixed Market Economies’ model (Molina and Rhodes, 2007; 
Schmidt, 2008). More specifically, Molina and Rhodes (2007:225-227) suggested 
that the state has a distinctive ‘compensatory role’ in this model and domestic 
actors invest in ‘one kind of asset - political power’. However, they failed to 
explain adequately why actors choose to invest in this kind of asset and what the 
motivation is that lies behind it.  
 
The argument presented here fleshes out empirically the motivation behind 
investment in political power in the Mediterranean model of capitalism. It 
suggests that the state may use its coercive and persuasive powers and tilt the 
balance in the conflict over institutional change between domestic business and 
labour actors. Organised labour’s incentives to invest in ‘political power’ and to 
develop links with parties were strong in the past, because the state had an 
important role in a large part of the economy. In publicly owned sectors it was 
easier for labour to organise, attract and retain high membership rates, as well as 
to win concessions from the state via alluding to the electoral importance of union 
members’ vote. However, the traditionally strong statist character of the 
Mediterranean model has been lessened. The state has largely withdrawn from 
direct ownership and regulation of a large part of the economy. Yet, the cases 
suggested that the strategy of labour actors to rely on the state’s coercive power 
survives despite the ‘redrawing of public and private spheres’. Importantly, the 
unions may still be able to steer the interest of the government and forge 
coalitions, because their historical links cover both Left and Right, while the state 
remains an important arbitrator in the system. In other words, statist cultures and 
practices survive to some significant degree. 
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It suggested that the pressures for liberalisation of the ‘incoherent’ Mediterranean 
model of capitalism will not necessarily lead to its convergence to the Liberal 
Market model. Instead, domestic collective actors will mediate the external 
pressures by forging coalitions and shaping the direction of institutional change. 
The cases also suggested that common pressures may be refracted differently, 
even among cases which are commonly held to belong to the same model of 
capitalism. For instance, in Coordinated Market Economies domestic actors have 
mediated the European regulatory impact, re-regulating the single market via 
wage bargaining (Menz, 2003; Menz, 2005). This insight holds even in the less 
‘coherent’ models of Mediterranean capitalism which lack the crucial 
‘institutional complementarities’. The Italian cases suggest that Anglo-Saxon 
‘cut-throat competition’ was avoided in the liberalised market of 
telecommunications. The agenda of European Union liberalisation for the 
network sectors was pragmatically accepted by trade unions, but they sought to 
create a new wage bargaining institution so that a ‘race to bottom’ in wages is 
avoided. By contrast, labour actors in the Greek telecoms case did not accept the  
European Union’s liberalisation agenda and devoted their resources to resist 
privatisation and delay the opening up of the telecommunications market. 
Paradoxically, their strategies backfired on them, since they accelerated the faster 
convergence to Anglo-Saxon ‘cut-throat competition’ conditions, with an 
unprecedented expansion of precarious and flexible contracts. 
 
Does this mean that the liberalisation shift may be questioned in those sectors? 
Not quite. The EU liberalisation in product markets was equally implemented in 
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both Greek and Italian cases. However, this similar change in the regulatory 
framework in product markets did not lead to similar product market strategies 
and outcomes. In the Italian telecommunications sector, the ‘race to bottom’ in 
wage costs was avoided, pushing firms to concentrate their competition in the 
quality and diversity of telephony services. By contrast, in the Greek 
telecommunications sector there was no floor on wage costs. Hence, the firms 
adopted a price-based competition strategy. The ‘cut-throat’ competition in 
prices, pushed many alternative telephony operators out of the market by the end 
of the 2000s, resulting in a more oligopolistic structure. This corroborates other 
works in the literature, which find that the institutional convergence in regulatory 
frameworks, does not necessarily lead to convergence in outcomes (Thatcher, 
2007b). 
 
Finally, the argument made here confirms the insight of political economists that 
the ‘coalitional’ perspective is best suited to explain institutional change in 
contemporary capitalism. It has been argued that studying the shifts in actors’ 
coalitions can help us understand what drives the change in the form and 
functions that institutions take over time (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Thelen, 2003). 
For instance, the Greek banking sectors suggested that wage bargaining 
institutions do not only rest on a ‘cross-class coalition’ (Swenson, 1989) but also 
on a labour-state coalition. Even more, the changes in the form and the function 
of wage bargaining in Italian banking sector, was not only shaped by the ‘labour-
state’ coalition, but also by the coalition between small and large firms (employer 
associability).  
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8.5.2. Comparative Employment Systems: Flexibility, Convergence and 
Divergence 
 
The empirical findings of the thesis are able to inform further debates in 
comparative employment systems which look either at the institutional context of 
the labour market; or at specific labour market practices inside firms. First of all, 
the debate between convergence and divergence is replicated in the comparative 
employment systems literature as well (Farndale et al., 2008; Tregaskis and 
Brewster, 2006; Wood and Collings, 2009:301-307). Admittedly, a sizeable body 
of literature has shown that convergence is not happening and diversity persists 
not only across the institutional spheres of industrial relations in Europe (Hyman, 
2001), but also in the range of human resources practices utilised by European 
firms (Lorenz and Valeyre, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, the thesis refined the ‘converging divergences’ argument put 
forward by Katz and Darbishire (2000) who found an increasing variation in 
employment practices within countries, and greater homogeneity across sectors. 
Instead, one of the findings of the thesis was that the introduction of employment 
practices is shaped by the coalitions between domestic actors and this may lead to 
variation even in the same sector. The path of introduction of more flexible 
employment practices diverged, and differences were observed in the intensity 
and process of adjustment to new market conditions. This in turn, led to different 
institutional arrangements and outcomes in flexibility. In the Italian 
telecommunications sector the trade unions shaped the new environment by 
introducing ‘negotiated flexibility’ in line with the government agenda on labour 
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market reforms. By contrast, in the Greek telecommunications the trade unions 
became attached to the ‘status quo’ and sought to prevent the tide of liberalisation 
and privatisation. This was met with a widespread failure. In the meantime, they 
lost the opportunity to influence the introduction of flexibility in the sector, 
ending up with ‘imposed flexibility’ and an extensive use of precarious labour 
contracts, which developed beyond their control. 
 
Additionally, the cases outline the diachronic relevance of the old dictum of Allan 
Flanders from the Oxford School Industrial Relations, who argued that ‘trade 
unions have always had two faces, sword of justice and vested interest’ 
(1970:15). The two faces resound dilemmas of organised labour in the post-
industrial age. Thus, Clegg and van Wijnbergen (2011) suggest that unions are 
still between ‘sectionalism and revitalisation’: either to focus on protecting 
insiders; or to embrace outsiders and reach out to new constituencies. In a similar 
vein, Doellgast et al. (2009) distinguished between inclusive and exclusive 
strategies of unions, depending on whether they embrace precarious call-centre 
employees in liberalised sectors.  
 
The cases in the thesis speak to those wider debates. For instance, these dilemmas 
were addressed differently by unions in the Greek and the Italian 
telecommunications sectors. In the Greek telecoms the trade unions opted for 
sectionalism, acting as ‘vested interest’, protecting only the insiders and adopting 
an exclusivist strategy towards precarious employees in the sector. By sharp 
contrast, their counterparts in Italian telecoms opted for a revitalisation strategy, 
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acted as a ‘sword of justice’ and adopted an inclusive strategy embracing the 
‘outsiders’ in the sector. 
 
8.6. Institutional Change in the Mediterranean Capitalism and Wage 
Bargaining in the Context of the Eurozone Crisis 
 
Undoubtedly, the current global economic crisis has the potential to destabilise 
models of capitalism, and certainly arrangements in the industrial relations realm. 
Yet, there is little consensus on where the countries are heading or how to 
conceptualise current trajectories of change. For instance, some scholars argue 
that Coordinated Market Economies such as Germany are well on a path towards 
convergence to the Liberal Market model (Streeck, 2010). On the contrary, other 
scholars suggest that Germany retains a shrinking but resistant core of ‘CME-
type’ institutional configuration (Hassel, 2011), which assisted greatly in the 
recent impressive recovery of the German economy. 
 
The current politico-economic juncture poses further problems for the way we 
understand the mechanisms of institutional change. In the past, institutional 
change in models of capitalism was perceived as an incremental and path-
dependent process, with the pressures of global markets from intensification of 
competition increasing slowly over time. The reforms and institutional changes 
were a result of the interactions between domestic actors (business, labour, and 
the state), who carved out their strategies and forged coalitions which drove the  
changes in the institutions. Instead, we now observe that changes are swift and 
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abrupt, and that global financial markets are able to put tremendous pressures on 
nation-states. 
 
The countries from the Mediterranean capitalism are tragic protagonists in the 
Euro-zone crisis. Greece and Portugal have already been bailed out by the 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while Spain and 
Italy are considered as the top candidates for a ‘contagion’ from the sovereign 
debt crisis. Intuitively, this is not totally surprising. Given the ‘incoherence’ in the 
political economy of Mediterranean model of capitalism, the countries’ 
competitiveness problems manifest themselves starkly during the crisis. Although 
the current sovereign debt problems cannot be fully explained by VoC insights, 
the VoC framework suggests that the absence of ‘institutional complementarities’ 
will exacerbate the problems of competitiveness in Mediterranean capitalist 
countries. Thus, their vulnerabilities will be exposed in the context of a deepening 
recession, and global markets will doubt their ability to repay debt, increasing the 
‘spreads’ and downgrading their credit ratings. It worths, however, asking the 
question what future trajectories of change should we expect for this group of 
countries? 
 
The crisis presents those countries with a huge exogenous shock. The pressures 
from global financial markets clearly put Mediterranean capitalism on a path 
towards becoming more liberalised and converging to the Liberal Market model. 
Still, institutional change in the bailed out cases is not anymore the outcome of 
interactions between domestic actors, as happened in the past in advanced 
industrialised countries. Instead, national governments seem to be ‘with the back 
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against the wall’ limited to second-mover role. We observe that changes and 
reforms are swift and abrupt, and that international actors such as the EU and the 
IMF are involved – more than ever before – in domestic institutional change, 
even in realms that are beyond ‘EU competencies’. Indeed, in the bailed out cases 
of Greece and Portugal, the ‘troika’ of the IMF, the European Commission, and 
the European Central Bank accentuates the pressures for ‘LME-type’ reforms. 
The pressures are less direct, but equally evident in the Italian and Spanish cases. 
These extraordinary conditions force national governments to pursue reforms and 
changes that –perhaps– were not part of their agenda. 
 
In the industrial relations realm, the current recession will likely intensify the 
pressures towards wage bargaining institutions within the Mediterranean 
capitalism countries. This thesis suggested that common pressures may be 
refracted differently across countries, depending on different coalitions between 
domestic actors. However, the involvement of international actors in domestic 
institutional change ‘re-shuffles the cards’ in the game. The case of the 
IMF/EC/ECB ‘troika’ insistence to allow the derogation in sectoral wage 
agreements in Greece (i.e. firm level agreements allowed to set wages below 
sectoral minima) is illustrative. The possibility for derogation was imposed top-
down, but was not implemented by labour market actors bottom-up. Although the 
government enacted the law that allowed this option (leading to a change in the 
regulatory framework), trade unions and firms did not use this possibility, so 
  
291 
there was no actual change in outcomes. In the face of this, the ‘troika’ suggested 
the complete abandonment of sectoral wage bargaining.
272
 
 
The thesis suggested that the consent of labour market actors is critical for the 
implementation of any labour market reform. It was shown that in any such 
process of institutional change the ‘representation of interests’ matters and the 
different coalitions between actors may well lead to divergent institutional 
configurations and labour market outcomes. For instance, the IMF applauded the 
reform of the wage bargaining system in Spain, which was expected to ‘to 
increase flexibility at the firm-level’ and ultimately increase competitiveness.
273
 
However, this institutional change in Spain had the consent of labour market 
actors, who had signed earlier a social pact for the overhaul of the system.
274
 As a 
result, the implementation is likely to be more successful and lead to a change in 
outcomes. In sum, the complete abolition of sectoral wage bargaining is not 
necessarily the best way forward and may be based on a false pre-crisis 
understanding of the link between labour market institutions and economic 
competitiveness. 
 
In conclusion, one of the insights of the thesis was that wage bargaining 
institutions are not intrinsically ‘rigid’, but may be restructured to meet new 
needs, as long as the collective actors can forge the requisite coalitions and pursue 
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compromises. Wage bargaining may still have advantages for firms by ensuring 
fair competition, minimising transaction costs, and assisting in business 
restructuring. Even more, if flexibility is introduced via the ‘negotiated’ route of 
wage agreements (as opposed to being ‘imposed’) the implementation of 
governmental labour market reforms is better safeguarded. These insights are 
likely to hold even in the context of a deepening recession. 
 
Indeed, the Harvard economist, Richard Freeman, argued that wage bargaining 
institutions can act as a ‘countervailing power’ to irresponsible financiers and 
may well be part of the way out of the recession: 
‘The financial implosion and global recession have, it is safe to conclude, 
demolished the case that labour institutions are the main source of weakness in a 
capitalist economy. […] I argue that by reducing economic inequality and raising 
the purchasing power of the bulk of the work force, collective bargaining can 
contribute to a healthy recovery from global recession. […] Collective bargaining 
and wage regulation put a downward floor on deflationary pressures. Stabilizing 
wages reduces uncertainty about future labour costs and prices. The reduction in 
uncertainty raises business investment and hiring decisions, which depend greatly 
on expectations…’(2011:258-267). 
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